Syracuse University

SURFACE
Dissertations - ALL

SURFACE

August 2019

Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear
Powers
Giles David Arceneaux
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Arceneaux, Giles David, "Beyond the Rubicon: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers" (2019).
Dissertations - ALL. 1080.
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1080

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact
surface@syr.edu.

Abstract

What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in emerging nuclear
powers? Why do some states implement robust administrative, physical, and technical controls
over their nuclear arsenals, while others limit safeguards against nuclear use?
The nature of a state’s nuclear command and control systems underpin the deterrent
capacity of a state’s nuclear arsenal, determine the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized
nuclear use, and affect the likelihood of conventional conflict escalating across the nuclear
threshold. Despite the importance of command and control systems for nuclear stability and
security, however, detailed analysis on the sources of nuclear command and control remain
scarce outside the context of the Cold War superpowers. Current explanations of command and
control in regional nuclear powers are largely built upon lessons from the U.S. nuclear
experience, but these explanations prove unpersuasive under empirical scrutiny.
In this dissertation, I analyze the origins of command and control systems in regional
nuclear powers. My dissertation makes three broad contributions to the study of nuclear strategy
and operations. First, I develop a typology of nuclear command and control systems that
measures the administrative, physical, and technical controls that a state deploys over its nuclear
arsenal. With these indicators, I identify three ideal types of command and control that categorize
command and control frameworks by when political leaders delegate the capability to use
nuclear weapons to lower-level commanders: delegative control systems that delegate nuclear
use capability during peacetime, conditional control systems that delegate nuclear use capability
early in crises, and assertive control systems that delegate nuclear use capability late in crises.

Second, I provide a theoretical framework that incorporates three variables to explain
variation in command and control arrangements across regional nuclear powers: the presence of
a conventionally superior adversary, the severity of domestic threats to the political regime, and
the level of military organizational autonomy. This framework generates specific predictions for
command and control outcomes in regional nuclear powers and identifies the conditions under
which each variable influences command and control systems.
Third, I evaluate my argument and a series of alternative explanations with a combination
of historical and primary source material. Specifically, I draw upon archival and original
interview data with political and military elites from India, Pakistan, and apartheid-South Africa
to describe and explain nuclear command and control arrangements in these states. By
employing extensive primary source evidence to evaluate the competing perspectives, my
dissertation offers the descriptive accuracy and theoretical leverage necessary to explain
command and control arrangements in regional nuclear powers.
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1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

What factors explain the origins of command and control systems in emerging nuclear
powers? Why do some states implement robust administrative, physical, and technical controls
over their nuclear arsenals while others limit safeguards against accidental and unauthorized
nuclear use?
Command and control systems refer to a state’s operational procedures for the
management, deployment, and potential release of nuclear weapons.1 As such, command and
control frameworks represent the core institutions responsible for managing nuclear operations.
Despite the importance of these systems for nuclear arsenal safety, security, and reliability,
however, researchers are yet to provide an empirically based account of the origins of command
and control in emerging nuclear nations. Indeed, detailed study on the sources of command and
control remains scarce outside the context of the Cold War superpowers.2 A review of the recent
literature on nuclear strategy and proliferation supports this observation, noting that “Almost no
attention has been focused on support, command and control, and the policy apparatus of nuclear
capabilities.”3

1

This definition borrows from Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and
International Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 4.
2
Cold War-era studies include: Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1985); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
(New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1983); Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket,
eds., Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987); Peter Douglas Feaver,
Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1992).
3
Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, “Nukes with Numbers: Empirical Research on the Consequences of Nuclear
Weapons for International Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 19 (May 2016), p. 408.

2
To date, theoretical frameworks developed by Peter Feaver and Scott Sagan over twenty
years ago remain the most direct attempts to explain command and control in emerging nuclear
nations.4 These studies emphasize a fundamental challenge facing command and control systems
known as the “always/never dilemma,” in which decision-makers “want a high assurance that the
weapons will always work when directed and a similar assurance that they will never be used in
the absence of authorized direction.”5 Importantly, these studies demonstrate that any effort to
guarantee the reliability of a nuclear arsenal undermines the safeguards against accidental and
unauthorized nuclear use, while any attempt to increase the safety and security of an arsenal
makes nuclear forces more vulnerable to an adversary’s first strike.6 As a result, states face
severe tradeoffs in arsenal safety, security, and reliability when establishing command and
control systems.
These foundational studies identify two ideal types of command and control that seek to
address the challenges of the always/never dilemma: first, assertive control systems that
centralize nuclear weapons under political authority; and second, delegative control systems that
give lower-ranking military commanders the authority and ability to use nuclear weapons.7
Assertive control prioritizes ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used without authorization,
while delegative control guarantees that an arsenal is always prepared for use by emphasizing the
reliability and responsiveness of nuclear weapons. Existing theories extend lessons from the U.S.
nuclear experience to explain variation in command and control arrangements along the

Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3
(Winter 1992/93), pp. 160-187; Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control
Systems,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers
Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 16-46.
5
Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” p. 163.
6
Ibid., pp. 163-165.
7
Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,” p. 36. For an elaborated discussion
on assertive and delegative control, see Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, pp. 7-12.
4
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assertive/delegative framework, including explanatory factors such as a state’s security
environment and patterns of civil-military relations.8
The frameworks proposed by Feaver and Sagan provide the most systematic attempts to
conceptualize and explain how states develop command and control systems in response to the
always/never dilemma.9 Nevertheless, I argue that the existing literature on nuclear command
and control suffers from three shortcomings.
First, the traditional assertive/delegative conceptual framework overlooks an important
distinction between command and control arrangements across nuclear states. Specifically, the
assertive/delegative framework views command and control decisions as fixed in time: states
either assert control over nuclear forces or delegate nuclear use capability to peripheral
commanders. For nuclear weapons to be deliverable, however, all states must eventually decide
to delegate control to lower-level military operators. The appropriate question when classifying
command and control systems is therefore not whether states delegate nuclear use capability to
lower levels of command, but rather when such delegation occurs.
Second, existing arguments fail to specify the conditions under which different variables
influence command and control decisions. As a result, existing theories are largely
indeterminate. For instance, when reviewing existing explanations for nuclear command and
control, Vipin Narang asks, “when a state’s security environment predicts one form of command
and control, but its civil-military structure predicts another, which variable is determinate and
under what circumstances?”10 Although the current literature offers several competing
Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations”; Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and
Command and Control Systems.”
9
Specifically, Vipin Narang labels Feaver’s work as “the best theoretical treatment of how nascent nuclear states
balance the so-called always/never problem.” Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 26.
10
Ibid.
8
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explanations for how particular factors influence command and control outcomes, no existing
argument identifies how states resolve competing pressures.
Third, due to a paucity of evidence from regional nuclear powers when scholars
developed their theoretical frameworks, the existing literature on nuclear command and control
is almost exclusively built upon deductively derived lessons from the U.S. experience.11 Recent
research, however, demonstrates that the opportunities and constraints confronting regional
nuclear powers differ significantly from those faced by the U.S. during its formative nuclear
period.12 For instance, whereas the U.S. and Soviet Union engaged in a decades-long nuclear
arms race supported by massive financial expenditures, other nuclear states often face a wide
range of domestic and external security threats and experience financial constraints when
developing nuclear doctrine. In the absence of evidence from beyond the Cold War superpowers,
current understandings of command and control in emerging nuclear powers are built upon
uncertain empirical foundations.
My dissertation addresses the three challenges facing the current academic literature on
nuclear command and control. First, I develop a conceptual framework that identifies three ideal
types of command and control: delegative command and control systems that grant lower-level
military commanders the ability to use nuclear weapons during peacetime; conditional command
and control systems that maintain centralized political control during peacetime, but rapidly
delegate nuclear use capability early in a crisis; and assertive command and control systems that
tightly manage nuclear operations deep into crises. My conceptual framework accounts for the

Feaver notes this challenge, stating: “Reliable data on existing or developing systems of command and control in
emerging nuclear nations are scarce.” Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” p. 160.
12
On the potential problems of extending lessons from the U.S. Cold War experience to other nuclear states, see
Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, pp. 1-8.
11
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timing of delegation with respect to the onset of a crisis and identifies observable institutional
indicators of command and control systems that allow analysts to systematically classify
command and control arrangements in regional nuclear powers.
Second, I develop a theoretical framework that incorporates three variables to explain
command and control arrangements in emerging nuclear powers: first, the presence of a
conventionally superior adversary; second, the severity of domestic threats to the political
regime; and third, the level of military organizational autonomy. This framework generates
falsifiable predictions for command and control outcomes and specifies the conditions under
which each factor shapes command and control arrangements in nuclear states.
Third, I evaluate my argument with evidence from several regional nuclear powers.
Specifically, I describe and explain nuclear command and control systems in India, Pakistan, and
apartheid-era South Africa. I employ historical, archival, and—for each case—original interview
data with political and military elites. By incorporating extensive primary source data, my
dissertation provides greater descriptive reliability and allows for an empirical evaluation of my
theory and the alternative explanations.
This chapter proceeds in two sections. First, I provide a review of the existing literature
on nuclear proliferation and strategy to identify several theoretical gaps in the literature and to
demonstrate the contributions of my dissertation to these research programs. I show that current
explanations of command and control in regional nuclear powers are built upon faulty theoretical
underpinnings, primarily due to an attempt by scholars to generalize lessons from the U.S.’s
Cold War experience without empirically evaluating the viability of these assumptions in
regional nuclear powers. In large part, this reliance on Cold War insights persists due to an
emphasis on the study of nuclear proliferation, rather than systematic analysis on the post-

6
proliferation behavior of nuclear states. Within this section, I also show how my project
contributes to the long-standing optimist/pessimist debate by providing empirical evidence to
evaluate the claims of each camp. Second, I provide an overview of the plan of the dissertation.
This section outlines the theoretical and empirical chapters that I provide to support my claims.

Literature Review
My dissertation contributes to three research programs within the broader field of nuclear
strategy and operations. First, my project builds upon the literature on nuclear posture by
providing an explanation for a core operational component of nuclear behavior in the postproliferation phase. Second, my research focuses on regional nuclear powers and shows that
these states face a set of structural and domestic constraints unlike those faced by the Cold War
superpowers. I argue that these constraints shape nuclear decision-making in meaningful ways.
Finally, I contribute to the longstanding optimist/pessimist debate, which questions the degree to
which continued proliferation is dangerous for stability and security. For each research program,
I provide a review of the literature, evaluate the state of the debates, and identify the
contributions of my dissertation.

Nuclear Proliferation and Posture
One major research program to which my project contributes is the growing literature on
nuclear posture.13 The recent development of research on nuclear posture is significant in two

For the original statement on nuclear posture, see Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear
Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 38-78.
13
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regards. First, the nuclear posture research program notes that, while scholars have extensively
evaluated the causes of nuclear proliferation, far less has been done to explain how states behave
once they have acquired nuclear weapons.14 Although scholars and practitioners broadly agree
that further nuclear proliferation is undesirable, Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities and
North Korea’s rapid expansion of warheads and delivery platforms provide contemporary
evidence that states still strive to develop nuclear capabilities and the spread of nuclear weapons
is likely to continue.15 The overemphasis on proliferation studies has detracted from our
understanding of how states such as Iran and North Korea will behave in the post-proliferation
phase. As a result, both scholars and practitioners are underprepared for engaging with the
prospective challenges of continued proliferation.
The nuclear posture research program is built upon a simple but important insight: the
danger of nuclear proliferation is not merely that more states possess nuclear weapons, but rather
that the ways in which states deploy and manage their arsenals after acquiring nuclear weapons
influence the likelihood of nuclear use. By focusing on the physical capabilities, deployment
patterns, and command and control systems of nuclear states, the nuclear posture research
program offers an opportunity to address a series of important questions left unanswered by

Several significant arguments include: Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 1 (February 2007), pp. 167-194; Scott Sagan, “Why Do
States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter
1996/97), pp. 54-86; Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Christopher Way and Jessica L. P. Weeks, “Making it Personal: Regime
Type and Nuclear Proliferation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No. 3 (July 2014), pp. 705-719.
For useful overviews of the proliferation literature, see: Mark S. Bell, “Examining Explanations for Nuclear
Proliferation,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (September 2016), pp. 520-529; Scott D. Sagan, “The
Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 1 (June 2011), pp. 225244.
15
R. Scott Kemp has recently argued that supply-side controls on proliferation are unlikely to prevent proliferation.
Instead, any nonproliferation effort must manage to reduce the demand for nuclear weapons. As stated here,
however, certain states maintain desires for nuclear weapons, and proliferation is likely to persist. See R. Scott
Kemp, “The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge, Supply-Side Controls, and the Future
of Nuclear Proliferation,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Spring 2014), pp. 39-78.
14
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proliferation studies.16 By extension, the study of nuclear posture challenges a prevalent
assumption in international relations theory of “existential deterrence,” which posits that the
mere possession of nuclear weapons constrains aggressive behavior in nuclear states, and also
fosters robust deterrence of conventional and nuclear conflict.17 Studies of nuclear posture
challenge the assumption of existential deterrence by showing that states demonstrate a wide
range of behaviors after acquiring nuclear weapons and that different nuclear doctrines have
unequal effects on the effectiveness of conventional deterrence.18
A second advancement made by the nuclear posture literature is the incorporation of
capability-centric arguments into a behavioral framework. Researchers often devote attention to
the size and quality of a state’s physical nuclear arsenal when evaluating nuclear powers.19 In
such accounts, however, physical capabilities are the primary explanatory variables for nuclear
16

These three aspects of posture—capabilities, deployment patterns, and command and control procedures—are
drawn from Narang, “Posturing for Peace?”, p. 41.
17
For the original statement on existential deterrence, see McGeorge Bundy, “The Bishops and the Bomb,” New
York Review of Books, June 16, 1983. For an existential deterrence argument, see Marc Trachtenberg, “The
Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985),
pp.137-163. Existential deterrence also lies at the core of arguments in favor of “the nuclear revolution,” which
argues that the mere possession of nuclear weapons provides sufficient deterrence to protect a state from external
aggression. For influential examples, see: Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the
Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and
Political Realities,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 731-745.
18
For instance, Mark Bell demonstrates that the acquisition of nuclear weapons can lead to a broader range of
foreign policy outcomes than simple emboldenment. A state may become more aggressive regarding existing goals,
expand its goals to incorporate new objectives, seek independence from the influence of its allies, bolster the
credibility of an alliance, become more steadfast during conflict, or even become more willing to compromise
during conflict. The central point of Bell’s argument is simple, yet significant: different nuclear states engage in a
diverse set of behaviors after proliferation. For a discussion of the ways in which nuclear weapons may change
foreign policy, see Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign
Policy,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Summer 2015), pp. 87-119. On the deterrent effectiveness of
different nuclear postures, see Vipin Narang, “What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and
International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 57, No. 3 (June 2013), pp. 478-508.
19
See, for example, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD?: The Nuclear Dimension of U.S.
Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 7-44; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The
Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 6 (November/December 2009),
pp. 39-51; Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.” For a recent debate on the importance of numerical
nuclear superiority for crisis bargaining, see: Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve:
Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 141-171;
Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization,
Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 173-195.
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state behavior, and scholars deemphasize the processes of arsenal management. The nuclear
force structure of a state is an important point of connection between the proliferation and
posture literatures, but it must be incorporated into a broader behavioral scheme in order to
provide an explanation for variation in foreign policy outputs.20 Studying the more holistic
system of how these capabilities are managed and deployed strengthens inference regarding how
a state might operate in practice, rather than merely estimating that state’s intentions.21 This more
complete understanding of nuclear behavior is essential to developing policy-relevant empirical
findings and exemplifies the value of continued research on nuclear posture.
The study of nuclear posture represents significant progress in the field of nuclear
strategy and operations, but several extensions of the debate merit further consideration. Notably,
research to date has largely focused on the effect of different nuclear postures on deterrence
outcomes.22 This perspective, however, only addresses one dimension of state behavior in the
post-proliferation period.23 Beyond studying the effects of nuclear posture on the efficacy of
deterrence, further research is needed to understand the broader spectrum of how a state’s
nuclear posture affects its foreign policy behavior. In practice, measuring deterrence outcomes

See Erik Gartzke, Jeffrey M. Kaplow, and Rupal N. Mehta, “The Determinants of Nuclear Force Structure,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 3 (April 2014), pp. 481-505 for a definition of and argument on the
sources of nuclear force structures.
21
Peter Feaver notes the shortcomings of a purely capability-centered study of nuclear strategy, stating that “these
measures are useful for estimating what a new nuclear nation might intend to do with its arsenal,” but they fail to
account for “how the nuclear organization itself might in fact behave.” Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging
Nuclear Nations,” p. 160. Emphasis in original.
22
See, for example, Vipin Narang, “What Does It Take to Deter?”.
23
One notable exception to this statement is provided by Mark Bell, who offers a theoretical framework for
explaining why states pursue different strategies after acquiring nuclear weapons. Bell argues that three structural
factors explain the variation in nuclear doctrines after proliferation: first, the presence of territorial threats; second,
allies and security guarantors; and third, trends in relative power ratios between a state and its rivals. These factors
are both substantially and sequentially important in Bell’s framework—states make different decisions regarding
their foreign policy outputs by first evaluating existential threats, then evaluating external security guarantees, and
finally estimating the relative power trends vis-à-vis their adversaries. On these points, see Mark S. Bell, “Nuclear
Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics,” Journal of Strategic Studies,
Vol. 42, No. 1 (January 2019), pp. 3-28.
20
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ultimately reveals more about an adversary’s cost-benefit calculations than it shows regarding
the behavioral changes within a nuclear-armed state. Although the research on deterrence
outcomes analyzes an important dimension of nuclear proliferation, the nuclear posture research
program requires additional analysis of behavioral foreign policy outputs to help scholars and
policymakers understand the conditions under which nuclear proliferation is most dangerous for
regional and international security.
My dissertation contributes to the nuclear posture research program in three ways. First,
by providing a theory of nuclear command and control systems, I extend the logic of the nuclear
posture research program to explain an important dimension of nuclear strategy and operations.
This shifts the study of nuclear posture beyond its current focus on deterrence outcomes and
captures an understudied institutional aspect of nuclear doctrine. Second, I supplement
structurally based explanations of regional power nuclear foreign policies with domestic level
factors.24 By modeling the effects of internal factors such as domestic threats to the political
regime and the level of military organizational autonomy, I strengthen the theoretical
foundations of the nuclear posture research program and identify the specific conditions under
which each factor shapes command and control outcomes in emerging nuclear nations. Third, my
project highlights the importance of operational level factors for nuclear strategy. Recent work
within the nuclear posture research program has shown that the viability of a state’s nuclear
strategy is dependent upon its operational capabilities. For instance, although a significant

Mark Bell’s work on the behavior of nuclear states after proliferating represents the best example of a work in
nuclear posture that explains variation in foreign policy outputs. However, all three of the factors that explain
foreign policy outcomes in Bell’s typology—threats, alliances, and relative power ratios—are structural. Bell
explicitly notes that other factors are also likely to shape foreign policy decisions, stating: “Other plausible
explanations might exist for the ways in which nuclear acquisition affects foreign policy – perhaps identifying
variables in the domestic politics of the state, or the psychology of particular leaders, or international norms.” Ibid.,
p. 25.
24
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portion of the literature on nuclear strategy views secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to
survive an adversary’s preemptive strike and respond with nuclear force—as easily obtainable,25
scholars have recently shown that technological advancements and operational challenges
undermine the basis of this assumption.26 I build upon this observation by showing that the
operational decisions states make regarding nuclear command and control systems significantly
shape the survivability of second-strike capabilities and the strategic options available to states
make for promoting arsenal reliability.

Regional Nuclear Powers
A second research program to which my dissertation contributes is the analysis of
regional nuclear powers. Although several scholars have identified the arrival of a “second
nuclear age,” most theories of nuclear strategy and operations are built upon lessons from the
U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War.27 Regional nuclear powers, however, face different

25

For examples, see: Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1990), pp. 95-97, 320; Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear
Posture Review’s New Missions,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84-126; Charles L. Glaser
and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward
China,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 49-98; Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American
Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution.
26
Important works include: Owen R. Cote, Jr., “Invisible Nuclear-Armed Submarines, or Transparent Oceans? Are
Ballistic Missile Submarines Still the Best Deterrent for the United States?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.
75, No. 1 (January 2019), pp. 30-35; Owen R. Cote, Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold
War Struggle with Soviet Submarines (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003); Brendan R. Green and
Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” Security
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Summer 2017), pp. 606-641; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of
Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4
(Spring 2017), pp. 9-49; Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike:
Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, Nos. 1-2 (January 2015),
pp. 38-73.
27
For examples, see: Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New
York, N.Y.: Times Books, 2012); Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner, 1999);
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the
Ultimate Weapon (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012).
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opportunities and constraints than those that faced the U.S. and Soviet Union, including smaller
arsenals, conventional and nuclear regional adversaries, and often weaker domestic political
institutions.28
Existing explanations of the origins of command and control in regional nuclear powers
require revision for three reasons. First, because much of the literature was developed before the
most recent wave of proliferators operationalized their nuclear arsenals, existing explanations of
regional nuclear power command and control systems are highly deductive and lack extensive
evaluation with evidence from these states.29 Second, scholars have mistakenly applied
assumptions from the United States experience to regional nuclear power decision-making in
ways that misguide the analysis. For instance, assuming strong civilian control of the military
overlooks the role of politically influential military organizations in some regional powers,
which may shape nuclear decision-making. Third, attempts to extrapolate lessons from the U.S.
case to regional nuclear powers have facilitated the omission of influential variables that shape
the behavior of recent proliferators, such as the availability of third-party nuclear patrons and
domestic threats to the ruling political regime.30 As a result, the Cold War foundations
underlying current explanations of command and control in regional nuclear powers are
empirically thin and potentially theoretically misleading.
The problems of extending Cold War insights to modern nuclear states create challenges
for both the descriptive and explanatory dimensions of research on command and control

On these points and for a discussion on how the “Cold War hangover” negatively affects the study of
contemporary proliferators, see Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, pp. 1-8.
29
These recent proliferators include India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Many explanations were also researched
before South Africa’s 1993 statement revealing that it had decommissioned its nuclear arsenal.
30
On the unique role of third-party patrons in the nuclear strategy of regional nuclear powers, see Narang, Nuclear
Strategy in the Modern Era, pp. 31-34.
28
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systems in regional nuclear powers. Descriptively, these problems are apparent in the
conceptualization of command and control. The concept of command and control entered the
academic mainstream in the mid-1980s, but its study quickly fell out of favor with the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991. As a result, Cold War lessons dominate the conceptual work on
command and control, and the “Cold War hangover” appears to be particularly pronounced in
the description and analysis of command and control in regional nuclear powers.31 Theorizing on
nuclear matters became seemingly obsolete in the post-Cold War environment and advancements
in the understanding of command and control systems slowed dramatically. For this reason,
employment of the concept often lacks resonance within the broader literature and persists
without a unified definition.32
For example, early works by Paul Bracken and Bruce Blair define command and control
in general terms, incorporating a variety of components such as physical controls, institutional
patterns of decision-making, and information processing.33 These broad definitions, however, do
not systematically identify the institutional dimensions of command and control arrangements,
which further precludes an explanation of how these institutions affect political behavior. Neither
Bracken nor Blair offers a concrete method for operationalizing and measuring the concept of
command and control,34 which inhibits the systematization of the concept, clarification of key

On the “Cold War hangover,” see ibid., pp. 1-8.
For a discussion on the criteria of concepts and conceptualization, see John Gerring, Social Science Methodology:
A Unified Framework, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 107-140, especially pp. 117-119
as it pertains to the resonance of a concept.
33
Bracken defines command and control systems as “an arrangement of facilities, personnel, procedures, and means
of information acquisition, processing, and dissemination used by a commander in planning, directing, and
controlling military operations.” Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, p. 3. Blair defines
command and control more broadly as “C3I,” or “command, control, communications, and intelligence.” See Blair,
Strategic Command and Control, especially chapter 1.
34
Bracken does identify the importance of political institutions in this process. He states, “For ensuring that a
military commander does not start a nuclear war on his own…the restraints are more institutional than physical.”
Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, p. 23. The core of the critique here, however, is that
31
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indicators, and scoring of cases in a systematic and replicable manner.35 These studies offer
valuable contributions to the study of U.S. command and control arrangements, but the lack of a
systematized concept prevents scholars from extending their analyses to regional nuclear powers.
Noting these shortcomings, Peter Feaver proposed a definition of command and control
on a spectrum of assertive and delegative control, which represent a high degree of civilian
control over military affairs and greater decision-making autonomy for the military,
respectively.36 By identifying a specific spectrum along which command and control can be
measured, Feaver fosters greater conceptual precision for the study of command and control.
Creating this spectrum also allows Feaver to tie the concept of command and control directly to
the literature on civil-military relations, especially Samuel Huntington’s work on civilian control
of the military.37 This is an important contribution because the concept of civil-military relations
substantially overlaps with command and control, but previous work only indirectly identified
this relationship. The decision to delegate control of nuclear assets, for example, is an inherently
political process that captures a central component of civil-military relations: the delegation of de
facto power from a superior power to a subordinate entity.38 Nevertheless, general theories of

speaking of institutional control in the abstract is insufficient to identify the importance of key institutional features
when classifying command and control arrangements.
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This approach—systematizing a concept, specifying the indicators, and systematically scoring cases—derives
from Robert Adcock and David Collier, “Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative
Research,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3 (September 2001), pp. 529-546.
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civilians allow the military to specialize in military affairs without civilian intervention. Subjective civilian control,
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take the form of hierarchical political institutions or constitutional provisions. For a full discussion of objective
versus subjective civilian control, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, M.A.: Belknap, 1957), pp. 80-97.
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essential element of that form of control: a bequeathal of de facto power to an otherwise subordinate element.”
Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, p. 7.
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civil-military relations do not clearly specify the relationship between civilians and military
leaders in the institutional management of nuclear weapons. By reframing patterns of command
and control along a spectrum of assertive and delegative control, Feaver’s model provides an
opportunity to capture both the institutional and civil-military aspects of command and control
systems.
This model, however, also faces challenges when applied to regional nuclear powers. A
central problem for Feaver’s framework is its presupposition of civilian control over the military.
This problem is further compounded by attempts to portray civil-military dynamics within the
principal-agent framework, where civilians behave as principals and military operators serve as
agents. For the U.S., the strategic interaction and hierarchy of civil-military relations is a core
feature that facilitates principal-agent analysis; however, the assumption that nuclear decisions
are universally administered by civilians is empirically inaccurate in several cases.39 Pakistan, for
instance, has a long history of military involvement in political affairs, especially the
development and management of the state’s nuclear program.40 Consequently, this framework
may fail to capture political-military dynamics at work in regional nuclear powers.
An overreliance on lessons from the U.S. experience also presents problems for the
dominant explanatory frameworks for command and control in regional nuclear powers.
Although twenty-five years have passed since its publication, Peter Feaver’s landmark work on
command and control in emerging nuclear nations remains the most direct attempt to explain
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University Press, 2003). For a helpful overview of principal-agent models, see Gary J. Miller, “The Political
Evolution of Principal-Agent Models,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8 (June 2005), pp. 203-225.
40
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command and control in new nuclear states.41 When developing his argument, however, Feaver
faced a severe paucity of empirical data on regional nuclear power command and control
systems. The most recent nuclear event at this time was India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in
1974, which was not followed by another openly-acknowledged nuclear test until India and
Pakistan formally tested nuclear weapons in 1998.42 As a result, Feaver was forced to extrapolate
lessons from the U.S. experience and established a deductively-derived framework for
explaining the origins of an emerging nuclear state’s command and control systems.43 Since this
argument was first proposed, however, no systematic attempt has been made to evaluate the
empirical veracity of the framework. Consequently, the conventional wisdom on command and
control in regional nuclear powers is built upon unproven theoretical and empirical foundations.
My dissertation employs evidence from regional nuclear powers to improve research on
command and control systems in two ways. First, I systematize the concept of command and
control along a series of institutional dimensions to help scholars compare and analyze nuclear
operations across emerging proliferators. By doing so, I provide a conceptual framework
independent of assumptions regarding a state’s patterns of civil-military relations or nuclear
force structure that facilitates evaluation of the potential for accidental or unauthorized nuclear
use. Second, the use of extensive primary source data from regional nuclear powers allows me to
test the explanatory power of my theory and the existing explanations for command and control.

Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations.” Vipin Narang recently labeled Feaver’s argument
as “the best theoretical treatment of how nascent nuclear states balance the so-called always/never problem.”
Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 26.
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With these data, I am able to evaluate the extent to which Cold War frameworks should inform
the analysis of command and control in emerging nuclear nations and offer an alternative
explanation that captures domestic and international factors that shape regional nuclear power
decision-making to a greater extent than the Cold War superpowers.

Nuclear Optimism and Pessimism
A third stream of literature to which this project contributes is the debate between nuclear
optimists and pessimists.44 The concept of command and control systems is central to this
longstanding debate. The core disagreement between optimists and pessimists centers on the
likelihood of nuclear use by emerging nuclear powers, whether intentionally or unintentionally.45
Proliferation optimists emphasize the outcome-based stability of nuclear states by focusing on
the ability of nuclear weapons to suppress the concerns of escalation.46 Because nuclear arsenals
inhibit conflict by providing robust deterrence, optimists advance the outcome-based conclusion
that nuclear weapons have inherently stabilizing qualities. For a nuclear optimist, smaller
arsenals are easier to manage and can easily be made survivable via rudimentary concealment
measures that promote safeguards against nuclear use, which reduces the need for states to
delegate launch authority to peripheral commanders in order to promote arsenal survivability.
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Furthermore, because other states realize that a first strike cannot entirely destroy an adversary’s
nuclear arsenal, even the smallest of arsenals provides a state with reliable security from external
aggression.47
In stark contrast, proliferation pessimists assert that the spread of nuclear weapons has
dangerous implications for regional security.48 Members of the pessimist school contend that
these states are not content to trust in existential deterrence and consider attacks on their arsenal
a real possibility.49 This suggests that proliferators with small arsenals fear for the survivability
of their nuclear capacity and increase the potential for nuclear accidents by delegating authority
to lower levels of authority. To a much greater degree than optimists, pessimists focus on the
potential for command and control failures that lead to accidental or unauthorized nuclear use.
This school notes three potential points of failure: first, emerging nuclear nations are likely to
experience significant technical difficulties in establishing command and control systems;
second, nuclear confrontations generated “near misses” in the Cold War context and are likely to
do so in new nuclear states; and third, these concerns afflict certain proliferators to a greater
degree than others.50 These three points suggest that command and control systems are

This characterization of nuclear optimism coincides with Peter Feaver’s definition of neooptimism. I mention the
original works on nuclear optimism—what Feaver terms “paleooptimism”—in passing because modern scholars of
nuclear optimism and pessimism are both critical of the simplistic existential deterrence arguments of paleooptimists. As Feaver notes, however, the essence of the neooptimist argument is still built upon the logic of
existential deterrence. Feaver, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation.” On the command
and control advantages of small arsenals, see Seng, “Less is More.” On the ability of small arsenals to deter
preventive nuclear attacks, see Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers.”
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For examples of nuclear pessimism, see Feaver, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear
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Nuclear Weapons,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66-107; Sagan’s chapters in Sagan and
Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
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technologically demanding, and that the robustness of these systems is likely to be challenged by
crises or simple accidents.51
The optimist/pessimist debate began in earnest in the early-1980s, when Kenneth Waltz
challenged the widespread acceptance of nuclear pessimism amongst scholars and policymakers
alike.52 Waltz argued that the spread of nuclear weapons encouraged conventional military
stability between the great powers, and as a result, U.S. policymakers should support the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.53 This argument became more influential over time as scholars
increasingly cited a “nuclear revolution,” which argues that the destructive power of nuclear
weapons makes military victory impossible, thereby reducing the incentives for aggression and
fostering peace and stability.54 By the early-1990s, nuclear optimism gained support from
notable scholars such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, although with certain
qualifications to Waltz’s original argument.55
Perhaps the most influential response to the optimist perspective came from Scott Sagan,
who demonstrated an extensive history of near misses during the development of the U.S. arsenal

On the challenges of “normal accidents” to command and control systems, see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of
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and provided a theoretical basis for expecting the same challenges to affect emerging
proliferators.56 Scholars continued to debate the logic underpinning each camp’s claims in light
of evidence from the U.S. experience, but by the end of the 1990s, the optimist/pessimist debate
had stalled and deep theoretical divisions remained.57
As a result of the pause in the optimist/pessimist debate, several theoretical issues persist
for each position. For example, nuclear optimism is effectively an extension of the existential
deterrence literature. Although nuclear weapons certainly provide significant deterrent value, two
major problems remain with optimist accounts. First, conventional and sub-conventional
conflicts may occur under the nuclear shadow, and escalation from the conventional to the
nuclear level remains possible.58 Indeed, the South Asian experience has demonstrated that
nuclear weapons may facilitate low-level conflict that creates significant instability.59 Second,
even if a state’s arsenal provides robust deterrence against aggressive action by an adversary, it
does not necessarily follow that the state will assume safer, more assertive patterns of command

On this point, see Sagan, The Limits of Safety, and Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation.”
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and control. If a state believes that it can deter its immediate adversaries from nuclear use,
regional nuclear powers—especially those with smaller arsenals—may still feel threatened by
the potential for a debilitating conventional first strike.60 This perspective also precludes the
potential for domestic-level factors to meaningfully shape nuclear decision-making processes
and ascribes nearly all explanatory power to structural factors. Despite optimists’ claims that
existential deterrence will guarantee stability, states may still have incentives to adopt command
and control systems that increase the likelihood for accidental or unauthorized nuclear use.
Nuclear pessimism also suffers from one significant theoretical shortcoming.
Specifically, pessimists fail to explain why some states are more likely to adopt command and
control systems that are vulnerable to failure. Although nuclear pessimism provides a compelling
critique of nuclear optimism and offers reasons for concern regarding future proliferators, this
school of thought fails to offer guidance on which states will be most susceptible to command
and control failures. Regional nuclear powers have adopted a wide range of command and
control frameworks, with some states placing significant emphasis on safe and secure nuclear
management procedures. Without a more detailed theoretical basis, nuclear pessimists cannot
anticipate the conditions under which states are most likely to adopt command and control
frameworks that facilitate accidental or unwanted nuclear use.
In addition to these broader theoretical issues, both sides of the optimist/pessimist debate
suffer from a lack of empirical engagement. Although the optimist/pessimist debate provides a
useful framework for analyzing the dangers of nuclear proliferation, both camps are often highly
stylized and rarely subject their hypotheses to rigorous empirical testing. Instead, advocates for
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each perspective primarily engage in highly deductive theorizing with small samples of evidence
that comport with the proposed argument. Optimists support their argument by noting the
absence of nuclear conflict between states, while pessimists detail the history of near-misses for
nuclear accidents to demonstrate that inadvertent nuclear use can occur.61 However, neither
argument systematically substantiates its claims with evidence from recent proliferators. In the
absence of reference to regional nuclear powers, these theories fail to provide generalizable
conclusions and cannot offer guidance to policymakers on how to engage emerging nuclear
powers. To gauge the potential dangers of future proliferation, more systematic, empiricallydriven research must be done in the context of regional nuclear powers to determine the
conditions under which nuclear mismanagement is most likely.
My dissertation advances the optimist/pessimist debate in two ways. First, I contribute an
empirical dimension to the debate in order to evaluate the predictive capacity of each argument.
Importantly, I employ evidence from regional nuclear powers, including India, Pakistan, and
apartheid-era South Africa. In addition to the general value of conducting empirical evaluation of
the arguments, these cases are particularly useful, as they represent the proliferators whose
behavior the optimist/pessimist debate sought to predict. Second, by establishing a theoretical
framework to explain variation in command and control arrangements, I offer a systematic
approach for evaluating the likelihood of nuclear mismanagement in regional nuclear powers. I
focus on a series of institutional dimensions that allow policymakers to anticipate which
countries are vulnerable to accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. Although my argument lends
some support for the nuclear optimism perspective by showing that the majority of nuclear states
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pursue command and control frameworks that seek to reduce the likelihood of accidental or
unauthorized use, I also provide support for the nuclear pessimism school by showing that severe
conventional security threats cause states to adopt nuclear management practices that prioritize
arsenal reliability over the safety and security of nuclear weapons.

Plan of the Dissertation
The preceding review of the literature on nuclear strategy and operations suggests that a
revised approach is needed for evaluating command and control in emerging nuclear powers. In
this dissertation, I offer an empirically falsifiable framework for measuring and explaining
command and control in regional nuclear powers. The remaining chapters of the project proceed
as follows. Chapter 2 presents the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of my argument. In this
chapter, I describe my operationalization of the concept of command and control, develop the
logic underpinning my theoretical framework, and outline a series of alternative explanations.
Chapters 3 through 5 provide case-based analysis of India, Pakistan, and South Africa. For each
case, I descriptively characterize command and control arrangements, evaluate the empirical
validity of my theory, and consider the explanatory leverage of the alternative explanations.
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the project’s findings and contributions,
briefly evaluating the generalizability of my theory, and identifying avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
COMMAND AND CONTROL IN REGIONAL NUCLEAR POWERS

In this chapter, I develop a theory of command and control in emerging nuclear powers. I
argue that three factors determine command and control frameworks in nuclear states: first, the
presence of a conventionally superior adversary; second, the severity of domestic threats to the
political regime; and third, the degree of military organizational autonomy. These variables,
however, produce divergent pressures on command and control systems that require states to
make tradeoffs between the imperatives of arsenal reliability, safety, and security. My theory
specifies the interactions and sequencing of these variables to produce falsifiable predictions for
command and control outcomes and identifies the conditions under which states optimize their
arsenals in favor of reliability versus safety and security.
This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I operationalize the concept of command
and control. In this section, I highlight the dilemmas and tradeoffs inherent to nuclear
management operations and provide a new conceptual framework for classifying command and
control arrangements. Second, I develop the theoretical framework of my argument. This section
establishes the three variables included in my theory, describes the theoretical underpinnings of
each variable, and provides a decision-theoretic framework that models how these factors
interact to explain command and control outcomes. Third, I establish the logic and observable
implications of three alternative explanations to my argument. Finally, I describe the empirical
strategy employed in this study.
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Conceptual Framework: Nuclear Command and Control
Command and control systems are the operational means by which a state plans the
management, deployment, and potential release of nuclear weapons.1 As such, these systems are
responsible for ensuring a state’s nuclear arsenal is effectively prepared for launch if needed,
while also safeguarding against potential mismanagement that could result in unwanted nuclear
use. Although command and control issues are central to understanding the dangers of
proliferation, detailed analysis on the origins and effects of these systems remains scarce outside
the context of the Cold War superpower competition.2
In this section, I address two dimensions of the academic literature on nuclear command
and control systems. First, I discuss how the competing imperatives of arsenal security, safety,
and reliability produce opposing pressures on command and control decisions. Second, I explain
how different patterns of command and control address these tradeoffs and present a framework
for classifying command and control systems.

The Always/Never Dilemma
The most fundamental tension in command and control systems is the always/never
dilemma.3 This dilemma lies at the core of command and control decisions and is characterized
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by a pair of contending considerations that confront states when establishing nuclear
management frameworks: decision-makers simultaneously seek to guarantee that nuclear
weapons always launch when political leadership orders nuclear use, while also ensuring that
nuclear weapons are never used without proper authorization.
Three competing imperatives underlie the tensions posed by the always/never dilemma.
First, nuclear weapons must be reliable—whenever political leaders authorize the use of nuclear
forces, they must be successfully deployed. Second, a nuclear arsenal must be safe—weapons
should not detonate accidentally due to poor handling or flawed design. Third, nuclear weapons
must be secure—nuclear forces should not be launched without authorization from the proper
authorities.4 Importantly, however, each of these imperatives is subject to challenges that
exacerbate the always/never dilemma.
The primary threat to arsenal reliability is the risk of decapitation.5 Nuclear decapitation
refers to the ability of an adversary to launch a first strike that disables a state’s ability to respond
with nuclear force, whether by destroying warheads and delivery platforms or by disrupting
command and control systems so that coordinating retaliatory strikes becomes impossible.6 To
protect against decapitation and bolster arsenal reliability, states must ensure that the physical
arsenal and communication links to decision-makers survive an initial attack long enough to
enable nuclear retaliation.7 Fears of decapitation are particularly pronounced in regional nuclear
powers, which typically have moderately sized arsenals and low levels of redundancy built into
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command and control arrangements. For example, recent analyses on the nature of a potential
U.S.-China conflict underscore this concern and emphasize how U.S. military operations may
degrade China’s nuclear retaliatory capacity, thus incentivizing escalation by China to ensure
arsenal reliability and prevent nuclear decapitation.8
Nuclear safety is challenged by the prospect of accidental use, which entails the
unintentional launch of nuclear weapons due to mishandling, poor design, or some other
unintended cause.9 Previous work on nuclear management provides numerous examples of nearaccidents, and recent experiences highlight the persistence of these concerns.10 For example, in
2007 the United States Air Force accidentally loaded six nuclear weapons onto a B-52 bomber
aircraft at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, transported the weapons to Barksdale Air
Force Base in Louisiana, and allowed the warheads to remain unprotected on the runway for
approximately ten hours before Air Force personnel noticed that the bombers were carrying
nuclear weapons.11 This episode demonstrates that even in a country with robust command and
control institutions and decades of experience conducting nuclear operations, nuclear accidents
remain an important threat to safe command and control practices.
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Nuclear security faces the problem of unauthorized use, which refers to when the
custodians of nuclear weapons—typically military forces—use nuclear weapons without proper
authorization from political leadership.12 Unauthorized use can occur through one of two
pathways. First, an individual or group could purposefully subvert the chain of command to use
nuclear weapons without official approval from senior leadership. This pathway envisions a
scenario where a lower-level political or military commander “goes rogue” and contravenes
national policy by unilaterally electing to use the nuclear weapons under his or her control
without proper authorization. Second, during a moment of crisis, a field commander may
perceive defeat as imminent and elect to use nuclear weapons to prevent being overrun or losing
control of nuclear weapons to the adversary. During such crises, military operators may face a
“use them or lose them” scenario, where lower-level commanders elect to use nuclear weapons
without consulting higher levels of authority. Rather than an intentional subversion of national
policy, this pathway envisions a scenario in which lower-level military commanders with legally
obtained launch authority respond to military threats with nuclear force without communicating
with higher-level leadership. This concern is prevalent in states such as Pakistan, which has
developed theater nuclear forces and likely predelegates decision-making autonomy to peripheral
commanders.13
Proliferating states aspire to develop measures that fully promote reliability, safety, and
security when fashioning command and control systems. However, the measures available for
addressing these considerations reveal the core tension of the always/never dilemma: any effort
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to ensure the reliability of a nuclear arsenal directly challenges the safeguards against unwanted
nuclear use, and any attempt to increase the safety and security of an arsenal make nuclear forces
more vulnerable to decapitation. For instance, if decision-makers predelegate launch authority to
lower-level commanders to reduce the time required to respond to an attack and improve arsenal
survivability, then fewer layers of authorization are required to use nuclear weapons and the
potential for unwanted nuclear use increases. Alternatively, leaders can implement administrative
steps guaranteeing oversight and require safety measures to be built into nuclear weapons as
protection against unwanted nuclear use. These measures, however, increase the time required to
respond to an attack and the arsenal becomes more vulnerable to decapitation. As these examples
demonstrate, the always/never dilemma continuously forces states to make significant tradeoffs
when operationalizing their nuclear arsenals.

Typology of Nuclear Command and Control
Command and control systems represent a state’s institutional approach to promoting the
reliability, safety, and security of its nuclear arsenal. As such, these institutions serve as a direct
resolution of the always/never dilemma.14
Scholars traditionally measure command and control frameworks along a spectrum of
assertive and delegative control.15 Assertive control describes systems where political leadership
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maintains a high degree of administrative control over nuclear decision-making processes and
extensive physical control of the arsenal. Through these measures, assertive patterns of command
and control increase safeguards against unwanted nuclear use. By doing so, however, a state’s
arsenal becomes more vulnerable to preemption due to the slower mobilization and response
times produced by the multiple layers of authentication required to prepare and deploy nuclear
forces. These authentication requirements also create nodes at which launch orders may fail to
transmit or receive validation. As a result, assertive patterns of command and control are
predisposed to “fail safe” or “fail impotent”—if command breaks down during a crisis, operators
are likely to default to the non-use of nuclear weapons.16 These measures strongly favor the
“never” side of the always/never dilemma and prioritize safety and security at the expense of
reliability.
Delegative control, in contrast, grants peripheral military actors with a high degree of
decision-making autonomy and physical custody of weapons. These patterns of command and
control provide military operators with the administrative autonomy and physical custody of
nuclear weapons necessary to guarantee rapid response to potential threats. Although delegative
control increases arsenal readiness, it also reduces the steps required to conduct a nuclear launch
and facilitates the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Delegative control is
subject to “fail deadly” during crises—if communications between political leaders and
peripheral military commanders are severed as hostilities escalate, operators are likely to default
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to the use of nuclear weapons. Delegative control favors the “always” side of the always/never
dilemma and promotes arsenal reliability but offers fewer protections for arsenal safety and
security.
The assertive/delegative framework remains the most widely accepted approach for
conceptualizing command and control arrangements.17 This framework, however, overlooks an
important distinction between command and control outcomes in nuclear states. Specifically, the
assertive/delegative framework views command and control outputs as fixed in time: states either
assert political control over nuclear forces or delegate authority to peripheral commanders. In
practice, however, because military operators are ultimately required to deliver nuclear weapons,
all states must delegate control at some point to conduct a nuclear strike. I argue that the
appropriate question when classifying command and control systems is therefore not whether
states delegate nuclear use capability to lower levels of command, but rather when such
delegation occurs.
Reframing the concept of command and control to account for the timing of delegation
with respect to the onset of a crisis allows analysts to better identify the potential avenues
through which nuclear accidents and escalation may occur.18 As I demonstrate in the discussion
below below, the challenges to arsenal reliability, safety, and security differ significantly
depending on how states conduct nuclear operations during the transition from peacetime to
crisis management. Command and control systems function best during peacetime, but these
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systems face severe pressures that challenge nuclear stability and political oversight of nuclear
operations as crises emerge.19
Political leaders possess three options for when to delegate the ability to use nuclear
weapons: first, during peacetime; second, early in a crisis; or third, late in a crisis. Rather than
creating an entirely new conceptual framework for command and control systems, I modify the
existing assertive/delegative framework to identify three ideal patterns of command and control
that correspond to these temporal categories, respectively: delegative, conditional, and assertive.
Building upon the traditional assertive/delegative framework allows me to maintain conceptual
resonance within the broader literature, while also emphasizing the temporal aspects of nuclear
management operations to make each pattern of command and control more analytically
distinct.20 I also maintain the traditional assertive/delegative framework’s emphasis on the
delegation of nuclear use ability, rather than authority, as the de facto ability to use nuclear
weapons more directly represents the challenges posed by the always/never dilemma.21
Whereas earlier research built upon the assertive/delegative framework includes
measures of de facto obedience of the military to civilians as indicators of command and control
arrangements, my framework separates the two concepts to isolate the potential effects of civilmilitary relations on command and control outcomes.22 Earlier frameworks force an assumption

19

On the challenges to command and control produced by crises, see: Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War;
Christopher Clary, Thinking about Pakistan’s Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War (New Delhi: Institute
for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2010); Kurt Gottfried and Bruce G. Blair, eds., Crisis Stability and Nuclear War
(New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A
Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).
20
On the importance of conceptual resonance, see John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Unified
Framework, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 117-119.
21
Peter Feaver writes that delegative control entails “a bequeathal of de facto power to an otherwise subordinate
element.” Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, p. 7.
22
For an example that includes civil-military dynamics as a component of command and control systems, see
Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” p. 171.

33
Table 2.1. Patterns of Nuclear Command and Control
Assertive
Conditional

Delegative

Administrative controls

Centralized use
capability

Peacetime
centralization, crisis
decentralization

Decentralized use
capability

Physical controls

Components
dispersed and demated

Components highly
proximate

Components
assembled and mated

Technical controls

Extensive PALs or
PAL-equivalents

Bypassable

Absent or minimal

Timing of delegation

Late-crisis
delegation

Early-crisis
delegation

Peacetime delegation

Primary threats to
control

Decapitation

Unintended
escalation

Accidental or
unauthorized use

of clear civilian supremacy onto regional nuclear powers and complicate the task of isolating the
effect of civil-military relations on the development of command and control systems. By
removing this assumption, I distinguish the center-periphery tensions underlying command and
control decisions from the measurement of civilian control of the military.
I focus on three institutional dimensions to operationalize the concept of command and
control: administrative, physical, and technical. These three institutional dimensions provide
observable indicators of nuclear management operations that aggregate together to characterize
nuclear command and control arrangements. Table 2.1 summarizes the differences between
assertive, conditional, and delegative command and control systems along these institutional
dimensions.
Administrative control refers to the doctrinal centralization or delegation of authority for
conducting nuclear operations. Command and control systems are characterized by one of two
general patterns of administrative control: centralized or decentralized. Centralized control
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establishes a series of standard operating procedures (SOPs) that dictate actors’ behavior during
a crisis, and aims to guarantee that nuclear weapons serve the overarching political interests
during crises by specifying detailed plans for a wide array of contingencies.23 Decentralized
control, in contrast, predelegates launch authority to subordinate actors and grants peripheral
operators greater authority to mobilize and deploy nuclear weapons without requiring higher
political approval.
Physical control encompasses two aspects of nuclear force management. First, physical
control describes the degree to which nuclear systems are conjoined or separated. Nuclear
warheads can be separated from detonating devices and fully-assembled weapons can be demated from delivery platforms, rendering nuclear forces inoperative until the various
components are combined and assembled.24 Second, physical control entails the degree to which
nuclear components are geographically dispersed. Disassembled nuclear components may be
stored in close proximity to facilitate rapid response or spread across geographic space to inhibit
unauthorized mobilization and theft.25
Technical controls include technological or mechanical locks that prevent nuclear
weapons from being armed, accessed, or launched without authorization. Permissive action links
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(PALs) offer an example of a common technological measure used to control nuclear assets.26
Modern PALs are electronic locks built into nuclear weapons that prevent the firing sequence
from occurring unless disabled by entering the appropriate electronic code. Nuclear weapons
equipped with PALs will not function until the proper code is entered and the lock is removed,
and some PALs are designed to destroy critical components of the nuclear weapon if an actor
tampers with the lock or repeatedly enters the wrong code. States without modern PAL
technology can accomplish similar control over nuclear assets through mechanical locks, which
physically block the arming process until the locks are removed.27 For smaller devices such as
nuclear artillery shells, locks may also be used to secure the entire weapon within a storage
container.28 In addition to controlling physical components of an arsenal, states can use
technological controls to prevent a weapon from being fired. For instance, permissive enable
systems (PESs) operate in the same manner as PALs, but whereas PALs prevent the warhead
from detonating, PESs prevent operators from launching nuclear weapons until they enter a
separate authorization code.29 Unless PESs are disabled, even fully operational nuclear weapons
cannot be launched.
These indicators of administrative, physical, and technical control allow for the
differentiation of assertive, conditional, and delegative command and control systems. Assertive
control describes systems where political authorities delegate control late in a crisis.
Administratively, political leaders exercise highly centralized oversight and management of
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nuclear operations. Physically, nuclear warheads are typically de-mated from delivery platforms
and geographically dispersed. Technical controls such as PALs further guarantee centralized
political oversight by preventing nuclear weapons from being accessed, armed, or launched
without political authorization.30 Importantly, technical controls separate the administrative
control of nuclear forces from the physical possession of nuclear weapons, allowing leaders to
promote safety and security deep into crises when peripheral operators may otherwise obtain
greater influence over nuclear operations.31
These measures make assertive command and control systems highly resilient against
accidental and unauthorized nuclear use. By withholding launch authority late into crises,
however, assertive control arrangements are susceptible to decapitation and may fail safe. If
command breaks down during a crisis, operators are likely to default to the non-use of nuclear
weapons. In contrast to delegative and conditional control, arsenal reliability is generally low in
assertive command and control frameworks.
Conditional control refers to states that delegate the ability to use nuclear weapons early
in a crisis. During peacetime, conditional control centralizes administrative authority, physically
de-mates and disperses nuclear weapons and delivery platforms across some distance, and
employs at least modest technical controls on nuclear weapons. In the early stages of a crisis,
however, states with conditional control procedures rapidly assemble deliverable nuclear
weapons and delegate the ability for nuclear use to lower-level nuclear commanders. Through
these measures, conditional control attempts to promote arsenal safety and security during
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peacetime while also developing procedures that rapidly increase arsenal readiness to guarantee
arsenal reliability.
Conditional control systems face three challenges that are distinct from the problems
confronting delegative and assertive control systems. First, the process of delegating authority
and increasing arsenal readiness early in a crisis may signal malign intent to an adversary.32
Actions such as mating warheads to delivery platforms and placing these weapons under military
command may serve defensive purposes, but an adversary would likely view these efforts as
offensive in nature. Second, as political leaders reduce physical and technical barriers to use and
delegate authority to lower levels, the military obtains significant influence in nuclear operations.
This rapid inclusion of military influence severely weakens political oversight and increases the
likelihood that national policy and military operations would diverge.33 Third, the problems of
signaling malign intent and weakened political control both occur in a crisis setting, where actors
face pervasive uncertainty and the likelihood of misperception increases dramatically. Although
conditional control systems seek to balance arsenal safety, security, and reliability by
maintaining centralized control during peacetime, the process of delegating control early in a
crisis generates external and internal pathways to unwanted crisis escalation.
Delegative control describes command and control arrangements where political leaders
delegate nuclear launch capability to peripheral commanders during peacetime.
Administratively, the delegation of nuclear use capability demonstrates a decentralized command
and control structure. At all times, military operators possess physical control of nuclear
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warheads and delivery platforms. These components are unconstrained by technical controls
such as permissive action links (PALs) to guarantee that the custodians of nuclear assets can use
nuclear weapons under any circumstances without requiring direct approval from senior
leadership.
Combined, these administrative, physical, and technical dimensions of delegative control
strongly improve arsenal reliability. The core challenge for delegative command and control
arrangements is the risk of unwanted use, as states employing delegative control rely almost
exclusively upon the professionalism of peripheral military actors to avoid accidental and
unauthorized use. As a result, states employing delegative command and control systems face
persistent challenges to the safety and security of nuclear weapons.

Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Powers
I develop a theoretical framework that incorporates three variables to explain a state’s
command and control arrangements: first, the presence of a conventionally superior adversary;
second, the severity of domestic threats to the political regime; and third, the degree of military
organizational autonomy. This framework generates falsifiable predictions for command and
control systems in emerging nuclear powers and specifies the conditions under which each factor
shapes command and control arrangements. In this section, I present a decision-theoretic
framework that shows how these three variables interact to produce command and control
outcomes and develop the logic and observable implications of each variable in the theory.
Figure 2.1 provides a graphical representation of the theoretical framework.
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Figure 2.1. Theory of Nuclear Command and Control

Conventionally Superior Adversary
The first node of my theory asks: does the state face a conventionally superior adversary?
The presence of a conventionally superior adversary represents an immediate and existential
threat to state security that severely constrains a state’s options when establishing command and
control frameworks. As Vipin Narang notes, this condition represents “one of the most
binding—if not the most binding—security environment[s] a state can face.”34
The concept of a conventionally superior adversary entails two necessary components.
First, the adversary must possess decisive superiority—whether quantitative or qualitative—in
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conventional military capabilities.35 Second, the adversary must be geographically proximate,
with limited distances required to conduct offensive operations and favorable terrain that
facilitates offensive action.36 States with approximate conventional parity or defensively
advantageous terrain such as mountainous borders or wide water boundaries can rely on
conventional military forces to deter and defeat a numerically superior adversary. In contrast,
states facing an adversary with in-theater superiority and traversable terrain that enables
offensive military operations experience an existential threat that the militarily inferior state
cannot offset through conventional means. Instead, these conditions force the conventionally
inferior state to rely on its nuclear arsenal to deter conventional threats and limit the doctrinal
options available to states when establishing command and control frameworks.37
My emphasis on conventional threats identifies a significant difference between regional
nuclear powers and the Cold War superpowers. Whereas the U.S. and Soviet Union adopted
“maximalist” nuclear postures to deter conventional and nuclear conflict, regional nuclear
powers tailor their nuclear arsenal for more specific purposes.38 Nuclear weapons provide strong
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deterrent credibility against nuclear use by other states, but the operational dispositions of
nuclear forces unevenly shape the ability of a state to deter conventional aggression.39 Depending
on the nature of conventional threats confronting a state, therefore, my argument anticipates that
political leaders will operationalize their nuclear arsenal differently.
Because a conventionally superior adversary can rapidly seize territory, destroy forces, or
sever lines of communications, states facing such adversaries experience incentives to lower the
nuclear threshold to deter conventional attacks. By lowering the threshold to nuclear use, a state
can offset its conventionally inferiority and signal to its adversaries that no room exists
underneath the nuclear umbrella for conventional conflict, as even limited conventional disputes
will risk escalation to the nuclear level.
States facing a conventionally superior adversary adopt more delegative command and
control systems that provide the operational means for states to manipulate the nuclear threshold
and bolster arsenal reliability. The delegation of nuclear launch authority to lower-level military
commanders increases the operational ability of military operators to respond to a conventional
incursion with nuclear weapons and signals to an adversary that non-nuclear aggression may
result in nuclear escalation. For example, France deployed tactical nuclear weapons under the
command of the First Army during the Cold War to prevent the Soviet Union from winning even
limited military objectives.40 France’s delegative command and control procedures purposefully
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lowered the threshold to nuclear use to offset the Soviet Union’s conventional military
superiority, exemplifying the logic of threshold manipulation proposed in this theoretical
framework.
The need for conventionally inferior states to manipulate the nuclear threshold demands
that the presence of a conventionally superior adversary precludes states from adopting assertive
command and control arrangements. A state’s conventional threat environment, however, is not
singularly determinative of its command and control frameworks. As the next section
demonstrates, the effect of conventional threats on command and control systems is conditioned
by the interaction of this variable with the severity of domestic threats to the political regime.

Domestic Threats to Regime Survival
The second node of the theoretical framework asks: does the state face domestic threats
to regime survival? Civilian positions on military matters are simultaneously shaped by domestic
and international considerations that force leaders to jointly consider internal and external
challenges to their regime when developing military doctrine.41 In addition to external threats to
state security, domestic threats such as military coups, armed rebellion, and mass protests pose
highly proximate threats to political regimes.42 Because these domestic challenges also generate
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existential threats to the ruling elite, I argue that analysts must jointly consider the interaction of
external and internal threats facing a state to explain command and control outcomes.
Studies that investigate the interaction between civil-military relations and national
security policy often emphasize the distorting effects of military organizational interests and
biases on foreign policy outputs, but typically overlook the potential for parochial civilian
interests to shape national security decisions.43 Instead, analysts commonly portray civilians as
unencumbered by organizational pathologies and predisposed to generate optimal foreign
policy.44 For example, Michael Desch argues that “civilian leaders are less subject to
organizational biases and have a more ‘national’ perspective on defense issues.”45
In contrast, I argue that civilian elites also possess parochial interests that shape doctrinal
preferences. Even in matters of national security where civilians are regarded as most likely to
align military doctrine with structural cues, internal challenges to the political regime
systematically produce similar command and control frameworks. Specifically, I show that
concerns for regime survival makes civilians more likely to prefer defensive and deterrent
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doctrines that facilitate political influence over military affairs whenever the political regime
faces significant internal threats.
Whereas external security threats impel leaders to adopt more delegative command and
control systems, domestic threats to the political regime encourage more assertive command and
control measures. Domestic threats incentivize assertive control for two reasons. First,
centralizing authority over nuclear operations allows leaders to institutionally exclude and
withhold resources and autonomy from domestic rivals. By excluding domestic rivals, nuclear
authorities can better guarantee continued access to material resources and institutional
privileges that allow actors to influence nuclear doctrine and foreign policy. For example, in
countries where leaders fear deposal by a military coup, nuclear weapons allow states to keep
military organizations weak and disorganized while relying on assertively managed nuclear
forces to deter external aggression.46
Second, nuclear weapons can be used to consolidate domestic support.47 In many
countries, nuclear weapons have been viewed as a “symbol of governing authority” around
which leaders have sought to coalesce domestic support.48 For example, the control of nuclear
devices embodied political power in France during the country’s early stages of proliferation,49
and Mao Zedong feared that allowing domestic competitors to take control of China’s nuclear
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weapons would undermine his domestic political authority.50 More recently, the Kim dynasty has
used its nuclear program to build support among the military actors underpinning the continued
survival of the Kim regime in North Korea.51 For leaders facing domestic instability, control of
nuclear weapons can clearly signal control of the government to potential rivals and
challengers.52
Political leaders optimize their command and control frameworks in response to the full
range of domestic and international threats. By jointly evaluating external and internal threats,
my theoretical framework makes specific predictions and addresses the causal indeterminacy that
plagues existing frameworks when multiple variables predict divergent outcomes.53 Furthermore,
by reframing the concept of command and control to account for the timing at which the
delegation of nuclear use ability occurs, I offer a unique framework for describing the
optimization strategies employed by states with nuclear weapons.
My theory makes three specific predictions for the interactive effects of the presence of a
conventionally superior adversary and domestic threats to regime survival on command and
control frameworks. First, states facing a conventionally superior adversary without a domestic
threat to the political regime adopt delegative command and control systems. These states can
focus nuclear planning solely on the external adversary and adopt delegative control patterns to
lower the threshold to nuclear use and deter conventional aggression.
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Second, states facing both a conventionally superior adversary and domestic threats to the
political regime adopt conditional command and control frameworks. These states emphasize
centralized control during peacetime to guarantee nuclear forces serve the regime’s narrow
political interests and to promote arsenal safety and security, but delegate launch ability early in a
crisis to lower the nuclear threshold and deter conventional attacks.
Third, states that do not face a conventionally superior adversary but experience domestic
threats to the political regime develop assertive command and control frameworks. For these
states, external threats do not meaningfully shape the threat environment for political leaders.
Instead, political elites become primarily concerned with internal threats and adopt assertive
control measures to centralize their authority over nuclear decisions.

Military Organizational Autonomy
If a state’s external security environment is benign and the political regime is
domestically stable, the final node of my theoretical framework asks: how autonomous are the
state’s military organizations? In the absence of external threats to state security and domestic
threats to regime survival, I argue that the level of military organizational autonomy serves as the
dominant explanatory factor for command and control outcomes.
Military organizations hold a distinct set of interests that shape the military’s strategic
and doctrinal preferences.54 These interests, however, are not necessarily commensurate with the
54
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political dimensions of a state’s grand strategy, and at times the two may be contradictory.
Furthermore, rather than methodically reasoning through individual decisions, military
organizations employ a series of simplifying mechanisms to address uncertainty during the
decision-making process.55 These simplifying mechanisms lead to a reliance upon organizational
rules and an emphasis on operational matters that obscure broader strategic imperatives.
Combined, the military’s organizational interests and biases produce systematic challenges for
integrating military doctrine with overarching political considerations.56
Military organizations possess three core interests which may pursued through political
channels.57 First, militaries desire greater access to material resources. With greater size and
wealth, military organizations are more capable of developing and acquiring weapons systems
necessary for conducting military operations.58 Second, militaries seek autonomy over the
management of internal military affairs, such as promotions and program management. Military
leaders see such matters as purely internal affairs, and view attempts by civilians to interfere as
efforts to politicize the military.59 Third, military organizations pursue command of operational
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and tactical decisions regarding the use of force. Control over operational command and tactics
represents the most central military organizational interest.60 The ability to develop and employ
operational and tactical doctrine lies at the core of a professional military,61 and civilian
interference in these affairs tends to estrange military leaders and produce civil-military
tensions.62
Military organizations are further characterized by a series of procedural biases that shape
military responses to the challenges of coordination and uncertainty.63 Coordinating operations
within a complex organization is immensely difficult,64 and this difficulty is exacerbated by the
pervasive uncertainty surrounding an organization’s purpose, people, and environment.65
Military organizations attempt to facilitate internal coordination and reduce operational
uncertainty through two means.66 First, militaries rely on organizational routines designed to
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address specific tasks and issues.67 Organizational routines and standard operating procedures
structure the behavior of individuals within an organization by providing specific guidelines for a
set of actions. By doing so, the use of organizational routines facilitates coordination among
various actors within an organization. However, these routines deny individual reasoning of
decisions and cause militaries to abide by protocol that may be poorly suited for a given
decision.68 Second, military organizations primarily conduct planning and analysis on
operational-level issues. Emphasizing operational considerations allows militaries to better
anticipate uncertainty during disputes. Problematically, this behavior also produces a form of
“goal displacement,” where the emphasis on operational means causes military organizations to
lose sight of the broader strategic objectives and inhibits political-military integration.69
The military’s efforts to reduce uncertainty and improve coordination produce a
systematic proclivity for offensive military doctrines.70 In contrast to defensive and deterrent
doctrines—which aim to deny an adversary its political objectives and punish adversaries for
aggression, respectively—offensive doctrines seek to preventively or preemptively disarm an
adversary by destroying the opponent’s armed forces.71 Offensive doctrines allow the military to
develop and execute elaborate war plans, which reduces the uncertainty facing military planners
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and facilitates operational coordination within the military.72 Conversely, defensive and deterrent
doctrines force a military to improvise in the face of significant uncertainty and allow the
adversary to structure the conduct of battle.73 This aversion to uncertainty also causes military
organizations to prefer the quick and decisive uses of force embodied in offensive doctrines,
rather than the gradual escalation of conflict aimed at persuading an adversary to change its
ambitions inherent to defensive and deterrent doctrines.74
Offensive doctrines also serve the military’s core interests in two significant ways. First,
offensive doctrines increase the military’s organizational size and wealth. Offensive operations
are resource intensive,75 typically requiring numerical superiority and extensive logistical
support that demand greater financial support and manpower commitments. The potential for
quick and decisive offensive action also offers hope for clear political gains, which incentivizes
national investment in military action.76 Second, offensive doctrines enhance military autonomy
and control of military operations. Because offensive operations entail complicated military
planning that requires extensive expertise, civilians face difficulties in understanding military
affairs well enough to justify intervening in operational or tactical issues.77 Furthermore, because
offensive operations are typically conducted outside of a country’s national borders, civilians are
less motivated to participate in operational planning.78 Combined, these points suggest that
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military organizations can secure greater autonomy through offensive doctrines by
simultaneously increasing the barriers to and reducing the incentives for civilian interference.
In nuclear states, the preference for offensive doctrines causes military organizations to
prefer more delegative command and control along physical, technical, and administrative
dimensions. This generates three specific predictions for command and control systems in
nuclear states with politically influential military organizations.79 First, military organizations
pursue greater physical control of nuclear assets. Physical control increases military autonomy
over the operational aspects of a state’s nuclear arsenal and allows the military to develop
organizational routines for mobilizing and deploying nuclear weapons. Second, military
organizations prefer fewer technical controls on nuclear forces. Technical controls require
greater coordination between military operators and senior leaders, which induces uncertainty in
military planning for nuclear contingencies and creates an aversion to these measures. Finally,
military organizations seek greater administrative control over nuclear weapons. The authority to
mobilize or launch nuclear weapons allows the military to develop standard operating procedures
that facilitate coordination within the military and reduces uncertainty in military operations by
reducing dependence on senior leadership during crises.80
The military’s ability to advance its preferences for more delegative command and
control systems is dependent upon its level of organizational autonomy. In this study, autonomy

79

For an applied analysis of how command and control systems may differ during moments of peace and crisis, see
Khan, “Nuclear Command-and-Control in South Asia During Peace, Crisis, and War.” Also see Blair, “Alerting in
Crisis and Conventional War,” pp. 75-120.
80
During the Cold War, U.S. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer delivered a nuclear war plan briefing to President John
F. Kennedy. This briefing, known as SIOP-62, included a clear statement on the importance and rigidity of SOPs in
military planning. See Scott D. Sagan, “SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,”
International Security, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 37-39, 49-51.

52
refers to the decision-making authority of military organizations.81 High military organizational
autonomy indicates that military organizations have greater decision-making authority, whereas
low autonomy indicates that political leadership is more directly involved in military decisions.
By focusing on the level of autonomy experienced by military organizations, my theoretical
framework identifies specific conditions under which the military is able to advance its interests
into operational nuclear doctrine.
Three institutional factors indicate the level of military organizational autonomy. First,
the process by which a state makes personnel decisions regarding senior military commanders
reflects the military’s level of decision-making authority. If the military directly appoints senior
commanders or only requires executive approval for such appointments, then the military
experiences greater autonomy. In contrast, if senior-level promotions require confirmation by
additional civilian bodies such as a state’s legislature, this indicates lower military autonomy as
civilians become more directly involved in internal military decisions.82
A second indicator of autonomy is the amount of military discretion in operational
military reform, including authority over weapons upgrades, troop deployments, and doctrinal
formulation. When military organizations have more authority in these decisions, they enjoy
greater autonomy. When civilians influence and determine military reforms, military
organizations possess less autonomy.83
Third, the organization of defense policy institutions exemplify the level of military
organizational autonomy. As the military obtains positions that provide policy recommendations
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or directly control operations, military organizations obtain greater autonomy.84 If the military is
institutionally excluded from decision-making processes or hierarchically weak, then military
autonomy is low.
My theory generates two predictions for command and control outcomes at this final
node of the framework. First, states with high levels of military organizational autonomy adopt
delegative command and control systems. Under these conditions, political leaders are willing to
rely on the military’s professionalism and obedience to protect against accidental and
unauthorized use and allow military organizations to manage physical nuclear forces and include
military leadership in the nuclear chain of command. Second, states with low levels of military
organizational autonomy adopt assertive command and control frameworks. These states possess
civil-military pathologies that purposefully exclude military organizations from conventional
operational decision-making, and these patterns of civil-military relations travel to nuclear policy
well. States with low military autonomy adopt assertive control measures to centralize nuclear
authority and preclude military influence over nuclear doctrine.

Alternative Explanations
The academic literature provides four theories to explain command and control systems
in emerging nuclear powers. Specifically, scholars have traditionally emphasized three potential
explanations for nuclear command and control: the stability of civil-military relations, the

84

This institutional structure reflects greater direct political influence of military organizations. Direct political
influence refers to the formal processes by which the military provides policy recommendations or controls
operations. At its apex, direct military influence refers to a military regime where the chief executive is a military
officer. However, the level of institutional authority does not have to be so extreme for the military to exert direct
influence on politics. On direct political influence, see Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, p. 5.

54
vulnerability of nuclear forces, and the strategic rationale of the nuclear arsenal. In this section, I
establish the logic underpinning these alternative explanations and identify the observable
implications of each theoretical perspective.

Civil-Military Stability
One influential explanation of regional nuclear power command and control systems
emphasizes the explanatory power of civil-military stability. In countries where civil-military
relations are more stable, military operators are expected to obey civilian political mandates,
causing civilians to delegate greater launch authority and arsenal custody to military operators to
promote arsenal survivability.85 Conversely, unstable civil-military relations—observed in states
with greater coup risks or extensively politicized militaries—are more likely to produce assertive
control to prevent a domestic rival from leveraging the political utility of nuclear weapons.86
This argument is similar to my theory in that it emphasizes the importance of civil-military
relations for command and control outcomes; however, each argument proposes a distinct causal
mechanism. Whereas I argue that the relative political power of civilian and military groups
allows dominant groups to pursue their parochial interests, the civil-military stability perspective
is built upon a principal-agent framework that evaluates the likelihood of agents enacting versus
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shirking political mandates.87 In this model, civilians unilaterally determine how much authority
and autonomy to delegate to military actors in command and control arrangements.
If the civil-military stability argument is correct, then evidence should show that a fear of
military intervention in politics causes civilians to assert greater control over nuclear decisions.
This fear should be particularly pronounced in states with a history of military coups, causing
command and control decisions to strongly favor assertive control. Civilians should be more
willing to delegate authority to military commanders when civil-military relations are historically
stable and the military is professional and subordinate to civilian mandates. Evidence should
demonstrate that civilians determine when to delegate nuclear authority, and the perceived
reliability of military actors should shape these decisions.

Arsenal Vulnerability
An influential security-based argument emphasizes the effects of arsenal vulnerability on
command and control decisions.88 From this perspective, states with nuclear arsenals that are
vulnerable to preemption or decapitation face challenges to the survivability and responsiveness
of their nuclear forces. States with greater arsenal vulnerability experience increased timeurgency—the degree to which a state believes its arsenal must be ready for rapid use—and adopt
delegative control frameworks that bolster arsenal reliability.89 Time-urgency is particularly
pronounced in states with small arsenals and nuclear-armed adversaries, as these conditions
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generate “use them or lose them” pressures on states to safeguard against an adversary’s
preemptive strike.90
If the arsenal vulnerability hypothesis is correct, then two implications should follow. First,
a state facing a nuclear adversary with a larger nuclear arsenal should adopt more delegative
patterns of command and control to offset the state’s nuclear inferiority.91 This should be especially
true for states whose nuclear weapons infrastructure is within range of large portions of an
adversary’s nuclear capabilities, as the adversary can bring a greater portion of its force to bear
when targeting a state’s nuclear arsenal. Second, states facing an adversary with tactical nuclear
weapons should also adopt delegative control measures. Because tactical nuclear weapons are
traditionally accompanied by first-use doctrines, states facing adversaries with tactical nuclear
weapons should be more likely to delegate control to guarantee that its nuclear arsenal is prepared
for use in case a localized nuclear conflict escalates to an interstate nuclear exchange.

Strategic Rationale
A final explanation of command and control assigns explanatory power to the strategic
rationale underlying a state’s nuclear weapons program.92 Nuclear strategies can be grouped into
two general categories: first-use and late-use strategies. Strategic rationale arguments posit that
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these strategies require distinct nuclear command and control systems to support the overarching
nuclear doctrine. First-use strategies anticipate using nuclear weapons first in a conflict, most
likely in response to conventional attacks. Late-use strategies, in contrast, plan to withhold
nuclear weapons until an adversary has conducted a nuclear strike or appears imminently likely
to do so.
The strategic rationale hypothesis generates two observable implications. First, states that
employ first-use doctrines will adopt delegative command and control systems. First-use
doctrines require the delegation of launch capability to lower-level military commanders to
guarantee that nuclear weapons are available for use before an adversary can preempt the state’s
nuclear launch. Second, late-use strategies employ a doctrine of nuclear retaliation that requires
survivable second-strike forces and permits centralized political control of the arsenal. Late-use
strategies therefore produce assertive command and control arrangements that allow for political
oversight late into disputes.

Empirical Strategy
To evaluate my argument and the competing explanations, I conduct a series of withincase qualitative analyses. Specifically, I employ the method of process tracing to develop a causal
narrative and test the mechanisms implied by each explanation. I use this method to analyze the
creation and development of command and control systems in regional nuclear powers. For each
case, I test the competing explanations with historical and archival data, as well as original
interview data with civilian and military elites in each country’s nuclear establishment.
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Process tracing is a valuable method of analysis for explaining the origins of command
and control for several reasons.93 Because the population of regional nuclear powers only
includes eight states, the number of state-level observations is severely limited and precludes
large-N quantitative analysis. For quantitative work, an observation is commonly viewed as the
measure of a single variable on single unit that provides leverage over a causal relationship.94 In
the context of within-case analysis, however, observations are better viewed as causal-process
observations (CPOs).95 Unlike the data-set observations (DSOs) used in quantitative research,
CPOs typically do not provide scores on specific variables across a sample of cases. Instead,
these observations provide insight into a variety of components of the hypothesized relationship
between two variables, such as the causal pathways and mechanisms at play. Although these
observations are “incomplete” by DSO standards, they may nevertheless aggregate together to
support a unified causal inference at a deeper level than simply identifying correlations across
DSOs. In practice, CPOs substantially improve causal inference by demonstrating that a
particular independent variable is the cause of the dependent variable—reducing concerns of
endogeneity—and creating an uninterrupted chain of events connecting the two variables to
address omitted variable concerns.96
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The issue of limited state-level observations is further compounded by the tendency
towards institutional persistence in command and control arrangements, which reduces the
amount of observable variation over time. Process tracing offers a method for addressing these
challenges by evaluating the causal processes that lead to the creation and evolution of command
and control systems over time, rather than measuring a single variable on a single unit over
time.97 By focusing on complete causal processes, I am able to test a wide range of implications
generated by my theory and the alternative explanations. These observations aggregate together
to support a unified causal inference and provide evidence to evaluate the mechanisms
underlying each explanation.98
I evaluate my theory using evidence from India, Pakistan, and apartheid-era South Africa.
This case selection strategy allows me to test the explanatory power of my theoretical framework
at each of the decisive nodes that generate empirical predictions. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the
predictions of my theoretical framework in these cases and all other regional nuclear powers.
For each case, I test the competing explanations with a combination of historical,
archival, and original interview data with military and political elites. These data establish
general trends in each state’s operational nuclear doctrine and provide primary source evidence
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Figure 2.2. Theory of Nuclear Command and Control: Empirical Predictions

to directly evaluate the explanatory power of the competing arguments’ causal mechanisms.
Importantly, the use of these original data allows me to directly explore the observable
implications of each argument in a manner unavailable to earlier studies of command and control
in regional nuclear powers.
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CHAPTER 3
INDIA

India was the first country to publicly demonstrate and acknowledge its nuclear weapons
program since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) established five
legally recognized nuclear states in 1970.1 India tested five nuclear weapons on May 11 and 13,
1998, formalizing a nuclear program that gained international attention with the 1974 test of a
nuclear device. Numerous scholars have extensively analyzed the causes of India’s decision to
acquire nuclear weapons and its subsequent nuclear strategy.2 I supplement the existing
scholarship on India’s nuclear weapons program by describing and explaining the sources of
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India’s nuclear command and control systems. I base my arguments on a combination of
historical and original interview data with political and military elites in India.
In this chapter, I show that India has maintained assertive command and control systems
throughout its nuclear history. Despite a range of conventional, subconventional, and nuclear
threats to Indian security posed by China and Pakistan, the conventional balance of power offers
India a high level of external security that allows civilian leaders to centralize political oversight
of nuclear operations during peacetime and late into crises. Furthermore, despite inheriting a
multiethnic state with religious cleavages, tribal identities, and an organized military capable of
opposing civilian directives after British decolonization, India’s efforts to politically include its
diverse population and politically exclude the military have prevented significant domestic
threats to the political regime. Given India’s conventional security and domestic stability, civilmilitary relations play a decisive role in determining India’s nuclear command and control
arrangements. Specifically, the Indian military’s low levels of organizational autonomy in the
nuclear realm have resulted in strict civilian control of nuclear operations and the purposeful
exclusion of military actors from nuclear debates. To maintain civilian control over nuclear
forces and to exclude military influence, India’s political elites have established assertive
command and control systems along administrative, physical, and technical dimensions.

India’s Nuclear Weapons Program
India’s nuclear program began near the end of British colonial rule and subsequent
partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The British had purposefully slowed the
development of India’s industrial and technological bases during their colonial reign, leading
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early Indian leaders to view scientific advancements as a means for overcoming these colonial
constraints and obtaining the status of a modern nation.3 As George Perkovich notes in his
authoritative history of India’s nuclear program, “In this period, no field of science and
technology appeared more promising and prestigious than atomic energy.”4
Two individuals powerfully shaped India’s nuclear program at this time: Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru and Indian physicist Homi Bhabha. India developed the Atomic Energy
Research Committee in 1946, which was later replaced with the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) in 1948 to guarantee the secrecy of India’s nuclear program.5 The AEC formally fell
under the purview of the prime minister, but Bhabha exercised significant influence over AEC
operations.6 As chairman of the AEC, Bhabha fashioned India’s nuclear policy to guarantee both
civilian energy and nuclear weapons options.7 Although Nehru publicly opposed nuclear
weapons on moral grounds, he nevertheless understood the value of nuclear weapons for
enhancing Indian status and security.8 As a result, Nehru and Bhabha combined to develop a
nuclear program in through the 1960s that maintained a restrained nuclear weapons capability.
India’s nuclear program continued to develop in the 1960s without explicit authorization
from political leadership.9 Although India publicly asserted that its nuclear program was only
intended for peaceful purposes, the AEC continued to produce and separate weapons-grade
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plutonium, develop explosive cores, and research the appropriate state of plutonium for nuclear
weapons. When the NPT was finalized in June 1968, India declined to sign the treaty.10 The
AEC and Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) continued to study and
design a nuclear design without political guidance. Ultimately, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
authorized the assembly of a nuclear device in 1972 and India conducted a “peaceful nuclear
explosion” (PNE) in 1974, ushering in a new era of military competition in South Asia.
India’s permanent representative to the United Nations at the time of the 1974 test
strongly asserted that India’s test was “conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes” and “had no
military or political implications.”11 Despite this public facing, India had demonstrated the ability
to retaliate against its adversaries with a nuclear attack. India thereafter maintained ambiguity
regarding its ability to produce a nuclear weapon for nearly 25 years with the apparent effect that
other states believed India was capable of producing and delivering a nuclear weapon.12 This
period of nuclear ambiguity ended when India’s right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) decided
to test three nuclear weapons on May 11, 1998 and two additional weapons on May 13, 1998.13
By conducting these nuclear tests, India removed any doubts regarding its nuclear capabilities
and clearly signaled its status as a nuclear weapons state.
India has employed a strategy of assured retaliation since its 1974 nuclear test.14 By
employing an assured retaliation posture, India seeks to directly deter nuclear attacks and
coercion by threatening nuclear retaliation against an adversary that targets India with nuclear
Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II,” p. 158.
For the full statement, see Rikhi Jaipal, “The Indian Nuclear Explosion,” International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4
(Spring 1977), pp. 44-51.
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14
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weapons.15 Although the operational specifics have varied over time, the underlying logic of
deterrence has remained constant in India’s nuclear doctrine.
After the 1974 test, India relied on its nascent nuclear capabilities to deter its adversaries.
India did not maintain a stockpile of deliverable nuclear weapons, but the PNE had demonstrated
India’s technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons if necessary. After the PNE, India
“formalized what had been unofficial previously: the ‘nuclear option’ strategy.”16 Although it
may have taken India weeks to assemble and deliver a nuclear weapon, the 1974 test showed that
India would be able to respond to aggression with nuclear force. Additionally, this strategy
represented India’s historical aversion to nuclear weapons under Nehru and “satisfied twin
objectives of retaining a moral high ground on disarmament while providing enough military
potential to give adversaries pause.”17
Following the May 1998 tests, India released two documents that encapsulated the
country’s assured retaliation posture. First, on August 17, 1999, India released a draft report of
its nuclear doctrine. This doctrine identified three pillars of India’s nuclear strategy: no first-use,
credible minimum deterrence, and punitive retaliation.18 The draft nuclear doctrine clearly
articulates these points, stating, “India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum
deterrence…India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive
retaliation should deterrence fail.”19
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Second, in January 2003, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security released a statement
that largely formalized the draft nuclear doctrine, but with a pair of caveats. The no first-use
criterion was loosened to state that “nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a
nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.”20 Furthermore, the terminology
of punitive retaliation was replaced with an emphasis on massive retaliation, promising that
“Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable
damage.”21 As a result, since 2003 the three pillars of India’s nuclear strategy have been: no
first-use, credible minimum deterrence, and massive retaliation. Indeed, Arvind Gupta—India’s
deputy national security advisor from 2014-2017—maintains that these three aspects of India’s
nuclear doctrine remain the fundamental pillars of Indian nuclear strategy.22 The essential logic
of assured retaliation that has characterized India’s nuclear strategy since 1974 remains intact in
India’s current nuclear doctrine.

India’s Nuclear Arsenal
Identifying a date on which India weaponized its nuclear weapons program is made
difficult by India’s ambiguous nuclear intentions in the period after the 1974 test. Although India
tested a nuclear device in 1974, its nuclear arsenal was not operationally viable until at least
1987. In March 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi publicly stated that while India had not yet
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developed nuclear weapons, “if [India] decided to become a nuclear power, it would take a few
weeks or a few months.”23
Despite this statement, several scholars argue that the date of operationalization happened
slightly later. George Perkovich suggests that weaponization more likely occurred between 1988
and 1990, during which time India “readied two dozen nuclear weapons for quick assembly and
potential dispersal to air-bases for delivery by aircraft or retaliatory attacks against Pakistan.”24
Similarly, Sonali Singh and Christopher Way argue that India first possessed an operational
nuclear capability in 1988,25 a coding with which Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke agree.26 By
1988, these studies argue that India had the necessary capabilities to assemble and deliver
nuclear weapons within a matter of days, if required.27 This delay was considered acceptable, as
India believed its emphasis on a “force in being” provided robust deterrence and its nuclear
arsenal would be prepared for use within 72 hours.28
Gaurav Kampani, however, provides an even later date, arguing that India’s weapons
only became fully operational in the mid-1990s.29 Kampani notes the differences between
several stages of a nuclear program, including the development of a nuclear device, the
development of nuclear weapons, the process of weaponization, and the operationalization of the
nuclear arsenal. Kampani states:
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A device is an apparatus that presents proof of scientific principle that a nuclear explosion
will occur. The weapon is a rugged and miniaturized version of the device. It usually
incorporates arming and safing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent use.
Weaponization is the process of integrating the weapon with delivery systems.
Operationalization entails the development of soft institutional and organizational
routines. It refers to command and control mechanisms, coordination procedures between
scientific and military agencies, and training protocols in the military to deploy and
explode nuclear weapons.30
Kampani argues that although India possessed a nuclear device in 1974, India did not fully
operationalize its arsenal until the mid-1990s—perhaps as late as 1996—at which point it
acquired the ability to reliably and safely deliver nuclear weapons. Once India’s nuclear arsenal
became operational, nuclear weapons would likely have been delivered by India’s Jaguar or
Mirage 2000 fighter-bomber aircraft, which were modified for nuclear missions in the 1990s.31
India’s 1999 draft nuclear doctrine clearly envisioned a nuclear triad of land-, air-, and
sea-based delivery capabilities. Specifically, the doctrine calls for “a triad of aircraft, mobile
land-based missiles and sea-based assets” to meet the requirements of its assured retaliation
posture.32 The various legs of India’s envisioned triad, however, have progressed at markedly
different rates.
India’s first nuclear weapons would have been delivered by the Indian Air Force. Nuclear
weapons could possibly have been air-deliverable in the late-1980s by a transport aircraft,
although this delivery method would have been imprecise and unreliable.33 Once the Frenchdesigned Mirage 2000 and French and British-designed Jaguar aircraft became nuclear-capable,
these aircraft assumed primary responsibility for nuclear strike missions. The Mirage 2000 and
Jaguar fighter-bombers remain the central delivery platforms of India’s nuclear posture, with
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three or four squadrons of aircraft assigned nuclear strike missions against Pakistan and China.34
On September 23, 2016, India and France reached an agreement for the procurement of 36
Rafale aircraft to replace the aging Mirage 2000 and Jaguar platforms.35 It is likely that India will
convert some portion of the Rafale acquisition to assume the nuclear missions currently
conducted by the Mirage 2000 and Jaguar aircraft.36
Land-based ballistic missiles have become an increasingly viable leg of India’s nuclear
arsenal. In 1983, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi renewed India’s Integrated Guided Missile
Development Program (IGDMP) to indigenously develop the Prithvi and Agni ballistic missile
families, with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi later accelerating the program.37 India began flighttesting ballistic missiles several years later with the short-range Prithvi I on February 25, 1988.38
The short-range Prithvi-II was the first missile developed under the IGDMP and first deployed in
2003.39 The Agni-I first became operational in 2007, three years after its introduction into the
armed forces, making it the first operational member of the Agni missile family.40 The solid-fuel
Agni missiles have since become increasingly prominent in India’s strategic nuclear forces,41
with the Agni-IV possessing an approximate range of 3,500 kilometers and nearing
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deployment.42 The Agni-V will eventually provide India with its first intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) range of more than 5,000 kilometers.43 Importantly, this improves the
survivability of India’s nuclear arsenal by allowing India to deploy its land-based missiles farther
from the border with China, while still possessing the range to target high-value targets and
major cities on China’s east coast. India is also developing the Nirbhay, a ground-launched
cruise missile that may also be intended for air- and sea-based deployment.44
The sea-based component of India’s deterrent remains the least developed leg of India’s
nuclear triad, but India has recently made notable advancements with its nuclear-armed
submarines.45 After fifty years of research and development on nuclear propulsion, India
commissioned the INS Arihant—India’s first indigenously-built nuclear-powered and ballistic
missile-capable submarine (SSBN)—in August 2016.46 The Arihant’s operational deployment
was delayed in 2017 when it experienced major water damage to its propulsion system caused by
an unsealed hatch while in port.47 In November 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced
that the Arihant had conducted its first deterrent patrol and completed the country’s final and
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most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, although it is unclear whether nuclear weapons were
carried on board during this patrol.48
India currently operates the Dhanush—a liquid-fueled, ship-based version of the PrithviII missile with a range of approximately 400 kilometers—on a pair of Sukanya-class surface
vessels.49 Once India’s nuclear submarines become fully operational, however, the Dhanush will
likely be retired and replaced with a pair of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The
K-15 SLBM was inducted into service in summer 2018, but with a limited range of only 700
kilometers, the K-15 is unable to target Islamabad and could only reach major Chinese cities
from deep within the South China Sea. The K-4 SLBM has a range of 3,500 kilometers and is
currently under development.50 Once the K-4 is operational, it will likely supplant the K-15 on
board India’s SSBNs. The K-4 will enable India’s nuclear-armed submarines to target major
Pakistani and Chinese cities from safer locations in the Indian Ocean that bolster the
survivability of India’s sea-based nuclear platforms.

Nuclear Command and Control in India
India has employed highly assertive command and control measures over its arsenal for
the duration of its nuclear weapons program. The operational specifics of how India maintains
assertive control have evolved over time as India has developed new nuclear technologies and
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modernized its arsenal, but the core principle of political control over nuclear operations remains
inviolable.
Although command and control debates did not receive systematic consideration until
India’s overt weaponization in 1998, India’s arsenal management practices from the late-1980s
until the 1998 tests demonstrated a de facto reliance on assertive control procedures.51 When
India began developing nuclear weapons in the late-1980s, India’s nuclear posture emphasized
three features: limited in size, separated in disposition, and centralized in control.52 These three
features allowed political leaders to physically separate nuclear weapons across multiple
governmental entities and administratively oversee all actions related to the access, movement,
and potential use of nuclear weapons.
India’s civilian leaders have demonstrated a consistent prioritization of negative controls
over nuclear use at the expense of positive controls that would bolster arsenal readiness. As
Vipin Narang notes, “Throughout much of its nuclear history, India has chosen to privilege
assertive control at the expense of the ability to swiftly constitute the bulk of its nuclear
weapons.”53 Because India has traditionally prioritized assertive control measures, a large
portion of India’s nuclear arsenal may take multiple hours or even a full day to prepare for use.
Several scholars note that from the time at which India began stockpiling nuclear weapons in the
late-1980s until at least the late-2000s, India would have required a significant time lag to
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conduct a nuclear attack.54 These measures increase the vulnerability of India’s nuclear arsenal
but allow political leaders to withhold nuclear launch authority late into crises and maintain
centralized political oversight of nuclear operations under a wide range of circumstances.
Following the 1998 tests, India became the first country to publicly announce its nuclear
doctrine. The 1999 draft nuclear doctrine includes a subsection that identifies six dimensions of
India’s nuclear command and control arrangements:
1. Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political
level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime
Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).
2. An effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and
responsiveness shall be in place. An integrated operational plan, or a series of sequential
plans, predicated on strategic objectives and a targeting policy shall form part of the
system.
3. For effective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces
including dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.
4. The survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective command, control,
communications, computing, intelligence and information (C4I2) systems shall be
assured.
5. The Indian defense forces shall be in a position to execute operations in [a
nuclear/biological/chemical weapons] environment with minimal degradation.
6. Space-based and other assets shall be created to provide early warning,
communications, damage/detonation assessment.55
These six dimensions highlight India’s prioritization of assertive control. In addition to explicitly
identifying the prime minister as the sole authority for nuclear use, the draft nuclear doctrine
emphasizes the importance of developing survivable communications and procedures to
guarantee that the prime minister’s office maintains control of nuclear operations deep into
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crises, including scenarios in which the operational environment has been degraded by nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons use.
In 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) revisited the 1999 nuclear draft
doctrine and formally adopted many of the principles proposed in the draft doctrine.56 The 2003
statement reinforces India’s commitment to assertive command and control procedures at
multiple points. For example, the statement reiterates that “Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only
be authorized by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.”57
Furthermore, the statement reads: “The CCS reviewed the existing command and control
structures, the state of readiness, the targeting strategy for a retaliatory attack, and operating
procedures for various stages of alert and launch. The committee expressed satisfaction with the
overall preparedness.”58 After years of de facto adherence to assertive control procedures, India’s
2003 declaratory doctrine provided a de jure basis for the continuation of assertive command and
control practices.
Highly centralized administrative control has remained the central method of political
control over nuclear forces in India since proliferation.59 The 2003 CCS statement on India’s
nuclear doctrine led to the creation of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)—a formal
administrative structure for the command and control of India’s nuclear forces. After planning
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for nuclear operations through informal procedures for over 15 years, Indian policymakers
deemed it necessary to manage its nuclear arsenal through more institutionalized means.60
The NCA entails two councils: first, a political council led by the prime minister; and
second, an executive council led by the national security advisor.61 Although the precise
composition of these councils remains unclear, Harsh Pant observes that “the political council
includes the members of the CCS and the national security advisor, while the executive council
is composed of the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee (COSC) of the three services, the
heads of intelligence agencies, and members of the scientific community associated with the
nuclear program.”62
The creation of the NCA also established an operational arm called the Strategic Forces
Command (SFC). The SFC controls India’s nuclear delivery platforms and is responsible for
executing the orders of the prime minister and national security advisor. The development of the
SFC was largely driven by the political realization that the military would ultimately be required
to conduct nuclear attacks and the armed forces would need to train its personnel accordingly to
improve India’s retaliatory capability.63 Although the NCA formally incorporates the military
into India’s command and control hierarchy, the SFC’s presence in the executive council
guarantees that the military remains firmly under the control of civilian leaders and can only
execute nuclear orders from the appropriate political authorities.
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This administrative control system guarantees that India’s nuclear arsenal firmly remains
under political control during peacetime and even in relatively intense crises.64 The prime
minister has the sole authority to issue orders for nuclear mobilization and use, including the
assembly, movement, or release of nuclear assets.65 The national security advisor is responsible
for assisting the prime minister in the decision to use nuclear weapons and, once the decision to
use nuclear weapons has been made, guaranteeing that the prime minister’s orders are
executed.66 In the event of the prime minister’s death, an alternate chain of command allows the
prime minister’s designated successor to authorize nuclear use.67 The presence of an alternate
chain of command ensures that civilian leaders can guarantee political oversight of nuclear use
decisions deep into crises, even under conditions that have escalated to militarized conflict and
incapacitated the prime minister and his or her immediate successors.
India’s nuclear forces are organized around four levels of readiness, each of which
requires direct authorization from the prime minister’s office: first, arming of the weapons;
second, dispersal of armed weapons to promote arsenal survivable; third, mating of nuclear
weapons to delivery systems; and fourth, release of nuclear weapons to military control.68 Each
of these steps is subject to the two-man rule, requiring multiple individuals to access, move, or
employ nuclear assets and strengthens administrative oversight of nuclear forces.69 Military
custodians of nuclear delivery systems operate within the SFC and execute orders as directed by
the civilian-led NCA. By separating the military units responsible for conventional and nuclear
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operations, India reduces the likelihood of crossing the nuclear threshold without explicit
political authorization.
Importantly, the chain of command for nuclear operations is completely separated from
conventional military operations and subject to direct civilian oversight.70 The SFC’s presence in
the NCA chain of command places the SFC entirely apart from conventional military units and
under strict civilian supervision. This strict separation of nuclear and conventional operations
creates a firewall against unauthorized nuclear use.71 Conventional military units can only plan to
retaliate against an adversary’s attack with conventional forces, leaving the decision to use
nuclear weapons firmly under civilian control. Furthermore, because India’s regional adversaries
deploy dual-use capable military platforms—platforms that can launch conventional or nuclear
weapons—India is likely unable to quickly discriminate between a conventional and nuclear
attack.72 Instead, India will most likely absorb a nuclear first-strike before retaliating with
nuclear force. Under these circumstances, civilian leaders would only provide the SFC control of
complete nuclear platforms and the requisite targeting information after India had experienced a
nuclear attack on its forces or homeland. These measures guarantee that highly centralized
administrative control procedures remain in place at all times for India’s nuclear arsenal.
The existing literature on command and control in India provides little information on the
nature of technical controls over nuclear forces.73 Although India does not appear to employ
advanced PALs, nuclear forces are likely protected by an indigenously developed PAL
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equivalent.74 Multiple interviews with Indian political and military elites support this claim and
offer references to the existence and importance of technical controls over nuclear assets,
although details regarding the sophistication and technological specifics of these controls remain
unclear.75 In the event that India’s political leaders authorize nuclear use, a code appears
necessary at the final stages of deployment to arm and prepare the nuclear weapon for release
across all platforms.76
Physical control has traditionally played an essential role in guaranteeing assertive
control over nuclear forces in India.77 To guarantee that nuclear forces only serve politically
approved purposes, nuclear weapons have historically been disassembled and de-mated from
delivery platforms. At least through the mid-2000s, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)
maintained custody of the fissile pits and the DRDO managed non-fissile components, such as
the nuclear triggers and detonators. Each of these civilian agencies geographically dispersed their
subcomponents across multiple locations to facilitate survivability and inhibit unauthorized
access to a complete nuclear device.78 India’s military forces would operate the country’s
delivery vehicles—such as land-based ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft—but had no
direct access to nuclear weapons components. These measures of arsenal disassembly and
geographic dispersion constituted a “super-PAL” that guaranteed nuclear weapons would only be
used by order of the prime minister or the prime minister’s designated political successor.79
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Despite the apparent continuity in India’s nuclear doctrine over time, some analysts have
recently suggested that India may be changing its strategic and operational nuclear doctrines.80
Recent research by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang provides the most pointed example of
this argument. Clary and Narang argue that India is consciously seeking more flexible nuclear
options that may indicate a shift from a strictly second-strike nuclear posture to a doctrine that
incorporates counterforce capabilities that would allow India to target Pakistan’s strategic
nuclear assets in a nuclear first-strike.81 In addition to observable changes in the composition of
India’s nuclear arsenal, several retired high-level Indian officials have made statements that
appear to give credence to this strategic shift.82 As a result, Clary and Narang find that India’s
command and control procedures are likely becoming more responsive and less assertively
controlled.
Specifically, India’s increasing reliance on canisterized systems undermines the physical
separation and dispersal of nuclear components on which India has based its assertive control
procedures for decades.83 Canisterized systems pre-mate warheads to delivery platforms to
protect solid fuel stores from external elements, increase the lifespan of the missile, allow for
easier handling of the missile, and enable the missile to be launched from almost any location,
rather than requiring a fixed launch site.84 Furthermore, canisterization increases arsenal
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readiness and decreases the length of the launch process by eliminating numerous preparatory
steps before launching a missile. As India continues to canisterize a larger portion of its nuclear
arsenal, its reliance on extremely assertive physical controls is unlikely to persist.
These challenges to assertive control appear especially pronounced as India develops its
SLBM capabilities. Space limitations onboard submarines force SLBMs to be canisterized, and
because the core mission of nuclear submarines is to bolster survivability and strengthen a state’s
retaliatory capability under any conditions, submarine commanders often possess greater
autonomy over nuclear use decisions than other platforms. India’s recent progress in its SSBN
program suggest that the pressures of at-sea deterrence will place additional pressure on India’s
historically assertive command and control procedures.
Clary and Narang correctly note an increasing reliance on canisterized systems that favor
arsenal readiness, but India’s command and control practices remain highly assertive and appear
likely to endure as the arsenal develops.85 Lieutenant General (ret.) Balraj Nagal, commander-inchief of India’s SFC from 2008-2010, referred to India’s increased deployment of canisterized
systems as a natural evolution of nuclear capabilities simply aimed at improving the quality of
India’s nuclear arsenal.86 Arvind Gupta, India’s deputy national security advisor from 20142017, provides further support for this perspective, noting that strict civilian oversight of nuclear
operations will remain an unassailable “guiding principle” of India’s command and control
procedures in the future.87
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As physical controls become less constraining on nuclear use, India is bolstering its
technical and administrative control procedures. Fail-safe technologies are present on all of
India’s current nuclear weapons, and both civilian and military elites expect robust technical and
administrative controls to manage India’s emerging sea-based capabilities. For example, efforts
are currently underway to improve communications with deployed submarines and
administrative procedures to guarantee that civilians retain strict political control over nuclear
use decisions.88 Admiral (ret.) Arun Prakash—Chief of the Naval Staff and Chairman of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee from 2004-2006—doubts that the Indian Navy exercises autonomous
control of nuclear-capable submarines.89 Although the underlying capabilities of India’s nuclear
arsenal are evolving, a commitment to strictly assertive control measures remains central to
India’s command and control practices.

Explaining Assertive Control in India
India’s persistent employment of assertive command and control procedures aligns with
the expected outcome of my theoretical framework, but does this outcome occur for the reasons
predicted by my theory? I argue that the Indian case supports two major implications of my
theory. First, despite a complex external threat environment that includes nuclear, conventional,
and subconventional threats to India’s security from two regional adversaries, India’s
conventional military security facilitates assertive control procedures. Indeed, multiple
interviews with political and military elites indicate that India’s decision-makers view the
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conventional security environment as secure and permissive for assertive control. Second,
India’s conventional security and domestic political stability interact to produce a favorable
threat environment that leads civil-military relations to influence command and control
decisions. Specifically, the Indian military’s low levels of organizational autonomy have
translated into the nuclear realm and resulted in the purposeful exclusion of military influence in
nuclear doctrine. As a result, civilian elites have instituted and maintained highly assertive
command and control systems over India’s nuclear arsenal.

Threat Environment: Conventional Security and Domestic Stability
India has experienced an array of external security challenges since achieving
independence in 1947, ranging from subconventional militant incursions to adversarial relations
with multiple nuclear powers. Despite the presence of numerous external threats to Indian
security, however, I argue that India’s conventional security has allowed domestic-level factors
to determine command and control outcomes. Because India does not face a conventionally
superior adversary with the capability and intent to achieve rapid and significant military gains,
India’s political leaders do not possess incentives to lower the threshold to nuclear use and
instead maintain highly assertive patterns of command and control.
India has an extensive history of conventional military conflict with its neighbors. India
faces an enduring border dispute with China dating back to the 1962 Sino-Indian War in which
Chinese forces decisively defeated India’s military in battle.90 This border dispute remains
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unresolved, with both China and India continuing to deploy significant military forces to the
region. Furthermore, India has engaged in numerous militarized crises and disputes with
Pakistan. After two conflicts over control of Kashmir in 1947 and 1965, India intervened in
support of East Pakistan’s Bengali population with significant military force to decisively defeat
Pakistani forces, severing Pakistan in two and resulting in the independent state of Bangladesh.
In the years immediately following Indian independence, conventional military conflict became a
central aspect of India’s external security environment.
Despite a prolonged history of militarized conflict with China and Pakistan, however,
India’s political leaders have retained strictly assertive control over nuclear operations. The
mountainous border with China limits the potential avenues for an offensive incursion and
provides India with a defensively advantageous position that facilitates a defense-in-depth
strategy, making a conventional Chinese attack on Indian territory unlikely to existentially
threaten India’s territorial sovereignty.91 Interviews with senior military and civilian officials
confirm that threat assessments by Indian elites reflect these circumstances, with leaders viewing
the conventional threat from China as non-existential and unlikely to escalate into a broader
conflict.92 Nuclear weapons therefore provide an “insurance policy” against conventional attacks
by China,93 allowing civilian leaders to maintain centralized control over nuclear decisions.94
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With respect to Pakistan, India enjoys clear numerical conventional superiority in land,
air, and sea capabilities.95 Bharat Karnad—a member of the first National Security Advisory
Board (NSAB) which produced India’s 1999 draft nuclear doctrine—suggests that Pakistan’s
conventional inferiority limited its influence on India’s earliest command and control decisions
and continues to be a low-priority threat.96 Combined, the inability of China and Pakistan to pose
an existential threat to Indian security with conventional military forces allows India’s political
leaders to maintain assertive command and control practices.
China and Pakistan also pose a range of nuclear threats to India’s security. China has
recently pursued a nuclear modernization program to bolster its second-strike capabilities,97
resulting in a stockpile of nearly 300 nuclear warheads deliverable by land- and sea-based
ballistic missiles and air-delivered gravity bombs.98 Analysts further expect China to increase the
number of land-based missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs),99 which will improve China’s offensive nuclear capabilities.100 Pakistan’s arsenal also
continues to grow and diversify, with an arsenal of approximately 140-150 warheads deliverable
by land- and air-based platforms.101 Notably, Pakistan’s arsenal includes the Nasr/Hatf-IX
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missile system—a tactical nuclear platform with a maximum range of approximately 60-70
kilometers that presents a unique challenge to India’s security.102
Although India shares borders with two nuclear states possessing a breadth of nuclear
capabilities, India’s command and control systems remain assertive. As predicted by my
theoretical framework, given a relatively benign conventional threat environment, Indian
policymakers view nuclear weapons as tools for deterring nuclear aggression by China and
Pakistan. Indeed, Manoj Joshi—a former NSAB member within India’s National Security
Council—explicitly noted that the absence of existential conventional threats allows India to
narrowly employ nuclear weapons as deterrents against other nuclear arsenals.103 Whereas
conventional threats to Indian security would incentivize the delegation of nuclear authority, the
presence of two nuclear rivals does not similarly compel India’s civilian elites to entrust the
military with nuclear autonomy. Instead, India’s political leaders maintain highly centralized
control over nuclear use decisions.
In addition to large-scale conventional and nuclear threats, India also faces acts of statesponsored terrorism by Pakistan.104 Although Indian policymakers hoped that overtly testing
nuclear weapons in 1998 might reduce Pakistan’s support for subconventional attacks against
India, the opposite result occurred. Instead, Pakistan used the seemingly greater threat of nuclear
escalation to continue its support for terrorist groups, including the 1999 attacks that began the
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Kargil War.105 The challenges of countering Pakistan’s sponsorship of subconventional attacks
have become even greater since the deployment of the Nasr/Hatf-IX tactical weapon platform,
which threatens the first-use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression.106
Nevertheless, these challenges have not caused India to contemplate more delegative command
and control frameworks. Although India’s policymakers view Pakistan’s use of tactical nuclear
weapons to create a shield behind which to support subconventional attacks as a severe foreign
policy challenge, the delegation of nuclear authority is not considered to be a viable policy
response.107
Instead, India’s military forces have developed “proactive strategy operations”—
commonly referred to as Cold Start—to deter Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks.108 The goal of
the Cold Start doctrine is to “establish the capacity to launch a retaliatory conventional strike
against Pakistan that would inflict significant harm on the Pakistan Army before the international
community could intercede, and at the same time, pursue narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad
a justification to escalate the clash to the nuclear level.”109 This would entail India rapidly
massing ground and airpower to make limited territorial gains—perhaps as shallow as 50
kilometers into Pakistani territory—and then use these territorial gains to extract concessions
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from Pakistan in post-conflict negotiations.110 Although Cold Start faces numerous challenges
and has failed to deter Pakistani support for subconventional attacks, the continued study of
proactive strategy operations further demonstrates India’s reliance on conventional military
forces to address non-nuclear threats.111 As a result, India’s reliance on assertive command and
control procedures remains unchallenged by external security threats.
In addition to its external security, India’s political regime has remained insulated from
domestic threats for the duration of its nuclear weapons program. To the extent that India has
experienced domestic instability, this instability has come in the form of inter-caste conflicts and
nationalist movements.112 Since independence, the Congress Party—India’s historically
predominant political party—has provided a highly institutionalized democratic party with broad
ethnic support that seeks to reduce social cleavages.113 Although ethnic tensions remain
prevalent, India’s democratic system continues to function without significant threats to the
established political order. Furthermore, India’s military organizations have remained
uninvolved in politics and do not pose a threat to civilian leaders. Despite occasional tensions
between civilian leaders and military organizations—especially during the initial period after
Indian independence—P. R. Chari notes: “at no time was the basic principle of civilian
supremacy questioned or challenged.”114 Combined, India’s external conventional security and
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domestic political stability have generated a permissive threat environment that allows for
India’s civil-military relations to influence command and control decisions.

Military Organizational Autonomy
Strict civilian control of the military has a long legacy in India’s civil-military relations.
India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru “thoroughly indoctrinated” the military with the
principles of civilian control in the early years of independence.115 Nehru’s subjugation of
military forces to strict civilian oversight reflected his disdain and distrust of the military. As
Stephen Cohen observes in his influential study on India’s strategic and military power, Nehru
“brought to the office [of the prime minister] a strong distaste for armed forces and things
military.”116 Additionally, Nehru viewed the Indian Army as an untrustworthy tool of the British
Raj. P. R. Chari supports this view, stating that “The Indian political leadership had developed in
circumstances which predisposed it to an antipathy for the civil administrators and armed forces,
who had been utilized as the instruments of foreign domination.”117 As a result, Nehru prioritized
economic development and state capacity over military power during the aftermath of
decolonization.118 India’s civilian leaders only became increasingly wary of military influence in
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politics as they watched Pakistan’s General Ayub Khan successfully lead the first military
takeover of the Pakistani government in 1958.119
Over time, India’s civilians have tightened control over all aspects of military affairs,
including acquisitions, training, and recruitment.120 Two critical changes occurred shortly after
Indian independence in 1947 that institutionally cemented civilian control of the military.121
First, civilian elites abolished the post of the military commander-in-chief, which had served as
the primary military advisor to the civilian government. In her study of India’s civil-military
relations, Ayesha Ray notes that “The abolition of the post of Commander in Chief was felt
necessary by India’s political leadership to prevent the Indian armed forces from directly
challenging civilian authority.”122 Second, Indian leaders established the Ministry of Defense to
act as an intermediary between civilian and military leaders to minimize the threats to civilian
control.123 The institutionalized marginalization of the military has since remained a core tenet of
Indian civil-military relations and in nearly every regard India’s military experiences
exceptionally low levels of organizational autonomy.
The institutionalized distrust of the military extends to the nuclear realm. India’s nuclear
weapons program developed exclusively under the supervision of political leaders and civilian
scientists. During this period, scientists exercised particularly strong influence over the trajectory
of the nuclear program, as they had direct access to the prime minister’s office and control over
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many budgetary decisions.124 Political leaders excluded the military from deliberations regarding
the 1974 nuclear test and, although India’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons became clear
after the 1974 test, the military did not plan for the incorporation of nuclear weapons into its
force structure.125 The 1986 Brasstacks crisis between India and Pakistan demonstrates the lack
of military knowledge regarding the nuclear program, as India’s military leaders were uncertain
about their ability to deliver nuclear warheads if the crisis escalated to a level that warranted
nuclear use.126 Gaurav Kampani’s research suggests that civilian leaders purposefully sought to
withhold autonomy from military organizations in the nuclear realm. As Kampani states: “Until
1998, the air force was the only military service with any knowledge of the weaponization
program because of its role in delivering the weapons. But even as the user service tasked with
delivery, until the early 1990s, it only participated in the weaponization program at the
margins.”127
From its inception, India’s nuclear weapons program was political rather than military in
purpose.128 When civilian elites began to fashion an official nuclear doctrine after the 1998 tests,
leaders prioritized the political objective of maintaining centralized control of nuclear decisions
over the military applications and implications of an operational nuclear capability. Political
leaders exhibited a preference for air-delivery platforms due to their safe and secure delivery
methods that facilitate assertive control.129 In practice, by the mid-1990s a nuclear response from
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India would require: first, the DAE would assess the political situation and, if the DAE deemed it
appropriate, pass the fissile cores to the DRDO; second, the DRDO would fully assemble the
nuclear weapons; and third, the DRDO would deliver the fully assembled weapons to the Indian
Air Force.130 Emergency drills were highly informal and unpracticed at this time and, as
recounted by Gaurav Kampani, “Command and control essentially meant gathering all the
members of the group (nuclear network) under one roof as quickly as possible.”131 These
command and control procedures allowed India to maintain its nuclear deterrent “force in being”
without requiring delegation to nuclear commanders.132
The group responsible for drafting India’s nuclear doctrine had almost no experts on
nuclear strategy and operations on the committee, resulting in very little attention to
operationalizing the arsenal.133 According to Admiral (ret.) Arun Prakash, a key driver of the
emphasis on centralized control during this phase was the fear that providing the military access
to nuclear weapons would grant the military an unacceptable lever of domestic power with which
to challenge civilian authority.134 Vice Admiral (ret.) Verghese Koithara supports this
perspective, noting that civilians have systematically resisted incorporating the military into the
nuclear chain of command. Koithara argues that “Keeping the military at arm’s length and
sidelining military competencies the way India has done has no parallel in global nuclear
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weapons development history.”135 Instead, India’s political leaders have traditionally preferred to
consult DAE and DRDO scientists on nuclear matters.136
The fear of a unified military body remains the primary reason for civilian opposition to
the establishment of a chief of defense staff (CDS) post for the military.137 The CDS would be
functionally similar to the U.S. chairman of joint chiefs of staff, with a single military officer
coordinating military affairs across services and providing a single point of counsel to the prime
minister. Several senior officers have openly called for the establishment of a CDS to improve
jointness between India’s services and allow the military to inform policy debates.138
Multiple committees have also advocated for the creation of a CDS. For example, the
Kargil Review Committee—organized in 1999 to review national security matters after India’s
slow and ineffective response to a group of Pakistan Army paramilitary and proxy fighters
occupying a portion of territory in Kashmir—argued in favor of replacing the COSC with a
CDS.139 The report bluntly states: “The COSC has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate. It
needs to be strengthened by the addition of a CDS and a Vice-Chief of Defense Staff
(VCDS).”140 Similarly, the 2011-2012 Naresh Chandra Committee reviewed India’s defense
management practices and advocated for the creation of a permanent chairman of the COSC.141
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The CDS position would allow the chairman of the COSC to relay information between the
prime minister’s office and SFC and focus entirely on strategic military debates, rather than also
considering service-specific issues.142 Nevertheless, the fear of military influence in political
affairs continues to inhibit institutional change and the development of a unified military
command.143
The same fears preventing the establishment of the CDS post have also reinforced the
division between conventional and nuclear operational planning. Rear Admiral (ret.) Raja
Menon—one of India’s foremost strategic thinkers—suggests that the core motivation for
maintaining this division is the concern that unifying both domains under a single military
command would result in a loss of civilian oversight and empower the military to influence
policy.144 As a result, some analysts worry that inadvertent escalation during crises is more
likely, as the military’s lack of training on the connections between conventional and nuclear
disputes precludes proper planning procedures.145 For their part, senior civilians maintain that the
military’s official role in the NCA provides the military with a sufficient point of access for
informing nuclear policy debates.146
The institutional structure of the SFC illustrates the lack of military influence in nuclear
decision-making processes. Although the military’s service chiefs can advise the NCA’s political
council if requested by civilian leaders during a crisis, the service chiefs do not regularly meet
with the political council.147 Furthermore, the SFC cannot interact with the DAE or DRDO
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unless approved by the NCA.148 On an institutional level, the military has been so thoroughly
excluded from launch authority processes that this division has been referred to as “a policy of
segregation.”149
The SFC also experiences a pair of internal challenges that reduce the likelihood of the
military challenging civilian leadership. First, the SFC is a tri-service command, meaning that
general officers from the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force take turns directing the SFC. This
rotation of officers keeps the military disorganized and prevents any single service from
dominating nuclear debates and posing a challenge to political authority.150 Second, because
many commander-in-chiefs of the SFC return to another role after their SFC posting, these
officers cannot risk challenging their civilian superiors without simultaneously threatening their
future career trajectory.151 Ultimately, these conditions make it so that the military has enough
structure to execute civilian mandates, but with minimal organizational autonomy and capacity
to influence nuclear policy.

Evaluating the Explanations
The Indian case offers support for my theoretical framework. Throughout its nuclear
experience, India has adopted highly assertive patterns of command and control. Despite a
complex security environment that includes a range of nuclear, conventional, and
subconventional threats, India’s conventional security allows political leaders to maintain
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centralized control over nuclear weapons decisions. The interaction of India’s conventional
security and domestic political stability produce a permissive threat environment that make civilmilitary relations essential for explaining India’s nuclear management practices. Specifically,
India’s low levels of military organizational autonomy translate into the nuclear realm and result
in civilian leaders exercising strictly assertive control over nuclear forces.
The three alternative explanations to my theoretical framework experience mixed results.
First, the civil-military stability hypothesis fails to explain India’s assertive nuclear command
and control arrangements. The civil-military stability hypothesis predicts that India’s history of
stable civil-military relations would create a sense of trust between civilian authorities and
military operators that produces delegative command and control arrangements. Given the
unquestioned supremacy of civilian authority within India’s military organizations and an
absence of attempted military interventions in politics, India provides an easy test for this
argument. Nevertheless, whereas the civil-military stability hypothesis predicts delegative
control, India’s assertive command and control systems demonstrate the opposite behavior as
predicted by this hypothesis. My argument agrees that civil-military relations matter for
command and control outcomes under certain conditions, but rather than the stability of civilmilitary relations, I demonstrate that it is the level of military organizational autonomy that
explains assertive command and control systems in India.
Second, the arsenal vulnerability hypothesis poorly explains India’s assertive command
and control arrangements. This hypothesis predicts that an increased vulnerability of physical
nuclear assets or the supporting command and control infrastructure should cause India to adopt
more delegative command and control systems. Two problems emerge for this hypothesis. First,
India’s command and control decisions have not been responsive to shifts in the regional nuclear
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balance of power. For example, despite possessing loosely planned and poorly institutionalized
command and control procedures that made India vulnerable to nuclear decapitation before
establishing the SFC in 2003, Indian leaders maintained highly centralized assertive control over
nuclear weapons during this period. Furthermore, India’s command and control systems have
remained assertive while its regional adversaries expand their offensive nuclear capabilities,
including China’s nuclear modernization program. Second, interviews with political and military
elites in India revealed an emphasis on conventional threats in command and control
deliberations, rather than nuclear threats and vulnerabilities. Guaranteeing the survivability of
command and control systems has been a priority in India since the release of the 1999 draft
nuclear doctrine, but the vulnerability of India’s nuclear arsenal has not led to delegative
command and control systems. Instead, my theory demonstrates that India’s conventional
security reduces the incentives for India to delegate control and lower the nuclear threshold to
deter conventional attacks, allowing civilian elites to maintain assertive control over India’s
nuclear arsenal.
Third, the strategic rationale hypothesis offers the most persuasive alternative explanation
to explain assertive command and control in India. The strategic rationale hypothesis predicts
that India’s adherence to a late-use assured retaliation posture allows political leaders to
centralize control over nuclear operations late into a crisis. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates a
strong correlation between India’s nuclear strategy and command and control arrangements and a
declaratory commitment to the principle of no first-use.152 However, differentiating the effects of
the strategic rationale hypothesis from my theory is made difficult by the effects of the variables
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within my theoretical framework on India’s nuclear posture. For example, Vipin Narang notes
that “India is in a relatively secure position but with highly assertive civil-military relations,
driving it toward an assured retaliation posture.”153 One possibility, therefore, is that the factors
that my theory identifies to explain command and control systems also influence India’s strategic
nuclear doctrine. Furthermore, although the strategic rationale hypothesis contributes to the
explanation for India’s command and control arrangements, my theory’s emphasis on India’s
low levels of military organizational autonomy receives substantial support from interviews with
Indian political and military elites. In sum, these observations suggest that the strategic rationale
hypothesis supplements my theory, rather than competing with it.
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CHAPTER 4
PAKISTAN

A substantial literature addresses the effects of nuclear weapons on conflict behavior and
crisis stability in South Asia,1 but the operational dimensions of nuclear doctrine typically
receive less attention than these strategic considerations.2 The primary motivation for analysts to
study Pakistan’s nuclear command and control systems has traditionally stemmed from persistent
concerns regarding domestic terrorists and religious extremists within civilian bodies and
military organizations.3 My study of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control arrangements
advances current understandings of nuclear operations in Pakistan by emphasizing the political
and strategic sources of command and control decisions, as well as providing a novel conceptual
framework for classifying Pakistan’s command and control systems.

Influential works include: Lowell Dittmer, “South Asia’s Security Dilemma,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 6
(November/December 2001), pp. 897-906; Sumit Ganguly, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International
Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 45-70; Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb:
Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2010); Devin T. Hagerty,
“Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter
1995/96), pp. 79-114; S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South
Asia (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2007); S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why
Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 127-152;
S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008),
pp. 71-94; and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 6
(November/December 2001), pp. 1064-1086.
2
Several notable exceptions include: Feroz Hassan Khan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia,”
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 59-74; Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Command-andControl in South Asia During Peace, Crisis, and War,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 2005), pp.
163-174; Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International
Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 38-78.
3
A volume from 2008 includes multiple contributions that address the range of potential threats to Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal. For examples, see: Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent
Fuel Cask or a Comercial Irradiation Source in Transport,” Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future:
Worries Beyond War (Carlisle, P.A.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), pp. 221-276; Chaim Braun, “Security Issues
Related to Pakistan’s Future Nuclear Power Program,” in Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, pp. 277-346;
Thomas Donnelly, “Bad Options: Or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Live with Loose Nukes,” in Sokolski,
ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, pp. 347-368.
1

99
In this chapter, I show that Pakistan employs conditional command and control systems
that entail centralized oversight of nuclear operations during peacetime and the rapid delegation
of nuclear use capability early in crises. These conditional control arrangements allow Pakistan
to address the competing internal and external pressures on its nuclear command and control
systems. Internally, conditional control enables safeguards against domestic instability during
peacetime. Externally, conditional control facilitates the delegation of nuclear use capability
early in a crisis to lower the nuclear threshold and credibly deter conventional aggression. In
Pakistan, conditional command and control arrangements strengthen peacetime arsenal safety
and security against the challenges of religious extremism, domestic terrorism, and political
instability, while also preparing the arsenal for use early in a conventional crisis with India.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program began in the aftermath of the 1971 India-Pakistan
War.4 The 1971 war divided Pakistan in two when India militarily intervened in support of
Bengali dissidents and decisively defeated Pakistani forces, transforming East Pakistan into the
sovereign state of Bangladesh. Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Hassan Khan notes the importance
of the 1971 war on Pakistan’s strategic thinking, stating that “No other event in the history of
Pakistan left as indelible a mark as the humiliating defeat of 1971, a key theme of Pakistani
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strategic culture today.”5 Indeed, almost immediately after Pakistan’s defeat in December 1971,
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto initiated a formal nuclear weapons program in January 1972.6
The 1972 decision to develop nuclear weapons demonstrates that Pakistan’s conventional
defeat prompted Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, rather than India’s 1974 nuclear tests.
Instead, India’s 1974 nuclear test strengthened Pakistan’s determination to obtain nuclear
weapons. As Samina Ahmed observes in her historical analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear program,
“Pakistan’s resolve to establish a nuclear weapons infrastructure was reinforced when India
detonated a nuclear device in May 1974, another turning point that set Pakistan irrevocably along
the nuclear weapons path.”7
Pakistan simultaneously developed parallel tracks of plutonium reprocessing and uranium
enrichment in its efforts to produce weapons grade material. The Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) took charge of the pursuit of the plutonium reprocessing route.8 Pakistan
signed an agreement with France in 1976 to purchase a plutonium reprocessing plant, but the
U.S. intervened to cancel the deal for fears of potential nuclear proliferation. Pakistan claimed
that the reprocessing plant would serve the country’s domestic energy needs, but the lack of
technological and economic resources to develop such an expansive nuclear infrastructure
indicated to the U.S. that the reprocessing plant would be used for military purposes.9 The U.S.
successfully pressured France to cancel its deal with Pakistan in 1977.10 Nevertheless, Pakistan
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remained persistent in its pursuit of fuel reprocessing facilities and the PAEC achieved
reprocessing capability in 1987.11
Pakistan’s pursuit of an indigenous uranium enrichment capability was made possible by
Abdul Qadeer “A. Q.” Khan, a Pakistani scientist who stole the necessary technology and
blueprints for uranium enrichment from a Uranium Enrichment Consortium (URENCO) in
Almelo, Netherlands.12 As Vipin Narang notes, the uranium enrichment route provided
numerous benefits to Pakistan: “the enrichment program was cheaper, more viable given the
technology then available to Pakistan, and easier to obfuscate, thereby giving Pakistan plausible
deniability that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.”13 After ousting Prime Minister
Bhutto in a 1977 coup, General Zia ul-Haq accelerated Pakistan’s development of its uranium
enrichment capabilities.14 Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) enriched sufficient weapons-grade
uranium for a nuclear device by the mid-1980s, with A. Q. Khan publicly stating in 1984 that
Pakistan had achieved an indigenous uranium enrichment capacity.15
Much like India, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capabilities remained ambiguous throughout
most of the 1980s and 1990s. When India tested five nuclear devices in May 1998, however,
Pakistan promptly followed suit and tested six nuclear devices later that month.16 As Pakistan’s
foreign minister Shamshad Ahmad stated the following year, “To restore strategic balance to
South Asia, Pakistan was obliged to respond to India’s May 1998 nuclear blasts…Pakistan’s
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nuclear tests were undertaken in self-defense.”17 Pakistan conducted these tests despite threats
from the U.S. to impose sanctions if Pakistan tested a nuclear device.18 On May 28, 1998,
Pakistan officially became the world’s ninth state to indigenously develop a nuclear weapons
capability.19
Pakistan has adopted two distinct nuclear strategies since developing a deliverable
nuclear weapons capability. First, Pakistan employed a “catalytic” nuclear strategy from the late1980s until the end of the Cold War in 1991.20 According to Vipin Narang, a catalytic nuclear
posture:
primarily envisions catalyzing third-party—often American—military or diplomatic
assistance when a state’s vital interests are threatened. It can do so by threatening to
break out known nuclear capabilities or previously ambiguous or non-operational nuclear
capabilities and escalate a conflict if assistance is not forthcoming…Because even a small
risk of nuclear use may be sufficient to trigger third-party intercession, this posture can
be executed with a limited arsenal that may not even be fully assembled or functional.21
Pakistan’s catalytic nuclear strategy primarily aimed to mobilize the United States to intervene
on its behalf in the event of a conventional conflict with India. This strategy sought to offset
Pakistan’s conventional inferiority by signaling to the U.S. that a conventional conflict in South
Asia might escalate across the nuclear threshold. The catalytic strategic option was made
possible by Pakistan’s belief that it could rely upon the U.S. to intervene in such an event
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because of Pakistan’s importance to the U.S.’s covert war in Afghanistan against the Soviet
Union during this time period.22
Two crises with India between 1986 and 1990 exemplify Pakistan’s catalytic nuclear
posture. First, Pakistan threatened to overtly weaponize its nuclear capabilities during the 198687 Brasstacks crisis.23 The Brasstacks crisis began in late-1986 when India conducted a massive
military exercise codenamed Brasstacks near the India-Pakistan border.24 The Indian Army
deployed approximately 250,000 troops and 1,300 tanks grouped into Reorganized Army Plains
Infantry Division (RAPID) formations with support from the Indian Air Force, which conducted
close air support sorties to practice combined arms operations. These operational concepts were
“designed to be partly mobile but capable of holding territory, which was a uniquely Indian
concept suitable for the India-Pakistan theater.”25
The massive scale and close proximity of the Brasstacks exercise to Pakistan’s borders
caused alarm amongst Pakistan’s ruling elites and led to the deployment of two Pakistani corps
to the border.26 At the crisis developed, U.S. leaders feared that Pakistan might weaponize its
nuclear capabilities. This prospect troubled U.S. policymakers, as an overtly nuclear Pakistan
would require the U.S. to enforce the 1985 Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, which would ban military and economic assistance to Pakistan unless the U.S. president

22

Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 56.
Ibid., pp. 62-65.
24
For overviews of the Brasstacks crisis, see Kanti Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen Cohen, and
Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (Delhi: Manohar,
1995); P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American
Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 39-79; Sumit Ganguly and
Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle, W.A.:
University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 68-81.
25
Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, pp. 44-45. Each RAPID formation included two
infantry brigades and one mechanized brigade.
26
Ibid., pp. 51-56.
23

104
annually certified to Congress that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons.27 Severing support
at this time would have threatened the prospects for continued Pakistani assistance in the war
effort in Afghanistan—the U.S.’s primary foreign policy interest in South Asia at the time.28
Although the U.S. ultimately played a limited role in the Brasstacks crisis, Pakistan’s repeated
threats to weaponize its nuclear program demonstrated the viability of its catalytic nuclear
posture by mobilizing the U.S. to open diplomatic conversations with Pakistan and India to ease
tensions.29
The 1990 Kashmir Compound crisis provides a second example of Pakistan’s catalytic
nuclear posture.30 This crisis began in early-1990 when Pakistan provided support and supplies
for Kashmiri militants operating in Indian territory. India responded by deploying troops to
Punjab and Kashmir, which resulted in Pakistan deploying I Corps and II Corps to the IndiaPakistan border. The crisis continued to escalate and by March 1990, India had placed 200,000
troops in Kashmir, Pakistan deployed 100,000 troops to the region, and both countries positioned
full corps-size units in Punjab and Rajasthan.31
As the crisis escalated, Pakistan signaled to the United States that it was willing to
escalate across the nuclear threshold. In his well-known account of the 1990 Kashmir Compound
crisis, Seymour Hersh states that “the Bush Administration became convinced that the world was
on the edge of a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India.”32 U.S. intelligence agencies
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estimated that Pakistan possessed between six and ten nuclear weapons by 1993.33 As the crisis
deepened, Pakistan moved its potentially nuclear-capable F-16s closer to the border and U.S.
analysts obtained high-confidence intelligence that General Mirza Aslam Beg—Pakistan’s Army
chief—“had authorized the technicians at Kahuta to put together nuclear weapons.”34 Whether
Pakistan actually readied nuclear weapons or merely feigned its willingness to cross the nuclear
threshold, the U.S. ultimately organized a mission led by Deputy National Security Advisor
Robert Gates to meet with Indian and Pakistani leaders. Shortly after the Gates mission, India
withdrew its armored units from Rajasthan and the crisis ended within two weeks.35 Pakistan’s
catalytic nuclear posture successfully mobilized U.S. support and guaranteed that the
conventionally superior India would not attack Pakistan’s homeland.36
As the Cold War ended, the U.S. no longer required Pakistani assistance to combat the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Pakistan could no longer rely upon the U.S. to intervene on its
behalf in disputes with India. Ambassador Robert Oakley—the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan
from 1988-1991—recalls that “there was also a feeling…that once again, the United States was
beginning to tilt toward India. And if there were a crunch, the United States would let Pakistan
down once again.”37 President George H. W. Bush’s refusal to certify that Pakistan did not
possess nuclear weapons in September 1990 gave credence to this perspective and invoked the

33

Ibid.
Ibid. Although questions remained regarding the ability of Pakistan’s F-16s to deliver nuclear weapons at this
time, analysts still worried that Pakistan could drop a nuclear device from the back of a C-130 cargo plane. Narang,
“Posturing for Peace?”, p. 54.
35
Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” pp. 100-101.
36
Devin Hagerty also notes the importance for Pakistan to obtain U.S. support, as “Washington had thoroughly wargamed the Indo-Pakistani confrontation, and Pakistan was the loser in every scenario.” Ibid., p. 101.
37
Ambassador Robert Oakley, quoted in Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruqee, eds., Conflict Prevention and
Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis, Occasional Paper No. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Henry
L. Stimson Center, April 1994), p. 7.
34

106
Pressler Amendment,38 resulting in the suspension of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan in
October 1990.39
The loss of the United States as a third-party patron caused Pakistan to transition to a
second nuclear posture. Since 1991, Pakistan has sought to develop and strengthen a posture of
asymmetric escalation.40 As defined by Vipin Narang, “an asymmetric escalation posture
attempts to directly deter conventional conflict by another nuclear or non-nuclear state in toto by
threatening the first use of nuclear weapons in either a tactical or strategic strike.”41 Whereas
Pakistan’s catalytic strategy sought to indirectly deter India by catalyzing U.S. support during a
conventional crisis, Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture seeks to directly deter a
conventional or nuclear attack.
In his study of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy, Michael Krepon identifies four pillars of
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine that underpin its nuclear strategy:
First, they assert that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is India-specific. Second, Pakistan has
embraced a doctrine of credible, minimum deterrence…Third, the requirements for
credible, minimal deterrence are not fixed; instead, they are determined by a dynamic
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threat environment. And fourth, given India’s conventional military advantages, Pakistan
reserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in extremis.42
The definitive characteristic of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is its explicit willingness to use
nuclear weapons first in a conflict. The other three pillars of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, in
contrast, are more flexible. For instance, although Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is primarily aimed
at India, concerns regarding U.S. plans to seize or destroy Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have led to
an alternative formulation of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy in which nuclear weapons “deter all
forms of aggression, mainly from India.”43 Furthermore, qualitative and quantitative
improvements to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are consistent with the formulation of credible
minimum deterrence insofar as these improvements are considered necessary to guarantee the
survivability and reliability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.44
Pakistan has publicly signaled its willingness to use nuclear weapons first in response to a
range of threats. In 2002, Lieutenant General (ret.) Khalid Kidwai—Director General of SPD
from 2000-2013—identified four conditions under which Pakistan would use nuclear weapons:
first, India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory (space threshold); second, India destroys a
large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces (military threshold); third, India economically strangles
Pakistan (economic strangling threshold); or fourth, India destabilizes Pakistan via internal
subversion (domestic destabilization threshold).45 In the context of a conventional conflict,
Kidwai’s remarks clearly demonstrate that Pakistan is willing to use nuclear weapons in response
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to a serious degradation of its conventional forces, even before India is able to seize significant
portions of Pakistani territory. As I describe in the next section, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has
evolved to provide the necessary capabilities to credibly threaten nuclear first-use under such
conditions.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal
Pakistan’s intentional ambiguity regarding its nuclear capabilities in the 1980s and 1990s
purposefully mimicked that of India. Although Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear ambiguity during
this period makes it difficult to identify the precise date on which Pakistan acquired nuclear
weapons, it appears that Pakistan was capable of producing nuclear weapons by 1987.46 This
observation is supported by previous U.S. intelligence estimates and statements by Pakistani
leaders. For instance, in 1993 former deputy director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Richard Kerr went on record to state: “There is no question that we had an intelligence basis for
not certifying [the absence of Pakistani nuclear weapons] from 1987 on.”47 Furthermore,
Pakistan’s President Zia ul-Haq announced in a March 1987 interview that “Pakistan has the
capability of building the Bomb.”48 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status would nevertheless remain
opaque from this time until late-May 1998 when the country tested six nuclear devices and
overtly demonstrated its status as a nuclear weapons state.
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Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons would have been delivered by aircraft. Pakistan’s PAEC
and KRL successfully conducted “cold tests” in 1984 to demonstrate the viability of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapon design, but Pakistan’s only nuclear weapon design “was still a large bomb that
could be delivered only by a C-130 cargo aircraft with no assurance of delivery accuracy.”49 The
U.S. began supplying F-16 multirole fighter aircraft to Pakistan between 1983 and 1987 and,
although the U.S. did not transfer any aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, Pakistan
promptly modified these F-16s for nuclear missions. The F-16 appears to have been Pakistan’s
first nuclear-capable aircraft, but the French-designed Mirage V fighter-bombers quickly became
nuclear-capable, as well.50 The F-16 and Mirage V remain the core air-delivery platforms of
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, with the U.S. agreeing to provide a mid-life upgrade for Pakistan’s
existing F-16s in 2006.51 Recent U.S. export sanctions have caused Pakistan to acquire Chinesesupplied JF-17 fighter aircraft that may also become nuclear-capable. JF-17s may provide a
platform for Pakistan’s dual-capable Ra’ad/Hatf-VIII air-launched cruise missile, but specific
plans for the JF-17’s nuclear role remain unclear.52
Land-based ballistic missiles constitute the core of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.53
Pakistan conducted its first successful test of its short-range Hatf-I ballistic missile on April 25,
1989 and has continued to increase its land-based ballistic missile capabilities until present.54
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Currently, Pakistan deploys four short-range ballistic missile systems: first, the Abdali/Hatf-II,
with a range of 200 kilometers; second, the Ghaznavi/Hatf-III, with a range of 300 kilometers;
third, the Shaheen-I/Hatf-IV, with a range of 750 kilometers; and fourth, the Nasr/Hatf-IX, with
a range of 60-70 kilometers. Pakistan also deploys two medium-range ballistic missiles: first, the
Ghauri/Hatf-V with a range of 1,250 kilometers; and second, the Shaheen-II/Hatf-VI, with a
range of 1,500 kilometers. Each of these missiles is solid-fueled and delivered by a road-mobile
transporter erector launcher (TEL), providing Pakistan with the ability to rapidly launch its
missiles and greater mobility to increase survivability.55
Pakistan is currently developing two ground-launched missiles that will provide new
capabilities for its nuclear arsenal. First, Pakistan is developing the medium-range Ababeel, a
solid-fuel missile with an estimated range of approximately 2,200 kilometers. In addition to the
Ababeel’s increased range, the Pakistan government claims that the missile is capable of carrying
multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).56 MIRV technology would provide
Pakistan with increased offensive capabilities and increase the number of warheads available per
launcher if an adversary’s first-strike failed to destroy all MIRV-capable missiles.57 Second,
Pakistan continues to develop the Babur/Hatf-VII ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). The
Babur’s ability to fly at low altitudes and maneuver in flight provide Pakistan with improved
offensive capabilities to defeat an adversary’s air defenses. The Babur was last tested in 2014
and is probably currently deployed within the armed forces.58 Pakistan is currently developing an
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updated version of the Babur GLCM—the Babur-II—which will extend the missile’s range from
350 kilometers to 700 kilometers.59
Perhaps the most noteworthy recent development in Pakistan’s land-based ballistic
missile inventory is the deployment of the Nasr/Hatf-IX in 2013.60 The Nasr is a tactical nuclear
weapon that—due to its limited range of 60-70 kilometers—cannot reach major Indian cities and
appears uniquely intended for battlefield use against India’s conventional forces.61 The Nasr
provides Pakistan with an operational capability to bolster its first-use nuclear doctrine and
credibly threaten nuclear retaliation in response to conventional Indian aggression.
Pakistan does not yet deploy a sea-based nuclear platform, but significant developments
are underway to provide Pakistan with an operational sea-based deterrent. Lieutenant General
(ret.) Kidwai confirmed Pakistan’s interest in a sea-based nuclear platform in 2015, stating that
“The assured second-strike capability comes from being sea-based” and that “this capability will
come into play in the next few years.”62 Pakistan is currently developing the Babur-III, a sealaunched cruise missile (SLCM) variant of the Babur-II GLCM. The Babur-III SLCM has been
tested successfully twice, most recently on March 29, 2018 from “an underwater dynamic
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platform.”63 Once the Babur-III is ready for deployment, it will likely be deployed on Pakistan’s
diesel-electric Agosta class submarines.64

Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan
Pakistan employs conditional command and control over its nuclear arsenal. Conditional
control allows Pakistan to centralize political and military oversight of nuclear use decisions
during peacetime, while also enabling the rapid delegation of nuclear use authority during crises
to deter conventional aggression and bolster arsenal reliability. These conditional control
arrangements reflect the competing imperatives of external security threats that require the early
delegation of nuclear use capability and domestic political instability that compels actors to
assert control over nuclear doctrine and operations.
Nuclear command and control systems were largely informal until Pakistan’s overt
nuclearization in May 1998.65 Because Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons were only air-deliverable
in the late-1980s and early-1990s, physical separation of nuclear-capable bombs from delivery
aircraft served as the primary means of arsenal safety and security during this period. According
to Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Hassan Khan—a retired brigadier general from the Pakistani
Army and former director of arms control and disarmament affairs in the Strategic Plans
Division—command and control procedures during this period were very “general” and
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administratively “under military control,” but without clear operational procedures and routines
in place.66
From 1993-1998, the Combat Development Directorate (CDD) supervised all nuclear
matters. General Mirza Aslam Beg formed the CDD in 1985 as an organization for the
“evaluation, analysis, and concepts of conventional weapons use and related doctrines.”67 The
CDD became involved in nuclear matters in July 1993 when President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned from their positions. At this time, Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) General Abdul Waheed received all nuclear documents and entrusted the CDD with
oversight of all nuclear issues under the direction of Major General Ziauddin Butt, director
general of the CDD.68 The CDD’s responsibilities were expansive, however, and included a
significant emphasis on conventional arms development and acquisition that distracted some
attention from the nuclear program. As a result, General Pervez Musharraf decided to develop a
new organization that would focus exclusively on Pakistan’s nuclear program upon assuming
command as COAS in 1998.69
At the direction of General Musharraf, Pakistan’s Evaluation and Research (E&R)
Directorate began researching command and control models in mid-1998 for presentation to
civilian and military leadership. In conjunction with the Military Operations Directorate, E&R
created an outline of command and control systems by October 1998 that was approved within
the military. This plan did not receive official civilian approval when the army first presented the
plan in April 1999 and was placed on hold shortly thereafter when the Kargil conflict erupted in

66

Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Hassan Khan, interview by author, November 28, 2017.
Khan, Eating Grass, p. 325.
68
Ibid., pp. 325-326.
69
Ibid., p. 328
67

114
May 1999.70 Nevertheless, the military proceeded to merge the CDD and E&R during this time
to form a new secretariat in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear program.71
Since 2000, Pakistan has managed its nuclear weapons through the National Command
Authority (NCA).72 The prime minister officially chairs the NCA, which is responsible for policy
formulation and the oversight of nuclear forces.73 Within the NCA, the military-led Strategic
Plans Division (SPD) is responsible for operational control of the arsenal. Over time, the SPD
has developed “a firm hold of Pakistan’s nuclear organization and policy,”74 resulting in
significant military influence over nuclear doctrine and operations.75 Christopher Clary notes the
centrality of the SPD to Pakistan’s command and control infrastructure, writing: “In some ways
the story of Pakistani nuclear command and control is the story of one organization—the
Strategic Plans Division—and how it sought to operationalize the deterrent after 1998.”76
Although civilian leadership possesses de jure authority over nuclear operations, military
commanders exercise de facto authority over nuclear use.77 The SPD performs a wide range of
functions that grant the organization significant influence over nuclear matters, including:
preparing the agenda for NCA meetings, formulating policy recommendations for Pakistan’s
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nuclear strategy and doctrine, and operations, and creating operational plans for the movement,
deployment, and employment of nuclear forces.78
Administratively, Pakistan’s command and control systems are centralized during
peacetime but allow for the rapid devolution of nuclear use capability to lower-level
commanders during crises.79 If communications are severed during a crisis and a field
commander is unable to receive orders from higher-level authorities, the field commander
appears capable of authorizing nuclear use.80 Major General (ret.) Mahmud Durrani—Pakistan’s
national security advisor from 2008-2009—suggested in 2004 that authorization codes are held
at military bases and can be assembled by lower-level officers. In the army, for example, the
code to arm nuclear weapons is likely divided between the group and unit commanders.81 This
practice is representative of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal management practices, as the two- or
three-man rule applies to all steps in the nuclear platforms.82 These measures of administrative
decentralization suggest that peripheral military commanders are capable of authorizing a
nuclear attack as a crisis unfolds and the threat of high intensity conflict increases.
A defining feature of Pakistan’s command and control infrastructure is its tight
integration of conventional and nuclear operations.83 Institutionally, the Joint Services
Headquarters (JSHQ) has served as the coordination center for both conventional and nuclear
operations since 2002. Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Hassan Khan writes:
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By 2002, Pakistan had established its air and land nuclear forces and created ballistic
missile units. The [Pakistan Air Force] squadrons under the Strategic Air Commands
operated under a coherent command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I)
system that was linked with Pakistan’s national military operation centers at the JSHQ.84
The COAS therefore oversees both conventional and nuclear operations and has the ability to
quickly authorize the escalation of conventional conflict across the nuclear threshold. This
administrative arrangement is a critical enabler of Pakistan’s first-use nuclear doctrine, as it
provides operational-level evidence that Pakistan is capable of rapidly responding to
conventional attacks with nuclear force.
Physically, Pakistan’s warheads are partially disassembled during peacetime, with the
fissile cores and detonators separated from one another and dispersed across an unknown
distance.85 These components are maintained in theft- and tamper-proof containers during
storage and transport, and the facilities housing these components are surrounded by a three-tier
security structure to protect nuclear assets.86 These layers of security are organized
concentrically: the SPD’s security division is responsible for managing the inner perimeter; the
second tier consists of fencing, electronic sensors, cameras, and additional security personnel;
and third, counter-intelligence teams search for potential threats to nuclear facilities.87
To bolster arsenal safety and security during peacetime, nuclear warheads have
traditionally been de-mated from delivery vehicles and separated by some distance.88 Although
some analysts doubt that nuclear warheads are truly disassembled during peacetime, most agree
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that—at a minimum—warheads are de-mated from delivery platforms to provide physical
control during peacetime.89 Brigadier General (ret.) Naeem Salik—former director of arms
control and disarmament affairs in the Strategic Plans Division—notes that, for most platforms,
“delivery systems are held by the services strategic force commands and though these are under
the administrative control of their respective services, their operational control rests with the
NCA while the warheads are under the direct control of the NCA.”90
As crises escalate, however, Pakistan is likely to begin assembling weapons and mating
those weapons to delivery platforms to increase the readiness of its nuclear forces. Analysts
suggest that Pakistan disperses its nuclear components no more than ten kilometers apart during
peacetime and may even collocate all components at a single location.91 In the event of a crisis,
Pakistan’s military can quickly prepare nuclear weapons for deployment.92 For instance, Hans
Kristensen, Robert Norris, and Julia Diamond suggest that “In a crisis, [air-delivered] bombs
could quickly be transferred to the base, or the F-16s could disperse to bases near underground
storage facilities and receive the weapons there.”93 In a 2002 interview with Lieutenant General
(ret.) Kidwai, reporters Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini confirmed such
arrangements, noting that “weapons can be assembled ‘very quickly’ and so also the reaction in a
situation of crisis can be relatively ‘very quick’.”94
Pakistan’s primary technical control over nuclear forces is a permissive action link
(PAL)-like device that aims to prevent unauthorized use. Although these devices are not as
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sophisticated as the PALs employed by the United States, Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Hassan
Khan claims that Pakistan “has developed physical safety mechanisms and firewalls…in the
weapon systems themselves.”95 Lieutenant General (ret.) Kidwai has stated that these “PakPALs” require twelve-digit alphanumeric codes to disable the technical control, although it
remains unclear whether this entails a single twelve-digit lock or multiple locks with shorter
codes.96 Pak-PALs are likely simple code-lock devices that lock subcomponents of the weapon
or blocks the fusing space to prevent a nuclear detonation.97
Importantly, Pak-PALs can be bypassed to allow for nuclear use in the absence of
authorization codes from political authorities.98 The military custodians of nuclear forces likely
include technical teams on base with the capacity to bypass these locks and enable nuclear use.99
Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Hassan Khan offers support for this perspective, noting that the
military custodians of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons must be “technically self-sufficient and
capable of launch even if orders from the NCA are not received.”100 Pak-PALs tighten political
control during peacetime, but the ability of lower-level military commanders to bypass these
technical controls in case of emergency allows Pakistan to rapidly transition its arsenal to a
higher level of readiness.
Two emerging capabilities will place pressure on Pakistan’s command and control
systems in the immediate future. First, Pakistan’s deployment of the Nasr tactical nuclear
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weapon platform poses challenges for nuclear management operations. Specifically, tactical
nuclear weapons face a “deployment dilemma,” which refers to the problems inherent to moving
tactical nuclear weapons from their peacetime storage facilities into forward battlefield
positions.101 The deployment dilemma has geographic and temporal dimensions. Geographically,
tactical nuclear weapons must be deployed close enough to the front line of battle to be effective,
but not so far forward that the weapons are vulnerable to destruction and not so far in the rear
that the weapons cannot reach their targets and become ineffective. Temporally, the authority to
use tactical nuclear weapons must be withheld long enough to prevent unauthorized use, but also
delegated early enough to guarantee that these weapons can be used before an adversary destroys
the tactical nuclear platforms or severs communications between field commanders and higher
authorities.102
Pakistan’s first-use nuclear doctrine makes the deployment dilemma especially
pronounced.103 By lowering the nuclear threshold to deter conventional aggression from India,
Pakistan faces significant pressures to delegate nuclear use capability to field commanders early
in a crisis. In addition to the increased likelihood of unauthorized use, Pakistan’s early delegation
procedures could signal malign intentions to India during a conventional dispute. If India
observed Nasr systems being forward deployed during a dispute, it would experience strong
incentives to strike the Nasrs before Pakistan had a chance to use its tactical nuclear weapons.104
Such strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could continue an escalatory cycle that would be
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difficult to stop. Although Pakistan’s 2013 deployment of the Nasr platform increases the
credibility of its threat to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Indian attack, these
weapons generate severe pressures on the safety and security of Pakistan’s arsenal and provide
additional avenues through which crises may escalate to the nuclear level.
Second, Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear-armed submarines also presents challenges for
command and control systems. Pakistan’s submarine-based nuclear forces will be managed by
the Naval Strategic Forces Command headquarters, which officially began operations in 2012.105
Although Pakistan views its forthcoming sea-based platforms as important for securing its
second-strike capabilities, several vulnerabilities—especially to Pakistan’s communications
systems—create challenges for command and control operations. As Paul Bracken notes in his
landmark work on nuclear command and control, these challenges are not unique to Pakistan.
For all countries, Bracken observes, “Communications are intrinsically difficult for the
submarines, and the command channels are inherently vulnerable to enemy attack.”106
Pakistan’s conditional command and control arrangements suggest that Pakistan will
likely adopt a bastion model for its naval nuclear assets, in which submarines remain close to
port during peacetime to provide for greater protection of submarines and facilitate centralized
authority over nuclear use decisions.107 This approach differs markedly from the continuous atsea deterrent patrol model, in which nuclear weapons are placed on board submarines and
continuously deployed at-sea to bolster arsenal survivability and reliability. Furthermore,
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Pakistan will likely keep its sea-launched nuclear weapons on shore during peacetime before
mating these weapons to submarines during crises.108 These measures would correspond to
Pakistan’s current conditional control practices by allowing leaders to maintain centralized
control over sea-based nuclear weapons during peacetime and rapidly deploy nuclear-armed
submarines to sea as crises emerge. If Pakistan elects to preplace nuclear weapons on board its
submarines during peacetime, this would reflect a shift to more delegative command and control
practices, even if the submarines are at port during peacetime.
The development of Pakistan’s sea-based nuclear capabilities poses several issues for
crisis stability and command and control practices.109 For instance, if India attacks Pakistan’s
naval communications systems in a broader dispute, Pakistan may view these actions as an
attempt to neutralize its sea-based deterrent and rapidly arm and deploy its submarines to bolster
their survivability. In turn, the deployment of Pakistan’s nuclear-armed submarines may appear
as the preparatory phase of a nuclear attack, which would encourage India to destroy Pakistan’s
submarines before they can target Indian cities. Pakistan therefore faces a deployment dilemma
at sea, as well—nuclear-armed submarines must be deployed early enough to ensure
survivability, but not so early as to initiate an escalatory spiral.110 The decision regarding when
to flush out submarines is complicated by the reality that once Pakistan places nuclear weapons
on board its submarines and deploys them to sea, physical and technical controls no longer
inhibit the use of nuclear weapons. These considerations will powerfully shape Pakistan’s
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doctrine as it continues to develop the sea-based leg of its nuclear triad and integrate its naval
nuclear platforms into its conditional command and control framework.

Explaining Conditional Control in Pakistan
In this section, I demonstrate that Pakistan’s employment of conditional command and
control arrangements aligns with the expected outcome of my theoretical framework and
supports two fundamental implications of the theory. First, Pakistan’s conventional military
inferiority with respect to India creates a severe external threat environment that incentivizes the
delegation of nuclear use capability to lower-level commanders. Although Pakistan also faces
additional threats from India’s growing and modernizing nuclear arsenal, the conventional
balance of power proves to be the most influential external determinant of Pakistan’s nuclear
command and control decision-making. Second, Pakistan’s long history of domestic political
instability has led to centralized authority over nuclear operations during peacetime. Combined,
Pakistan’s conventional military insecurity and domestic instability create opposing pressures on
command and control systems. To address these competing pressures, Pakistan employs
conditional command and control arrangements that facilitate centralized control procedures
during peacetime, while also enabling the rapid delegation of nuclear use capability early in
crises to address Pakistan’s conventional threat environment.

Conventional Threat Environment
Pakistan’s conventional inferiority with respect to India served as the core motivation for
Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and has remained a defining characteristic of regional
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security in South Asia throughout Pakistan’s nuclear history. Pakistan and India have fought four
conventional wars since partition in 1947 and, although the 1971 war was the only one in which
Pakistan experienced a complete and decisive defeat, India has largely prevailed in each of these
conflicts.111 A future conflict between India and Pakistan would be characterized by different
numerical, geographic, and technological factors than were relevant in previous wars, but
Pakistan’s history of conventional defeat continues to shape threat perceptions amongst political
and military leaders in Pakistan. Pakistan’s continuing conventional inferiority has produced
command and control systems that delegate nuclear use capability early in a conflict to lower the
threshold to nuclear use and deter conventional attacks by India.
India’s large and growing economy have allowed it to spend a lower percentage of its
gross domestic product (GDP) on defense expenditures than Pakistan, while also widening the
absolute gap in military spending over time.112 Since India and Pakistan overtly tested nuclear
weapons in 1998, India has spent an average of 2.65% of its GDP per year on military
expenditures. During this same period, Pakistan’s military expenditures accounted for an average
of 3.84% of GDP per year, representing a 45% relative premium on India’s military investments.
In absolute terms, however, India has massively outpaced Pakistan in terms of military
expenditures. On average, India spent over $44.1 billion U.S. dollars (USD) per year on military
expenditures during this period, while Pakistan averaged just over $7.9 billion USD per year.113
This disparity became even more pronounced after the U.S. enforced nonproliferation sanctions
in accordance with the Pressler Amendment in 1990. Pakistan responded to its worsening
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conventional environment during this time by increasing its emphasis on nuclear weapons.
Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Hassan Khan corroborates this point, stating: “Pakistan’s
conventional force balance with India, which had marginally improved in the 1980s, began to
plummet, forcing it to seek more reliance on nuclear force goals.”114
India’s economic advantage underpins its ongoing military modernization efforts, which
continue to exacerbate the disparity in conventional power between India and Pakistan.115 India
has recently increased its acquisitions of advanced precision-strike munitions, reconnaissance
platforms, and command and control capabilities,116 causing greater concern within Pakistan
about its quantitative and qualitative disadvantages relative to India.117 Pakistan has responded to
these challenges by emphasizing high-quality materiel and developing internal lines of
communication,118 but major cities such as Lahore and Gujranwala are located near the IndiaPakistan border and the primary lines of communication connecting Islamabad, Lahore, and
other large cities are also close to the border and vulnerable to India’s conventional forces.119
India’s conventional military preponderance in the region therefore remains the primary threat to
Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Some recent research suggests that the conventional military balance in South Asia may
not disadvantage Pakistan to the extent that scholars traditionally assume. Walter Ladwig, for
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example, argues that rugged terrain and the deployment of Pakistan’s conventional forces
decrease the likelihood of India achieving rapid military success in areas of strategic value.
Furthermore, Ladwig expects that India would be unable to achieve the necessary strategic
surprised to enable even a limited offensive to achieve quick gains.120 Christopher Clary offers
further support for this perspective, arguing that India has “consistently ‘punched below its
weight’ in the conventional force balance, underperforming compared to its impressive military
spending advantage over Pakistan.”121 Furthermore, despite India’s material advantages in land,
air, and naval forces, Clary argues that the “integration of action across services still appears
problematic and incomplete.”122 These observations support an insight offered by Stephen Cohen
and Sunil Dasgupta, who document India’s longstanding inability to efficiently convert its
resources into military power.123
Although these analyses provide a valuable corrective to the study of the conventional
military balance in South Asia, two factors highlight the continued importance of India’s
aggregate conventional military advantage. First, although India may be unable to suddenly seize
strategically valuable territory near the disputed line of control separating India and Pakistan,
India may still be able to achieve rapid success in other regions along the international border.124
Furthermore, India still appears likely to prevail in a conventional conflict as the duration of the
engagement prolongs.125 Brigadier General (ret.) Feroz Hassan Khan offers support for this

Ladwig III, “Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia.”
Clary, “Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia,” p. 136.
122
Ibid., p. 147. For a full discussion of the challenges of integrating India’s armed services to achieve battlefield
success, see pp. 141-152.
123
For this argument, see Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military
Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
124
Clary, “Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia,” p. 149.
125
John H. Gill, “Brasstacks: Prudently Pessimistic,” in Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, eds., Nuclear
Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2009), pp. 44-45; Narang,
Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 78.
120
121

126
analysis, assuming that India’s conventional preponderance would result in a decisive
breakthrough within 1-2 weeks of combat.126 Second, the historical trends promise to worsen
Pakistan’s relative conventional inferiority in the future. Christopher Clary aptly observes this
reality, noting that “As long as India continues to grow faster than Pakistan and continues to
spend at rates comparable to historical averages…there is no doubt that Pakistan will be unable
to maintain even a patina of conventional parity over time.”127
Statements by senior Pakistani officials provide evidence that Pakistan’s conventional
vulnerability has resulted in more responsive command and control arrangements that seek to
lower the nuclear threshold. For example, in 2009 Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesman Abdul
Basit stated:
Pakistan cannot remain oblivious to increasing conventional asymmetries, unrelenting
arms acquisitions as well as preferential treatment being accorded to certain countries in
the region. Such developments disturb the strategic balance and Pakistan is constrained to
adopt necessary safeguards as it deems fit…It is important that asymmetry between
Pakistan and India in the context of conventional arms should not be widened too much.
We have noticed that there are acquisitions of sophisticated weaponry by our neighbor
which will disturb the conventional balance between our two countries and hence, lower
the nuclear threshold.128
Basit’s comments clearly indicate the importance of conventional threats to Pakistan’s nuclear
decision-making. Indeed, this pronouncement explicitly demonstrates Pakistan’s willingness to
lower the nuclear threshold in response to India’s growing conventional military superiority.
Several years after Basit’s statement, Pakistan began deployment of its Nasr tactical
nuclear weapon platform. As Vipin Narang notes, Pakistan’s deployment of the Nasr provides
the operational means “to lower the nuclear threshold in response to Indian conventional
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power.”129 Lieutenant General (ret.) Kidwai offered strong support for this perspective in 2015
when discussing the purpose and contributions of the Nasr/Hatf-IX platform:
Nasr, specifically, was born out of a compulsion of this thing that I mentioned about
some people on the other side toying with the idea of finding space for conventional war,
despite [Pakistan’s] nuclear weapons…That there was some kind of gap in their
realization at their tactical level, and therefore it was leading to this encouragement, or
this idea of the concept on the other side that there was space for conventional war…So it
was this particular gap that we felt needed to be plugged at the lowest rung. Because war
was being brought down under the Cold Start Doctrine to the tactical level.130
As these examples demonstrate, Pakistan’s conventional military inferiority with respect
to India decisively compels Pakistan to lower the threshold to nuclear use. To strengthen its
claims that nuclear weapons such as the Nasr will be used first in response to conventional
military aggression, Pakistan employs conditional command and control systems that enable
lower-level military commanders to quickly respond to a conventional attack with nuclear
weapons. The decision to delegate nuclear use capability early in a crisis provides Pakistan with
the necessary operational procedures to lower the nuclear threshold and strengthen deterrence
against the conventionally superior India.

Domestic Threats
Pakistan’s conventional military insecurity provides strong incentives for Pakistan to
adopt more delegative command and control systems. In practice, however, Pakistan’s
conditional control arrangements stop short of delegating nuclear use capability during
peacetime and instead rely upon highly centralized oversight of nuclear forces during peacetime.
I argue that Pakistan’s history of domestic political instability explains why Pakistan’s severe
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external threat environment does not result in purely delegative command and control systems.
Pakistan’s employment of conditional control arrangements represents an attempt to
simultaneously address two competing pressures: first, conventional security threats that
encourage more delegative control; and second, domestic threats that encourage more assertive
control. In this section, I show that the competition for influence over Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program over time has produced highly centralized institutions that grant politically
dominant actors greater influence over nuclear doctrine and operations. Furthermore, persistent
domestic instability and threats to Pakistan’s physical arsenal provide strong incentives for
Pakistan to maintain tight control over nuclear assets. Pakistan’s external and internal threat
environments interact to generate conditional command and control arrangements that facilitate
centralized arsenal management during peacetime and the rapid devolution of nuclear use
capability during crises to deter conventional attacks.
Poor civil-military relations have produced a longstanding source of instability in
Pakistan’s domestic politics.131 Pakistan has experienced four successful military takeovers of
government since independence in 1947. With each alternation between military and civilian
government since the early-1970s, political leaders attempted to increase their control of the
nuclear weapons program. Over time, however, Pakistan’s military—especially the Pakistani
Army—has gained nearly absolute control over nuclear doctrine and operations since the
country’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998.
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Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto sought to centralize his control of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program immediately after initiating the program in 1972. Within a month of taking
power, Bhutto convened a meeting with the PAEC. In this meeting, Bhutto abruptly replaced the
PAEC’s chairman of twelve years—Ishrat Hussain Usmani—with Munir Ahmad Khan, a close
friend of Prime Minister Bhutto. Bhutto ordered Khan to report directly to him, rather than the
traditional practice of coordinating with the secretary of science and technology. From this
moment on, the PAEC has remained strictly under presidential or prime ministerial control.132
General Zia ul-Haq deposed Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto through a military coup
in 1977, resulting in the military’s discovery of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.133 Bhutto
had attempted to reduce the military’s influence in politics after assuming office. For instance,
Bhutto simultaneously promoted General Muhammad Sharif to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee and General Zia ul-Haq to COAS to exploit the cleavages between the rival
commanders.134 This attempt failed, however, and Bhutto was removed from power only five
years after becoming prime minister. Samina Ahmed notes that after this point, “The nuclear
weapons program operated under the absolute control of the armed forces, while the civil
bureaucracy played an active role through its subsidiary arm, the nuclear scientific
establishment.”135 The military had seized a foothold in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
General Zia, who served as both COAS and president, died in a mysterious plane crash in
August 1988. After his death, General Mirza Aslam Beg became COAS, Ghulam Ishaq Khan
assumed the office of president, and Benazir Bhutto—daughter of the deposed Zulfiqar Ali
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Bhutto—was elected as prime minister.136 Although Bhutto’s election signaled greater civilian
influence in Pakistani politics, her ascension as prime minister was conditional on her acceptance
of five conditions proposed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and brokered by General Beg:
(1) Not to be vindictive toward the family of Zia-ul-Haq; (2) not to change defense
policies or interfere in the affairs of the armed forces; (3) not to make sweeping
bureaucratic/administrative changes; (4) not to alter the Afghan policy…and, most
important, (5) not to alter nuclear policy, and to let the veteran President Ghulam Ishaq
Khan guide and control the secret nuclear program.137
Bhutto’s acceptance of these terms reflected the military’s increasing control over nuclear
matters. By her own agreement, Bhutto would avoid interfering in military affairs, allow political
institutions to remain unaltered, and cede authority of the nuclear program to President Ghulam
Ishaq Khan and General Beg.138 Over the next year, Bhutto grew to resent the Pakistan Army’s
dominance in national security issues and became aware that she was excluded from many
debates regarding foreign policy, especially the nuclear program.139 Nevertheless, Bhutto
remained sidelined in many high-level decisions regarding Pakistan’s national security.
The military formally obtained control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in 1993
when COAS General Abdul Waheed forced President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif to resign. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan refused to share nuclear information with
a transitory government and instead chose to grant all nuclear responsibility to the Pakistan
Army under General Waheed.140 By the early-2000s, the army had institutionalized its control of
the nuclear weapons program under the NCA and through the SPD. In 2007, President and
COAS General Pervez Musharraf passed the NCA Ordinance to cement this institutional
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arrangement and prevent efforts by domestic competitors to undermine the army’s oversight of
nuclear weapons.141 A nominally civilian government returned in 2008, but by this point
Pakistan’s nuclear program was soundly under the control of the COAS and SPD.142 Christopher
Clary observes the lasting influence of the army in this realm, noting: “The military seems quite
able to resist…civilian pressure in an area that the military views as core to Pakistan national
security, and the existing SPD policy to refuse political appointments seems likely to remain
intact.”143
Although the Pakistan Army has directly controlled the country’s nuclear weapons
program since 1993, domestic instability and security challenges continue to affect nuclear
decision-making. A notable example of a domestic challenge to the security of Pakistan’s arsenal
management practices is the A. Q. Khan scandal, in which Pakistan’s preeminent scientist A. Q.
Khan illicitly transferred nuclear technology and knowledge to international actors such as Iran
and held meetings with actors such as North Korea and Al Qaeda. The A. Q. Khan affair led
Pakistan to restructure its command and control systems to emphasize the security of its nuclear
arsenal. In addition to creating a security division within SPD, Pakistan instituted a stringent
personnel reliability program (PRP) and human reliability program (HRP).144 The PRP and HRP
screen all military and civilian personnel involved in Pakistan’s nuclear program and evaluates
candidates on multiple dimensions every two years, including known associates, political
affiliations, financial background, and physical and psychological health.145
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Nevertheless, the A. Q. Khan affair seemed to confirm the fears of many outside
observers of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, who often worry about the potential effects of
religious extremism and domestic terrorism on the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal. U.S. President Barack Obama clearly articulated these fears in 2010, stating: “The single
biggest threat to U.S. security, both short-term, medium-term, and long-term, would be the
possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon.”146 In their study of U.S.Pakistan relations, Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder note that:
Pakistan would be an obvious place for a jihadist organization to seek a nuclear weapon
or fissile material: it is the only Muslim-majority state, out of the 50 or so in the world, to
have successfully developed nuclear weapons; its central government is of limited
competence and has serious trouble projecting its authority into many corners of its
territory (on occasion it has difficulty maintaining order even in the country’s largest city,
Karachi); Pakistan’s military and security services are infiltrated by an unknown number
of jihadist sympathizers; and many jihadist organizations are headquartered there
already.147
Although outsiders continue to worry about the physical safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal, Pakistan’s leaders tend to emphasize the effectiveness of PRP and HRP protocol. Indeed,
in 2015 Lieutenant General (ret.) Kidwai publicly stated:
For the last 15 years Pakistan has taken its nuclear security obligations seriously. We
understand the consequences of complacency; there is no complacency. We have
invested heavily in terms of money, manpower, equipment, weapons, training,
preparedness, and smart site security solutions. I say with full responsibility that nuclear
security in Pakistan is a non-issue.148
Despite public statements by Pakistani officials that the country’s nuclear arsenal is safe
and secure, the threats of religious extremism, domestic terrorism, and political instability
continue to shape command and control frameworks. To address these domestic threats, Pakistan
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maintains an emphasis on its PRP and HRP requirements and de-mates and disperses nuclear
weapon components to guarantee physical control over its nuclear arsenal. The interaction of
Pakistan’s domestic threats and conventional military inferiority with respect to India results in
conditional command and control arrangements that allow leaders to centrally manage Pakistan’s
arsenal and nuclear use decisions during peacetime, while also enabling the delegation of nuclear
use capability early in crises to lower the nuclear threshold and offset Pakistan’s conventional
military inferiority.

Evaluating the Explanations
The evidence from Pakistan’s nuclear experience provides support for my theoretical
framework. To resolve the competing pressures of conventional insecurity and domestic
instability on command and control systems, Pakistan employs conditional control arrangements
that facilitate centralized control during peacetime to strengthen arsenal safety and security,
while also enabling the rapid delegation of nuclear use capability early in a crisis to deter India’s
conventional military forces. This case also demonstrates the utility of my conceptual
framework, which provides a method for resolving the country’s seemingly contradictory
combination of assertive and delegative control measures by classifying Pakistan’s command
and control systems according to its emphasis on the early delegation of nuclear use capability in
crises.
The three major alternative explanations, in contrast, are generally unpersuasive in
explaining Pakistan’s command and control systems. First, the civil-military stability hypothesis
is unable to account for Pakistan’s conditional control arrangements. The civil-military stability
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hypothesis predicts that Pakistan’s long history of military coups and attempts by civilians to
restore civilian control of the government would generate assertive command and control
systems. Indeed, Pakistan’s prolonged civil-military instability provides an easy test for this
hypothesis. Nevertheless, the civil-military stability argument is unable to explain conditional
control in Pakistan. This argument correctly anticipates that actors attempt to seize control of
nuclear decision-making institutions and exclude their political rivals, but these domestic threats
only constitute half of the aggregate threat environment facing Pakistan’s political and military
elites. As my theory demonstrates, Pakistan also faces a conventionally superior adversary in
India that compels leaders to create command and control procedures that allow for the
delegation of nuclear use capability early in crises to deter conventional attacks. Furthermore, the
civil-military stability hypothesis is unable to anticipate command and control outcomes in states
where the military assumes control of the state, as has repeatedly occurred in Pakistan’s history.
Second, the arsenal vulnerability hypothesis also fails to explain Pakistan’s conditional
command and control systems. This hypothesis predicts that increased arsenal or command
vulnerability should cause Pakistan to adopt more delegative command and control systems.
Two empirical observations challenge the explanatory value of this hypothesis, however. First,
despite India’s continuing nuclear force modernization and potential consideration of nuclear
counterforce missions, Pakistan’s command and control systems have remained conditional and
emphasize centralized control during peacetime.149 Second, the evidence provided in this section
demonstrates that Pakistan’s efforts to lower the nuclear threshold have occurred in response to
conventional threats to Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty, rather than threats to its nuclear arsenal.
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Although Pakistan experiences a notable degree of arsenal vulnerability, it has elected to address
this vulnerability through nuclear platform diversification and redundancy rather than adopting
more delegative command and control arrangements.
Third, the strategic rationale hypothesis only provides a partial explanation for
conditional control arrangements in Pakistan. The strategic rationale hypothesis expects that
Pakistan’s clear emphasis on a first-use nuclear doctrine should produce more delegative
command and control arrangements. Pakistani officials routinely emphasize that their arsenal is
operationally prepared for the early use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional
aggression by India, suggesting that the strategic logic of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine
meaningfully influences its command and control systems. The strategic rationale argument,
however, cannot explain why Pakistan employs conditional control frameworks rather than
purely delegative control. Although the strategic rationale hypothesis provides a partial
explanation for command and control in Pakistan, my theory’s emphasis on the interactive
effects of Pakistan’s conventional military inferiority and domestic political instability provides a
more complete explanation for why Pakistan’s leaders choose to withhold nuclear use capability
during peacetime and quickly delegate nuclear use capability early in crises.
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CHAPTER 5
SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa’s nuclear experience provides a unique case of nuclear proliferation and
rollback.1 In 1993, President F.W. de Klerk announced to the world that South Africa secretly
developed and operated a nuclear arsenal since the mid-1970s and that the country had fully
decommissioned its weapons program by 1991.2 South Africa’s decision to dismantle its nuclear
weapons makes it the only state to ever decommission an indigenously developed arsenal.3
Given such an unprecedented trajectory, scholars have extensively evaluated the causes of
proliferation and disarmament in the South African context. In comparison, however, researchers
have largely overlooked the strategic and operational behavior of nuclear South Africa. I address
this shortcoming by explaining the origins of command and control in South Africa and
theorizing the evolution and ultimate dismantlement of these institutions over time.
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In this chapter, I show that South Africa adopted highly assertive patterns of command
and control for the duration of its nuclear program. Although the country faced a variety of
external threats to state security during the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa did not face a
conventionally superior adversary that would compel the regime to delegate nuclear use
authority. Instead, domestic threats to the survival of the apartheid regime served as the primary
determinant of South African command and control systems. Political elites adopted assertive
control measures to guarantee that nuclear weapons were only used for purely political
purposes—namely, bolstering the survivability of the apartheid regime—and elected to
dismantle the nuclear program with the impending collapse of the apartheid regime in the early1990s. Furthermore, despite the high levels of organizational autonomy traditionally enjoyed by
South Africa’s military services, civilian elites tightly centralized control of all nuclear decisionmaking processes and intentionally excluded military influence in debates regarding nuclear
doctrine and operations.

Nuclear Command and Control in South Africa
Although it is difficult to identify a precise date on which South Africa officially decided
to pursue nuclear weapons, two events mark important points in the regime’s decision to
proliferate. First, in 1974, the Atomic Energy Board (AEB)—South Africa’s primary civilian
scientist organization for nuclear research—notified Prime Minister John Vorster that South
Africa could develop a nuclear device.4 Without explicitly approving the program, Vorster
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instructed the AEB to begin developing a potential nuclear test site at the Vastrap Air Force Base
in the Kalahari Desert, ostensibly for further research on the peaceful nuclear explosives
program.5
Second, by 1977, South Africa’s primary uranium enrichment facility—the Y-Plant—
was fully operational and the AEB completed an operational nuclear device. Although the YPlant had not yet produced enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for a complete nuclear test,
Vorster ordered a cold test of the device to determine the viability of the weapon. Before the test
was conducted, however, U.S. and Soviet intelligence identified the test site and requested an
inspection of the facilities. The AEB hastily relocated and concealed its equipment and the
device was never tested.6 Although this episode temporarily delayed progress, the AEB
successfully conducted a cold test of a nuclear device in 1978,7 the Y-Plant began producing
weapons-grade HEU by 1979, and the AEB produced an operational nuclear device in 1979.8
AEB scientists later completed the first fully operational nuclear weapon in December 1982,9
formalizing the completion of a “supremely efficient” nuclear weapons program.10
While scholars debate the explicitness of Vorster’s support for nuclear weaponization, it
is certain that by 1978 newly-elected Prime Minister P. W. Botha sought to weaponize South
Africa’s nuclear program.11 Under Botha, South Africa adopted an explicitly catalytic nuclear
posture aimed at mobilizing a third-party actor to intervene on South Africa’s behalf through
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diplomatic or military means if its vital interests were threatened.12 South Africa’s nuclear
doctrine epitomized the strategic logic of a catalytic posture. For the duration of the program, the
core purpose of South Africa’s nuclear strategy was to mobilize external support—primarily
from the United States—in the event of a challenge to the core interests of South Africa’s
political regime.13
To accomplish this goal, Botha approved a three-stage nuclear strategy in 1978.14 First,
South Africa would maintain a policy of nuclear ambiguity that leveraged strategic uncertainty to
deter aggression. Second, if this nuclear uncertainty failed to deter an adversary, South Africa
would covertly disclose its nuclear capacity to a third-party to catalyze support. By revealing this
nuclear capacity and indicating that conflict may escalate to the nuclear level, South African
leaders hoped to mobilize the more powerful U.S. to intervene on their behalf. Third, if the U.S.
declined to become involved on South Africa’s behalf or failed to deter the adversary, then South
Africa would overtly disclose its nuclear status by public announcement, or by conducting an
underground or atmospheric test to demonstrate its nuclear capability and resolve.15 If these three
stages failed to deter an adversary and catalyze U.S. support, however, South African leaders
planned to withhold nuclear weapons for fear of Soviet retaliation.16
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Whereas policymakers systematically evaluated and subsequently articulated a clear
political purpose for South Africa’s nuclear program by 1978, command and control decisions
were largely overlooked at this time. Indeed, command and control systems only received
systematic analysis once the nuclear arsenal became fully operational in 1982.17 However, as
soon as nuclear management operations became a key foreign policy issue, South Africa’s
political regime established assertive control along administrative, physical, and technical
dimensions.
South Africa’s civilian elites implemented assertive command and control through highly
centralized administrative control procedures.18 To access the components of a nuclear weapon,
the president would issue orders to the minister of defense and minister of energy affairs. The
defense minister would then relay the order to the chief of the South African Defense Force
(SADF), while the energy minister would relay a separate order code to the chairman of the
Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC)—the descendant organization of the AEB created in 1982.19
The defense minister would also relay the order to an official from the Armaments Corporation
of South Africa (ARMSCOR)—South Africa’s state-run arms procurement and production
agency and organizational custodian of nuclear assets—who would be responsible for unlocking
the vault upon receipt of the codes from SADF and AEC representatives. These individuals
would provide half of the code to a representative from their respective organizations and could
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Figure 5.1. South African Administrative Control

only then jointly remove the nuclear component from the vault. Because weapons were split into
two halves, this process required duplication to completely assemble a nuclear weapon.
This multi-tiered chain of command centralized political control by precluding
subordinate actors from acquiring nuclear assets without senior-level approval and inhibited
potential collusion between these actors. Furthermore, after removing both components to
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assemble a weapon, only senior political leaders could provide the codes to disable mechanical
locks. Figure 5.1 provides a diagram of this administrative control structure.
Political leaders further exercised administrative control by institutionalizing centralized
oversight of nuclear use procedures. The same administrative control methods constraining
peacetime nuclear management operations also applied to the movement and potential use of
nuclear weapons. South Africa only developed air-delivery platforms for its nuclear weapons,
which allowed political elites to maintain control of nuclear weapons throughout mobilization
and deployment processes. An assembled nuclear weapon would require transportation from an
ARMSCOR facility to a South African Air Force (SAAF) base, where the device would be
loaded onto an aircraft under the supervision of civilian authorities. Political leaders would
provide SAAF operators with targeting instructions, and final authorization codes to arm the
weapon would be transmitted from civilian leadership to the air delivery crew immediately
before releasing the nuclear weapon.20 These procedures guaranteed executive civilian oversight
of nuclear use until the last possible moment, and ensured that military actors could not mobilize,
deploy, or detonate nuclear weapons without authorization from senior political authorities.
Physically, nuclear weapons were disassembled into two parts: a front part containing the
nuclear warhead, and a rear part containing the gun assembly and uranium missile to initiate the
detonation process. This gun-type design was based upon the relatively simple and reliable
technology used for the earliest U.S. nuclear weapons in the mid-1940s,21 and by completely
separating the atomic material from the gun device, guaranteed that the weapon could not
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detonate until both halves were conjoined. Furthermore, each component was secured in a
separate vault.22 If orders were given to assemble and deploy a nuclear weapon, each component
would be transported in a separate vault to reduce the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized
use. The two components would only be bolted together and ready for deployment once
integrated with the delivery platform, such as a missile or glide bomb. These procedures also
applied to underground tests, indicating that South Africa’s physical control arrangements were
highly assertive for peacetime and crisis scenarios alike.23
Even if the warhead and detonator were mated, the weapons were protected by technical
controls to inhibit unauthorized use. Each nuclear weapon contained a mechanical lock that
served as a safing mechanism by blocking the uranium missile from initiating a nuclear reaction
unless the lock was removed.24 Although this lock was somewhat rudimentary, it provided an
effective layer of protection against unwanted nuclear use by preventing nuclear mobilization
without proper authorization.25 These locks remained in place while weapons were in storage, as
well as when weapons components were transported during mobilization. The lock could only be
opened and the physical barrier between the warhead and gun device removed after the weapon
was fully assembled and mated to a delivery platform.26 Combined, these indicators show that
technical controls remained highly assertive for all potential operations.
As South Africa’s command and control systems began to take shape in the early-1980s,
however, the country’s security environment progressively worsened. South Africa became
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increasingly isolated from the international community, while the prolonged border war with
Angola continued to escalate during this time with Cuban troops pouring into the region to
support the Angolan military and the Soviet Union providing extensive material support for
Cuban and Angolan forces.27 Upon evaluating the viability and preparedness of South Africa’s
nuclear arsenal, defense planners worried that nuclear weapons would not be ready for use in the
event of a crisis, which could undermine the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. South Africa’s
nuclear strategy and command and control arrangements were largely informal until this time,
and policymakers questioned whether operators were prepared to conduct nuclear operations.
In response, South Africa’s political elites conducted a review of nuclear strategy and
operations in 1985. André Buys, a senior official at ARMSCOR, led the review committee.
According to Buys, command and control matters were a central concern of the committee.28
Political leaders sought to promote safety, security, and reliability at all stages of nuclear
management and specifically aimed to eliminate the possibility of unauthorized use by military
actors.29
The committee formalized two parallel chains of command as a means of centralizing
administrative control over nuclear assets and reiterated the requirement of mechanical locks on
disassembled nuclear devices to protect against accidental or unauthorized use.30 The review
committee ultimately formalized the three-stage strategy tacitly approved by Vorster and
institutionalized assertive command and control procedures, guaranteeing that nuclear operations
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would be managed through highly assertive control procedures under all potential scenarios. As a
result, South African command and control systems demonstrated a high degree of assertive
control along physical, technical, and administrative dimensions for the duration of the country’s
nuclear program.
South Africa’s status as a nuclear weapons state proved short-lived. In 1989, only seven
years after completing its first operational nuclear weapon, newly-elected president F.W. de
Klerk immediately began the process of decommissioning South Africa’s nuclear arsenal.31
South Africa developed six deliverable nuclear weapons by this time and canceled the program
with a seventh weapon in production. These weapons were never fully assembled, nor were they
tested.32 South Africa joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) completed verification of all nuclear materials and facilities by 1993.33
By the time of the 1994 elections—the first elections to grant universal adult suffrage in South
African history—both the nuclear weapons program and apartheid regime were dismantled.

Explaining Assertive Control in South Africa
Although South Africa’s nuclear weapons program was short-lived, the case provides a
clear example of highly assertive control and offers insight into the explanatory power of my
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theoretical framework. I argue that the South African case supports three broad implications of
my theory. First, although South Africa’s general security environment worsened throughout its
nuclear tenure, the absence of a conventionally superior adversary led political leaders to
prioritize domestic considerations when establishing command and control frameworks. Second,
the presence of severe domestic threats to the survival of the apartheid regime served as the
primary domestic determinant of command and control decision-making, causing political elites
to centralize control over nuclear weapons to narrowly leverage South Africa’s nuclear forces in
support of the apartheid regime’s continued survival. Third, South Africa adopted assertive
control measures in spite of the military’s traditionally high levels of organizational autonomy,
demonstrating the political leaders’ prioritization of regime survival over other considerations
when developing nuclear doctrine. I elaborate on each of these points in the section below.

Security Environment
South Africa’ nuclear program was originally intended for exclusively peaceful purposes.
Initially, political elites prioritized the economic and industrial benefits of nuclear technology,
while scientists and engineers involved in the early phases of South Africa’s nuclear program
valued the scientific advancement of nuclear research.34 Nuclear technologies, however, are
inherently dual-use, and the rapid transfer of technology and knowledge created a foundation for
nuclear weapons research in South Africa.35 Over time, an increasingly hostile regional and
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international threat environment caused policymakers to reconsider the purposes of the program
in the early-1970s and political leadership ultimately supported a move towards weaponization
by the late-1970s.36
Regionally, South Africa faced a variety of security threats. The collapse of Portuguese
colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique fostered the rise of communist governments that were
antipathetic to South Africa’s white-minority rule and created instability on South Africa’s
borders. To its west, South Africa faced resistance by the Southwest African People’s
Organization (SWAPO), which challenged South Africa’s territorial claims in Namibia through
guerrilla military operations.37 This dispute became a core component of South Africa’s
prolonged border war with Angola, which was made more severe by a large contingent of Cuban
troops sent to support Angolan forces, as well as the Soviet Union’s extensive provision of
military supplies to Angolan and Cuban troops. To the east, Mozambique’s porous borders
offered sanctuary to South Africa’s domestic adversaries, such as the African National Congress
(ANC). The ANC exploited this opportunity by using positions in Mozambique to plan and
conduct attacks within South African borders aimed at undermining the apartheid regime.38 From
the center to the periphery of South African territory, South Africa’s political system was under
attack.
Internationally, South Africa faced additional pressures from the international community
and Western states with whom South Africa had historically amicable relations. In 1962, the
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United Nations (UN) General Assembly voted in favor of a voluntary embargo on trade with
South Africa.39 In 1977, UN pressure escalated with UN Resolution 418, which established an
embargo that formally precluded all member states from arms deals with South Africa and led to
the cancellation of corvette and submarine sales by France, as well as the termination of U.S.
fuel supplies for the SAFARI reactor.40 As a result, South Africa quickly became diplomatically
isolated in the international arena, primarily due to international opposition to South Africa’s
apartheid policies.41
Individual states further enacted policies that exacerbated South Africa’s international
concerns. For example, in the 1970s U.S. policymakers began forcefully advocating for an antiapartheid position that would interrupt economic and technical cooperation between the two
countries.42 In 1975, after covertly supporting South African involvement in the Angolan civil
war, the U.S. quickly distanced itself from South Africa when Nigeria and several other African
states discovered and objected to U.S. involvement in the region, leaving South Africa alone in
its fight against Angola.43 The U.K. also canceled the longstanding Simonstown Agreement that
guaranteed bilateral naval cooperation and protection in the South Atlantic Ocean.44
By the late-1970s, several previously friendly countries had effectively severed ties with
South Africa and the UN had implemented a series of robust sanctions and embargoes. South
Africa’s connections to the West weakened at a time when the Soviet Union increased its
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material support for several of South Africa’s regional adversaries, such as Angola and
Mozambique.45 Concerningly for the ruling regime, South Africa’s external security environment
became more threatening precisely as its external support and international status began to
dwindle.
The continuous worsening of South Africa’s external security environment explains an
important part of the country’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons, but these trends did not
prove decisive in the development of South Africa’s command and control procedures. This
outcome aligns with a core prediction of my theoretical framework: because South Africa did not
face a conventionally superior adversary capable of posing an existential threat to South African
existence, domestic considerations became primary for decision-makers. Although the large
contingent of Cuban and Angolan troops posed a significant threat in the contested area of
Namibia, for example, these forces were insufficient to decisively defeat South Africa in a
conventional conflict. Additionally, Cuban commanders dispersed the units within their divisions
to minimize the potential damage of a nuclear attack by South Africa.46 With already insufficient
numbers and capabilities to project conventional power across the entirety of South Africa, the
dispersal of forces made South Africa’s primary external adversary incapable of significant
offensive action.47 Instead, the primary threat to South Africa’s political regime emanated from
domestic sources.

For an overview of the Soviet Union’s involvement in Southern Africa and how it affected South African security
perceptions, see Robert Legvold, “The Soviet Threat to Southern Africa,” in Robert I. Rotberg, Henry S. Bienen,
Robert Legvold, and Gavin G. Maasdorp, eds., South Africa and Its Neighbors: Regional Security and Self-Interest
(Lexington, M.A.: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 27-53.
46
Waldo Stumpf, interview by author, July 21, 2016.
47
The concentration of military force is considered to be a necessary component of successful offensive
conventional military operations. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
45

150
Domestic Threats to the Apartheid Regime
Although South Africa’s conventional threat environment did not produce an immediate
threat to the survival of the apartheid regime, the intensifying combination of international,
regional, and domestic challenges to South Africa’s political order in the 1970s created the
impression of a “total onslaught” among political elites.48 South African leaders observed threats
in political, economic, diplomatic, and military spheres and sought to develop an equally
expansive range of responses to counter these challenges.49 As General Magnus Malan, Chief of
the South African Defense Force, stated:
The total onslaught is an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable
and unconditional imposition of the aggressor’s will on the target state. The aim is
therefore also total, not only in terms of the ideology, but also as regards the political,
social, economic and technological areas.50
For South Africa’s ruling elites, the concept of total onslaught represented an existential
threat to the future of the regime. Facing an array of threats to the future of South Africa’s
political system, civilian elites began to investigate the viability and requirements of developing
a nuclear arsenal. By the mid-1970s, political elites perceived nuclear weapons as valuable for
deterrence and prestige, and South Africa soon began moving towards an indigenous nuclear
weapons capability.51
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Prime Minister P. W. Botha embraced the concept of total onslaught to a much greater
degree than his predecessors. Whereas earlier leaders prioritized external threats such as the
arrival of Soviet-backed Cuban forces in Angola, international opprobrium, and a broader
ideological struggle against communism,52 Botha recognized the severity of internal security
matters and became the first prime minister to publicly acknowledge the potential reality of a
domestic revolution.53 To counter the wide-ranging scope of threats posed by total onslaught,
Botha adopted the doctrine of “total national strategy,” which sought to jointly leverage South
Africa’s political, economic, social and psychological, and security bases of power.54 A 1977
defense white paper demonstrates the expansive scope of total national strategy, stating that “A
total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all
levels and to all functions of the state structure.”55
Through total national strategy, Botha tightly centralized his oversight over domestic and
foreign policymaking in an effort to strengthen the ruling political regime. In the period
immediately preceding South Africa’s official pursuit of nuclear weapons, South African foreign
policy was produced through a loose and decentralized system of management. This was
especially true during the rule of Prime Minster John Vorster. The use of informal policy
formulation generally achieved Vorster’s aims and allowed Vorster to maintain control over the
distribution of patronage and maintain support from key domestic actors.56 Despite a general
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reliance on an informal policymaking apparatus, in 1969 Vorster supported the development of a
Bureau of State Security (BOSS). The creation of BOSS supported Vorster’s goal of
consolidating his domestic political power by reassigning security functions from the security
police and military intelligence to BOSS, which reduced the political influence of the South
African Police (SAP) and SADF. Vorster chose General Hendrik van den Bergh—a close friend
and supporter of Vorster—to lead the new agency and doubled the size of BOSS within its first
ten years.57
P. W. Botha’s rise to prime minister produced a drastic shift in the balance of domestic
political power. Before becoming prime minister, Botha served as minister of defense under
Vorster for thirteen years. Despite his prolonged service under Vorster, however, Botha preferred
an orderly and systematized decision-making process, much in contrast to Vorster’s
decentralized policy apparatus. In part, Botha blamed South Africa’s humiliation in Angola on
Vorster’s informal foreign policy procedures, which allowed South Africa to stumble into a
conflict unprepared. Upon assuming the office of prime minister, Botha swiftly moved to
centralize and reorganize South Africa’s foreign policy institutions. In addition to establishing a
more competent policymaking process, Botha also needed to assert control over BOSS and other
bureaucratic bodies that may have remained loyal to Vorster.58
The most notable institutional change enacted by Botha was the creation of the State
Security Council (SSC). As part of Botha’s administrative reforms, the SSC became the primary
organization for producing foreign policy. SSC meetings were chaired by Botha and included
senior cabinet members, the directors-general of foreign affairs and justice, the chief of the SAP,
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and the chief of the SADF. The SSC met every Monday to discuss and produce policies on
matters relating to South African security, and the committee made decisions by consensus. Most
often, this consensus was led by the prime minister—or, after South Africa transitioned from a
parliamentary to a presidential system in 1984, the president—which gave Botha a significant
degree of influence over security-related policy issues.59 Because South Africa’s doctrine of total
onslaught and total strategy meant that almost any political issue could be treated as a security
matter, Botha was able to directly shape nearly all aspects of South African politics. Through the
SSC, Botha achieved immediate control over all significant domestic and foreign policy
decisions.
Importantly, these institutional changes altered the means through which policymakers
made nuclear decisions. Nuclear weapons quickly became an important part of South Africa’s
total national strategy, and within one month of assuming office, Botha developed a committee
to transform the AEB’s peaceful nuclear devices into operational nuclear weapons.60 Under
Vorster, South African policymakers failed to articulate a clear nuclear strategy. In contrast,
Botha quickly sought to formalize a nuclear doctrine and, shortly after becoming prime minister
in 1978, Botha created the Witvlei Committee to formally develop nuclear weapons policy.61
The Witvlei Committee represented the highest echelon of political power in South Africa,
including: the prime minister; ministers of defense, foreign affairs, minerals and energy, and
finance; director of ARMSCOR; minister of foreign affairs; AEB director; and chief of the

59

For overviews of the State Security Council and its role in South African foreign policy, see: Kenneth W. Grundy,
The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington, I.N.: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 49-57;
Rotberg, “Decision Making and the Military in South Africa,” pp. 18-26.
60
von Wielligh and von Wielligh-steyn, The Bomb, p. 165.
61
As an example of the importance of the Witvlei Committee for South Africa’s nuclear doctrine, this committee
produced the memorandum detailing South Africa’s catalytic nuclear posture. See “KRAMAT Capability: Current
Status and Further Development,” declassified document, September 2, 1987. An English version of this
memorandum is available in von-Wielligh and von-Wielligh-Steyn, The Bomb, pp. 487-496.

154
SADF.62 By creating this committee, Botha was able to consolidate his authority over all aspects
of South Africa’s nuclear program, including the production, procurement, financing, and
employment of nuclear weapons.
The core principle driving weaponization under P. W. Botha was that nuclear weapons
were purely political devices that would not be used militarily.63 Botha viewed nuclear weapons
as tools for diplomatic leverage to promote regime survival, rather than military assets for
achieving battlefield success. Botha’s oversight of the Witvlei Committee allowed him to
centralize and manage the debate on how to operationalize South Africa’s arsenal and guarantee
that nuclear weapons only served narrow political purposes. Indeed, Botha rejected a range of
“exotic” recommendations by the working group that envisioned the military application of
South Africa’s nuclear forces, and over time Botha helped to formalize South Africa’s catalytic
nuclear posture.64 Nuclear weapons would only be used as an opaque deterrent for supporting the
political regime, and civilian elites would retain highly centralized control of nuclear assets to
guarantee this.
South Africa’s political elites viewed preventing the military application of South
Africa’s nuclear arsenal as a necessary condition for regime survival. An internal memorandum
by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) expected that “the immediate international response
to the use of a nuclear device would overwhelm and remove/destroy that component of South
African society/government, both the political and military, that had initiated the use of the
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device.”65 The military use of nuclear weapons, therefore, was a self-defeating option that
amounted to “a no-win assurance of self-destruction for those whom the nuclear device [was]
designed to ultimately protect.”66 This analysis suggests that apartheid leaders thought of regime
survival separately from state security, and of the two considerations, regime survival took
precedence. Strong assertive control guaranteed that the nuclear weapons designed to strengthen
the ruling regime would not contribute to the detriment of the regime.
Ultimately, the end of the Cold War and impending collapse of the apartheid system
combined to produce a structural shock to South Africa’s political system that forced ruling elites
to reconsider the political utility of nuclear weapons.67 With the end of the Cold War, Cuban and
Soviet support for Angola’s war with South Africa dwindled. This ameliorated South Africa’s
threat environment and drastically reduced the likelihood that the U.S. would intervene on South
Africa’s behalf in future disputes.68
The end of the Cold War, however, cannot alone explain South Africa’s decision to
denuclearize. In response to the sudden removal of the Soviet threat, states such as Israel, France,
and Pakistan simply reevaluated their nuclear strategies, while only South Africa dismantled its
nuclear arsenal.69 An important determinant of the decision to dismantle was the recognition by
political elites in the early-1990s that the apartheid government would soon collapse. Nuclear
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weapons promoted regime survivability but could not suppress domestic unrest. Under pressure
from the U.S.—who feared nuclear weapons falling into the hands of an ANC regime with
connections to communist governments and extremist organizations—South Africa’s political
elites chose to decommission the arsenal, rather than relinquish command of nuclear weapons to
its domestic rivals.70 The end of the apartheid regime also meant the end of South Africa’s
nuclear weapons program.

Military Organizational Autonomy
South Africa’s adoption of assertive command and control systems demonstrates the
importance of sequencing the explanatory factors within my theoretical framework. South
Africa’s military forces traditionally enjoyed high levels of organizational autonomy and, in
many aspects of foreign and domestic politics, exerted strong political influence. In the nuclear
realm, however, civilian elites intentionally excluded the military from decision-making units.
Nuclear weapons would not serve military purposes under any conditions and civilian elites
designed command and control systems to guarantee that nuclear weapons would only be used in
support of the regime’s survival. As a result, military forces were unable to advance their
preference for more delegative control measures within South Africa’s command and control
arrangements.
Civilians maintained dominance over strategic and operational decisions for the duration
of South Africa’s nuclear program, which allowed the civilian regime to leverage the political
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dimensions of nuclear weapons in support of regime survivability and guarantee political control
of nuclear forces. South Africa’s military services viewed nuclear weapons as a threat to budgets
for conventional operations and ill-suited for military purposes, but a lack of political influence
in doctrinal decision-making prevented military actors from shaping command and control
decisions. Throughout the nuclear program, civilian authorities purposefully excluded military
influence to guarantee the regime’s control over nuclear weapons, and rather than relinquish
control of nuclear forces to domestic opponents, elected to dismantle the nuclear program with
the impending collapse of the apartheid regime.
South Africa’s nuclear program operated almost exclusively under civilian control
throughout its formative period. During these early stages of proliferation, only a select group of
civilian leaders and scientists were aware of nuclear operations, and this pattern of civilian
exclusion of the military persisted at length.71 Because the program operated under secretive and
peaceful auspices for decades before the decision to develop a nuclear arsenal, a narrow group of
decision-makers were responsible for the creation of South Africa’s nuclear doctrine. The AEB
especially enjoyed dominance in internal debates regarding nuclear affairs and had direct access
to the South African prime minister, which allowed South African scientists to develop the
nuclear weapons program without significant external interference.72
Military forces, in contrast, were completely excluded from nuclear matters until Prime
Minister Vorster’s decision to test a nuclear device at Vastrap Air Force Base, and were only
then approached by political leaders to assist by providing a site for the AEB to conduct a
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nuclear test.73 The degree of secrecy and executive civilian authority over the program was so
extreme that South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha only learned about the nuclear
program after meeting with U.S. Ambassador William Bowdler in 1977. Prior to this meeting,
Soviet satellites had detected South Africa’s preparations for an underground test at the Vastrap
location and passed intelligence to the U.S. with hopes that the Americans could dissuade South
Africa from pursuing nuclear weapons.74 Bowdler expressed direct concern over South Africa’s
nuclear intentions, and presented Botha with satellite photographs of the Vastrap test site.75
Although he had no prior knowledge of the nuclear program, Botha quickly recognized the
purpose of the Vastrap site and realized that South Africa was planning to test a nuclear device.76
Despite Botha’s senior position, he only learned of South Africa’s nuclear program through
Soviet and U.S. intelligence. Representatives from the military itself were equally unaware of the
nuclear project, and only the Chief of the SADF would later become involved in the formal chain
of command.77 Instead, a narrow group of civilian elites held sway over nuclear decisions in
South Africa and overwhelmingly excluded the military and defense establishment from the
decision-making unit.
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As peaceful nuclear research gave way to weaponization efforts, civilian control of the
nuclear program tightened. In 1979, Botha transferred control of nuclear research from the AEB
to ARMSCOR.78 Upon assuming control of nuclear research, ARMSCOR’s political mandate
was very broad: elites directed the agency aimed to build a deterrent using nuclear weapons, but
left the tactical-level details unspecified.79 Although ARMSCOR brought in members of other
organizations to assist with the production of nuclear weapons, the military’s sole representative
in the process was an operator from the SADF to provide details of technical requirements for
military use.80 Additionally, SADF representatives were only consulted for guidance on user
requirement specifications, such as the necessary size and delivery platforms to make nuclear
weapons viable.81 All strategic and operational planning occurred under the direction of civilian
authorities. During these critical moments of nuclear policy formulation, South Africa’s military
remained absent; instead, civilians and scientists controlled the development of nuclear doctrine
and the trajectory of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program.
The Witvlei Committee established the SADF’s first institutional role in nuclear
decision-making. The inclusion of a military representative in the Witvlei Committee reflected
the broader trend of militarization in South African politics.82 The South African government’s
emphasis on total onslaught and total national strategy required a strong and capable
organization for policy implementation, and P. W. Botha’s tenure as minister of defense led him
to rely on the SADF as a political tool for addressing domestic and international threats.
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Furthermore, Botha worked closely with and trusted General Magnus Malan, who was serving as
chief of the SADF when Botha created the Witvlei Committee.83
Nevertheless, two factors mitigated the ability of SADF leaders to influence nuclear
decisions. First, internal secrecy remained a trademark of South Africa’s nuclear program, even
after the development of the Witvlei Committee, several cabinet members and military officials
remained unaware of the nuclear program, including influential officers such as General Jannie
Geldenhuys, the army chief of staff and later SADF chief.84 Second, the military’s representative
in the committee was not responsible for creating policy, but rather for implementing the
committee’s decisions.85 Strategic decisions regarding South Africa’s nuclear program were
made by Botha and a narrow group of civilian elites—such as the ARMSCOR working group
that clarified South Africa’s three-stage nuclear strategy—and military leaders were narrowly
responsible for ensuring that the military could perform political mandates.
South Africa’s military services viewed the utility of nuclear weapons differently from
civilian leaders,86 but the military’s exclusion from nuclear decision-making prevented military
actors from advancing their preferences and civilian interests prevailed.87 Military leaders
initially opposed the adoption of nuclear weapons due to fears that funding for the nuclear
program would reduce conventional defense spending and because nuclear weapons served no
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operational combat purpose.88 General Constand Viljoen, chief of the SADF from 1980-1985,
clearly articulated this position, stating: “you don’t win a revolutionary war with a nuclear
bomb…let’s rather buy tanks or guns.”89 Given threats to SADF budgets and the lack of an
offensive military purpose, several of South Africa’s senior military officials opposed the nuclear
program, albeit without success.
To allay the military’s concerns, South Africa’s political elites promised continued
funding for conventional operations and technical upgrades, ultimately persuading the armed
services to facilitate nuclear operations by providing facilities and security.90 However, facing a
border war with Angola that rapidly escalated in the mid-1980s, South Africa’s military sought
additional resources for conventional combat operations and pushed for changes in nuclear
doctrine.91 Operationally, the military questioned the deterrent credibility of South Africa’s
three-tier strategy and advocated for a battlefield nuclear capability to strengthen deterrence
against a conventional assault on South African territory.92 Specifically, SADF leaders requested
a long-range ballistic missile capability and miniaturized nuclear warheads capable of fitting on
these missiles to serve offensive military purposes.93 Furthermore, whereas political guidance
earlier mandated the production of seven gun-type nuclear warheads,94 SADF requests called for
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fourteen gun-type warheads and called for increased efforts to develop plutonium-based
implosion-type nuclear warheads.95
President P. W. Botha, however, rejected these proposals to develop advanced nuclear
weapon designs due to budgetary constraints and the desire to maintain a purely deterrent
capability.96 Although South Africa’s military preferred a more offensive nuclear doctrine that
would more closely integrate nuclear weapons with conventional doctrine and increase SADF
autonomy over nuclear operations, civilian elites controlled doctrinal debates and guaranteed that
the nuclear arsenal would only be used for deterrent purposes.

Evaluating the Explanations
The empirical record from South Africa’s nuclear history strongly supports the
predictions made by my theoretical framework. In the absence of a conventionally superior
adversary, South Africa’s command and control systems were determined by domestic level
factors. Specifically, the presence of a severe domestic threat to the ruling political regime led
apartheid leaders to tightly centralize control over nuclear management operations to guarantee
that nuclear weapons narrowly served the purpose of supporting regime survival. These patterns
of assertive control emerged despite the South African military historically enjoying high levels
of organizational autonomy, further demonstrating the primacy of domestic threats to the
political regime for shaping nuclear command and control decisions.
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How do the alternative explanations fare against the evidence from South Africa? If the
civil-military stability hypothesis is correct, then greater stability should cause civilians to trust
military actors and adopt more delegative patterns of command and control. South Africa
provides a relatively easy test of this argument, as political elites not only trusted the military,
but also depended on the military for political survival during the tenure of P. W. Botha.
Therefore, the civil-military stability explanation would expect apartheid leaders to delegate at
least some degree of command and control authority to the SADF. Empirically, however,
precisely the opposite relationship occurs. Despite the trust and strong ties between civilian and
military elites—an amicable relationship largely supported by the common goal of maintaining
minority white rule—South Africa’s political leaders maintained highly assertive patterns of
command and control for the duration of the program. Indeed, civilians explicitly rejected the
SADF’s requests for offensive capabilities that would require ceding authority to peripheral
military commanders. These observations call into question the explanatory leveraged offered by
the civil-military stability argument. Instead, evidence from South Africa suggests that civilian
and military groups competed for influence over command and control systems, and because
civilians dominated these debates, command and control systems were designed to represent the
ruling elite’s interest of protecting the political regime.
If the arsenal vulnerability hypothesis is correct, then the presence of a superior nuclear
adversary or South African vulnerabilities should produce more delegative command and control
frameworks. South Africa provides mixed results for this hypothesis. On the one hand, the
arsenal vulnerability hypothesis correctly predicts that, in the absence of an immediate and
overwhelming nuclear adversary, South Africa would not adopt delegative command and control
frameworks. On the other hand, South African leaders were nevertheless attentive to the Soviet
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Union’s nuclear capabilities. Interviews with apartheid-era officials suggest that nuclear threats
shaped South Africa’s strategic nuclear decisions, rather than operational outcomes. For instance,
multiple interviewees referred to the use of nuclear weapons against Soviet-supported troops as
“suicide,” which led to the creation of South Africa’s catalytic nuclear posture.97 To the extent
that Soviet nuclear forces shaped South African nuclear policy, the effects were primarily
strategic. Furthermore, although the arsenal vulnerability hypothesis explains why South Africa
would not adopt delegative patterns of command and control, it does not offer a direct
explanation for why South Africa would adopt highly assertive control arrangements. The benign
nuclear threat environment facing South Africa therefore offers a partial explanation for South
Africa’s command and control decisions but requires augmentation to explain why civilian elites
so tightly managed nuclear operations for the duration of South Africa’s nuclear program.
If the strategic rationale argument is correct, then South Africa’s catalytic nuclear posture
and reliance upon the U.S. as a third-party nuclear patron should explain assertive command and
control arrangements. The South African case appears to provide support for this position. As the
strategic rationale hypothesis predicts, apartheid leaders centralized control over nuclear forces
and refrained from integrating nuclear weapons into military doctrine.98 The interview and
archival data presented in this chapter, however, demonstrate that South Africa’s command and
control decisions were primarily driven by a concern for regime survival, rather than a byproduct
of trusting in the U.S. to intervene on South Africa’s behalf during a crisis. Indeed, fear for the
survival of the apartheid political regime provides an explanation for both South Africa’s
strategic nuclear doctrine and command and control systems, suggesting that nuclear strategy
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and operations were largely determined by similar factors. Rather than serving as competing
explanations, therefore, my theory and the strategic rationale argument explain different nuclear
behaviors that are largely produced by the same causal factors. Although South Africa’s catalytic
posture correlates with the observed assertive control measures, the availability of the U.S. as a
nuclear guarantor did not clearly shape nuclear management decisions. Instead, my theoretical
framework is necessary to directly connect domestic threats to the political regime to South
Africa’s highly assertive command and control outcomes.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This dissertation provides conceptual and theoretical frameworks for understanding and
explaining command and control systems in regional nuclear powers. In doing so, this
dissertation provides three significant contributions to the broader literature on nuclear strategy
and operations. First, I develop a new conceptual typology of nuclear command and control
systems. Traditional conceptualizations of command and control measure whether states assert
political control over nuclear forces or delegate nuclear use capability to lower-level
commanders. In practice, however, military operators are ultimately required to deliver nuclear
weapons and all states must delegate control at some point to conduct a nuclear attack. I argue
that the appropriate question when classifying command and control systems is therefore not
whether a state delegates nuclear use capability to lower levels of command, but rather when
such delegation occurs.
To account for the temporal aspects of nuclear command and control decisions, I identify
three ideal types of command and control: first, delegative command and control systems that
delegate nuclear use capability during peacetime; second, conditional command and control
systems that centralize political oversight of nuclear forces during peacetime but rapidly delegate
nuclear use capability early in a crisis; and third, assertive command and control systems that
maintain centralized control over nuclear weapons until late in a crisis. I use three institutional
indicators to classify command and control arrangements within this framework: administrative
control, physical control, and technical control. These institutional aspects provide observable
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indicators that allow me to descriptively classify a state’s nuclear command and control systems
and account for the timing of nuclear delegation.
Second, I provide a theoretical framework to explain variation in command and control
arrangements across regional nuclear powers. My theory incorporates three variables: first, the
presence of a conventionally superior adversary; second, the severity of domestic threats to the
political regime; and third, the level of military organizational autonomy. I sequentially order
these variables into a decision-theoretic framework to specify the conditions under which each
factor influences command and control outcomes.
The structure of my theoretical framework reveals three findings that advance the
existing literature on command and control in regional nuclear powers. First, command and
control systems in these states are specifically responsive to conventional threats. Although most
regional nuclear powers face threats from nuclear adversaries, the presence of a conventionally
superior adversary provides the strongest incentives for a state to delegate nuclear use capability
during peacetime or early in a crisis and lower the threshold to nuclear use. Second, political
leaders in regional nuclear powers are also responsive to domestic threats to the political regime.
My theoretical framework shows that political elites simultaneously evaluate their international
and domestic threat environments and develop command and control systems that address the
interactive combination of conventional security threats and domestic instability. Third, military
organizational autonomy proves to be the decisive explanatory factor in states with a benign
external and internal threat environment. Although a well-established body of literature notes the
effects of military organizational interests and biases on military doctrine, my theory
demonstrates that military organizations are only able to align nuclear doctrine in accordance
with their interests and biases in states that are conventionally secure and domestically stable.
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Third, I evaluate my argument and a series of alternative explanations with a combination
of historical and primary source material. Specifically, I draw upon archival and original
interview data with political and military elites from India, Pakistan, and apartheid-era South
Africa to descriptively categorize and theoretically explain command and control systems in
these states. By doing so, I update the literature on command and control—which is primarily
built upon deductive extensions and generalizations from the U.S. experience—with the
necessary data to empirically adjudicate between competing explanations of command and
control in regional nuclear powers.

Theoretical Implications
In addition to these specific contributions to the nuclear command and control research
program, my dissertation speaks to three broader debates in the literature on nuclear strategy and
proliferation. First, my dissertation demonstrates the theoretical and practical importance of
continued research on nuclear operations. Although nuclear proliferation and strategy remain
important topics of academic study and policy relevance, the operational disposition of a state’s
nuclear forces yields significant implications for nuclear strategy and merits explicit attention.
For instance, my dissertation demonstrates that some countries—such as India for many years
after developing an operational nuclear capability and South Africa for the duration of its tenure
as a nuclear weapons state—accept vulnerabilities to their command and control infrastructure in
order to guarantee political control over nuclear decisions. This observation undermines the
widespread assumption that states can easily acquire and maintain a secure second-strike
capability and challenges a key underpinning of major theories on nuclear strategy.
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Second, my dissertation illustrates the value of focusing on decision-making in regional
nuclear powers. The Cold War experiences of the U.S. and Soviet Union provide foundational
lessons for the study of nuclear weapons, but the majority of nuclear powers differ in significant
ways that shape nuclear behavior. For example, none of the regional nuclear powers have
pursued a maximalist nuclear posture that requires thousands of nuclear warheads and strains
command and control systems by necessitating the involvement of more actors. Furthermore,
regional powers do not employ strategies of extended deterrence that severely complicate
command and control decisions. Regional nuclear powers are also less concerned about a sudden
massive nuclear exchange that requires higher peacetime alert levels and preplanned procedures
for rapid nuclear use. Instead, my dissertation shows that rather than nuclear threats,
conventional threats provide more leverage for explaining command and control outcomes in
regional nuclear powers. My focus on regional nuclear powers therefore provides a more
comparable set of cases for projecting how new and emerging nuclear powers will manage their
nuclear arsenals. Answering this question is inherently important, as any future proliferators will
be regional nuclear powers.1
Third, my dissertation informs the longstanding debate between nuclear optimists and
pessimists by identifying several potential avenues through which conventional crises may
escalate across the nuclear threshold. Each command and control framework that I identify
produces different challenges for escalation management. Delegative control persistently faces
the risk of accidental and unauthorized use due to the peacetime delegation of nuclear use
capability to lower-level operators. Delegative control also dramatically lowers the threshold to
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nuclear use when applied to land-based platforms that aim to deter conventional attacks.
Conditional control provides relatively safe and secure arsenal management practices during
peacetime, but the emphasis on early-crisis delegation opens avenues for undesired escalation.
Once a state with conditional control systems removes barriers to nuclear use, the custodians of
nuclear weapons become capable of unauthorized use. Furthermore, the rapid delegation of
nuclear use capability during a crisis may signal malign intent to an adversary and provoke
counterforce operations that initiate an escalatory spiral. Assertive control provides robust
safeguards against accidental and unauthorized use and maintains a high threshold for nuclear
use. Assertive control provides for greater crisis stability, but if a state’s arsenal or command
systems are vulnerable to preemption or decapitation, the slower mobilization time inherent to
assertive control systems may increase the appeal of a decisive first-strike for an adversary.

Empirical Results
The three cases presented in this dissertation provide empirical support for my theory. By
selecting one case from each decisive node in the decision tree, I demonstrate the importance of
sequentially ordering the three key variables in my theoretical framework. Specifically, I find
support for my theory in the cases of India, Pakistan, and apartheid-era South Africa.
First, India demonstrates the decisive role played by civil-military relations in states with
a benign conventional security environment and domestic political security. Despite possessing a
complex security environment that includes nuclear, conventional, and subconventional threats,
India’s conventional military security and domestic stability allow political leaders to centralize
their authority over nuclear weapons. Given these conditions, the level of military organizational
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autonomy becomes the dominant explanatory factor for assertive control in India. Specifically,
India’s historically low levels of military organizational autonomy translate into the nuclear
realm and cause civilian elites to adopt highly assertive command and control systems. I support
these arguments with extensive interviews with political and military elites in India.
Second, Pakistan shows the interactive effects of external security threats and domestic
political instability on command and control outcomes. Pakistan has experienced a severe
relative conventional military inferiority with respect to India throughout its nuclear history.
Additionally, a prolonged history of military coups, tumultuous transitions to civilian power, and
widely prevalent domestic terrorism and religious extremism generate high levels of domestic
instability. Pakistan attempts to resolve these competing pressures by employing conditional
command and control systems. These command and control arrangements entail centralized
control during peacetime to strengthen arsenal safety and security, while also enabling the rapid
delegation of nuclear use capability early in a crisis to deter India’s conventional military forces.
In addition to demonstrating the theoretical utility of my argument, Pakistan also illustrates the
value of my descriptive framework. My conceptual category of conditional control allows
analysts to reconcile Pakistan’s seemingly contradictory combination of assertive and delegative
control features by emphasizing Pakistan’s reliance on early delegation when transitioning from
peacetime to crisis arsenal management practices. I draw upon elite interviews and public
statements by senior Pakistani officials to substantiate my claims regarding Pakistan’s command
and control decision-making.
Third, South Africa’s nuclear history provides support for multiple implications of my
theoretical framework. In the absence of a conventionally superior adversary, South Africa’s
command and control decisions were largely determined by the presence of domestic threats to
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the apartheid regime. South Africa’s domestic instability led apartheid leaders to adopt highly
assertive command and control systems that guaranteed centralized control over nuclear doctrine
and operations to guarantee that nuclear weapons exclusively supported regime survival. The
South African case provides further support for the decision-theoretic structure of my theory, as
concerns for domestic political survival superseded the organizational interests of the politically
influential South African Defense Force. I support these arguments using archival and original
interview data with apartheid-era South African political elites.

Alternative Explanations
I evaluate three alternative explanations for command and control outcomes in this
dissertation. Specifically, I evaluate the explanatory power of civil-military stability, arsenal
vulnerability, and strategic rationale on command and control systems in regional nuclear
powers. The evidence presented in my dissertation suggests that my theoretical framework offers
a more consistent and compelling theory of command and control in regional nuclear powers
than the alternative explanations.
First, the civil-military stability hypothesis is empirically unpersuasive. The civil-military
stability hypothesis expects stable civil-military relations to produce more delegative command
and control systems, while unstable civil-military relations should result in more assertive
command and control arrangements. This hypothesis inaccurately predicts all three cases in this
dissertation. Despite historically stable civil-military relations in India and apartheid-era South
Africa, both cases result in highly assertive command and control arrangements. Furthermore,
despite Pakistan’s prolonged history of civil-military instability, Pakistan employs conditional
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control arrangements that delegate nuclear use capability to peripheral military commanders
early in a crisis. My theory concurs that civil-military relations influence command and control
outcomes, but the empirical challenges to the civil-military hypothesis show that the argument
fails to specify the proper causal mechanism and does not identify the conditions under which
civil-military relations become causally important.
Second, the arsenal vulnerability hypothesis provides a weak explanation for command
and control in the cases discussed in this dissertation. This hypothesis expects states with
vulnerable nuclear arsenals or command systems to adopt more delegative command and control
arrangements to bolster arsenal reliability. The arsenal vulnerability hypothesis correctly
correlates with South Africa’s assertive command and control systems. For India and Pakistan,
however, this argument fails to convince. Despite significant command vulnerability during the
initial stages of India’s nuclear weapons capability, India maintained highly assertive control
procedures. India’s adherence to assertive control has also persisted despite China’s nuclear
modernization efforts that increase China’s offensive nuclear capabilities. Similarly, Pakistan
continues to employ conditional command and control systems even though India’s offensive
nuclear capabilities continue to grow. Combined, these cases suggest that arsenal vulnerability
was more important to the Cold War superpowers than it is to regional nuclear powers. Instead,
my theory’s emphasis on conventional military threats better captures the specific external
threats that influence command and control decisions in regional nuclear powers.
Third, the strategic rationale hypothesis provides the most compelling alternative
explanation to my theoretical framework. The strategic rationale hypothesis expects states with
early-use nuclear doctrines to favor more delegative control, while late-use doctrines should
generate more assertive control. This hypothesis correctly predicts assertive control in India and
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South Africa. Indeed, the evidence presented in the chapter on South Africa demonstrates that
the reluctance of apartheid leaders to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances contributed
to the country’s assertive command and control frameworks. Two caveats, however, deserve
attention. First, despite an explicitly first-use nuclear doctrine, Pakistan employs conditional
control frameworks. The strategic rationale hypothesis is unable to explain why Pakistan
emphasizes centralized launch authority during peacetime. My theory provides a more complete
explanation of command and control in Pakistan that demonstrates how domestic instability
interacts with its conventional threat environment to produce conditional command and control
systems. Second, the factors that I argue explain command and control systems also influence a
state’s nuclear strategy. As a result, my theory and the strategic rationale hypothesis are likely
complementary, rather than in competition with one another.

Empirical Extensions
I briefly analyze the command and control arrangements in each of the remaining
regional nuclear powers to evaluate the generalizability of my findings. This analysis includes
evidence from the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, and North Korea. Although a full
study of these cases is beyond the scope of this project, I evaluate whether these states employ
the types of command and control systems predicted by my theory and whether the expected
explanatory variables appear to be influential in these cases. As I demonstrate below, my theory
appears to successfully predict seven of eight cases for a success rate of approximately 88%.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the performance of my theoretical framework in predicting command and
control systems in regional nuclear powers.

175
Figure 6.1. Theory of Nuclear Command and Control: Empirical Results2

United Kingdom
My theory predicts that the United Kingdom should employ delegative command and
control systems from 1952 to present. The U.K. did not face a conventionally superior adversary
during this time. Although the U.K. opposed the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the nature of
the Soviet threat was not such that the U.K. feared an immediate conventional attack on its

2

An asterisk (*) indicates insufficient data exist to evaluate the theoretical prediction. A caret symbol (^) denotes
cases that are incorrectly predicted by the theoretical framework. The theory accurately predicts seven of eight cases
for a success rate of approximately 88%. This calculation omits North Korea due to data limitations.
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homeland. Indeed, Soviet forces would have to defeat forward-deployed NATO forces, advance
through the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, Belgium, or France, risk nuclear
escalation in doing so, and cross the English Channel to directly attack the U.K. with
conventional forces. The U.K. has also been domestically stable throughout this period. My
argument therefore predicts that the U.K.’s high levels of military organizational autonomy
should produce delegative control throughout the U.K.’s nuclear weapons history.
Preliminary evidence suggests that my theory accurately predicts the U.K.’s delegative
command and control arrangements.3 The U.K. depended upon air-delivery for its nuclear
arsenal from 1952-1967. During this time, the Royal Air Force (RAF) “became solely
responsible for the custody and storage of all atomic bombs after production, including
responsibility for the fissile cores and all component parts.”4 The military planned to have
nuclear bombers airborne within one hour of receiving an order to mobilize. Although
operational protocol required pilots to withhold nuclear weapons unless they explicitly received a
“go code” from political leadership, the only barrier to nuclear use under such conditions was a
reliance on the military’s organizational professionalism.5 No technical or physical barriers to
use inhibited the RAF from using nuclear forces, even during peacetime. Indeed, Stephen
Twigge and Len Scott observe that “the government implicitly granted de facto control of

This section only discusses the U.K.’s national command and control systems. The U.K.’s nuclear doctrine was
also extensively integrated into NATO command during the Cold War. I focus narrowly on the U.K.’s national
command and control systems to maintain comparability between cases and emphasize the internal foreign policy
decision-making of the country. On the U.K.’s nuclear roles in NATO, see: Shaun R. Gregory, Nuclear Command
and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response (New York, N.Y.: St.
Martin’s, 1996), pp. 103-129; Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces
for Europe, 1949-2000 (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s, 1997), pp. 63-92.
4
Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, “Learning to Love the Bomb: The Command and Control of British Nuclear
Forces, 1953-1964,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1999), p. 33.
5
Ibid., pp. 38-39.
3
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nuclear weapons to the military” and “senior military officers possessed the ability to order a
nuclear strike even without receiving direct instructions from the Prime Minister.”6
Since 1969, the U.K.’s nuclear weapons have all been deployed on nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).7 The U.K. conducts continuous at-sea deterrent patrols,
keeping at least one submarine deployed and full-armed with nuclear weapons at all times.8 The
prime minister possesses the sole authority to authorize nuclear use. In practice, however, the
U.K.’s SSBN crews are technically capable of launching nuclear weapons without higher
approval. The “letter of last resort” protocol illustrates the military’s autonomy in this sphere. As
Niklas Granholm and John Rydqvist note, if an SSBN is unable to communicate with political
leadership, the SSBN commander has four options:
1. Put yourself under US command.
2. Make your way to Australia, if it still exists.
3. Take out Moscow, or the capital of whichever country has initiated the attack.
4. Use your own judgment.9
These four options illustrate a high degree of military control over nuclear operations and
delegative command and control arrangements. Although political leaders expect SSBNs to
await explicit nuclear use authorization for as long as possible, the ability to use nuclear weapons
is delegated to military commanders during peacetime. The U.K. case therefore aligns with the
predicted outcome of my theoretical framework, adopting delegative command and control
systems from 1952 to present.

6

Ibid., p. 45.
Lawrence Freedman, “British Nuclear Targeting,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1985), p. 89.
8
Niklas Granholm and John Rydqvist, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe: British and French Deterrence Forces,” FOIR--4587--SE (April 2018), p. 18. For more on the U.K.’s current SSBN program, see Nicola Butler and Mark
Bromley, “Secrecy and Dependence: The UK Trident System in the 21st Century,” BASIC Research Report,
Number 2001.3 (November 2001).
9
Granholm and Rydqvist, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” p. 26.
7
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France
My theory predicts that France should adopt delegative command and control systems
from 1960 to present, but for two distinct reasons. From 1960-1991, France’s immediate
vulnerability to a conventional attack by the Soviet Union should cause leaders to delegate
nuclear use capability to lower the threshold to nuclear use and deter a conventional Soviet
onslaught. After the Cold War ended in 1991, my argument expects the French military’s high
levels of organizational autonomy to perpetuate delegative nuclear command and control
arrangements.10
My argument appears to accurately predict France’s command and control arrangements.
During the Cold War, France placed its tactical nuclear weapons directly under military
control.11 Specifically, the First Army controlled France’s land-based Pluton forces and the Force
Aérienne Tactique controlled France’s air-launched tactical weapons.12 French political leaders
envisioned tactical nuclear weapons as serving a “prestrategic” function, in which the use of
tactical nuclear weapons in response to an oncoming conventional attack would serve as a final
warning before the conflict escalated to a nuclear exchange.13 Although all nuclear forces were
nominally under political control, the military’s operational control of nuclear weapons indicates
that lower-level commanders could use nuclear weapons without explicit political approval.14

On the interaction of civil-military relations and nuclear doctrine in France, see Samy Cohen, “France, CivilMilitary Relations, and Nuclear Weapons,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Autumn 1994), pp. 153-179.
11
Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO, p. 137.
12
Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, pp. 159-160.
13
On the prestrategic function of France’s nuclear weapons, see Shaun Gregory, “French Nuclear Command and
Control,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1990), pp. 57-61.
14
Robbin F. Laird, “French Nuclear Forces in the 1980s and 1990s,” Professional Paper 400 (Alexandria, V.A.:
Center for Naval Analyses, August 1983), pp. 22-23.
10
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France’s efforts to lower the nuclear threshold by delegating nuclear use capability during
peacetime corresponds to the causal logic proposed by my theoretical framework.
Shortly after the end of the Cold War, France withdrew its forward-deployed Pluton
forces from the Plateau d’Albion and canceled the Hadès program, which was intended to
replace the aging Pluton forces.15 France now relies upon a combination of M51 sea-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (ASMP) air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs) for its nuclear deterrent.16 The M51 SLBM family serves as the backbone of France’s
strategic deterrent and, like the U.S. and U.K., France conducts continuous at-sea deterrent
patrols with its SSBN fleet. The ASMP-A variant currently deploys a TN81 nuclear warhead,
which has dial-variable yields and allows the ASMP-A to serve strategic and tactical roles in
France’s nuclear doctrine.17
Although France withdrew its land-based tactical nuclear weapons after the Cold War,
French nuclear behavior since 1991 offers two important pieces of support for my theory. First,
France maintains delegative control over its SSBNs. To guarantee the reliability of France’s
secure-second strike capabilities, SSBN commanders conducting deterrent patrols appear capable
of conducting a nuclear strike without political approval.18 Indeed, France’s military services still
possess operational custody of fully mated and assembled nuclear weapons.19 Second, France’s
removal of its land-based tactical nuclear weapons and greater reliance on SSBNs for strategic
deterrence illustrate the changing logics of delegative control in my theory. Whereas the Pluton
David S. Yost, “France’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Autumn 2005), p. 122.
Granholm and Rydqvist, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” pp. 50-56.
17
Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 170.
18
Gregory, “French Nuclear Command and Control,” p. 59.
19
Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 171. For a contrary perspective that France employs more
assertive command and control systems, see Bruno Tertrais, “France,” in Hans Born, Bates Gill, and Heiner Hänggi,
eds., Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control and Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons (New York, N.Y.:
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 103-127.
15
16

180
forces allowed France to lower the nuclear threshold and more credibly deter conventional
aggression during the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the need for France
to manipulate the nuclear threshold. Command and control systems remained delegative after the
Cold War, but rather than for reasons of deterring conventional attacks, France’s high levels of
military organizational autonomy facilitate the delegation of nuclear use capability to military
commanders during peacetime. This change between rationales for delegative control
corresponds to the predictions of my theoretical framework.

China
My theoretical framework predicts that China should adopt assertive command and
control arrangements from when China developed nuclear weapons in 1964 to present. Although
China experienced a pair of notable border conflicts with India in 1962 and the Soviet Union
during 1969, neither adversary posed an existential threat to China’s sovereignty with
conventional military forces.20 The Soviet Union posed the greatest conventional threat to
Chinese security, but China’s quantitative in-theater military advantage—often in excess of a 2:1
numerical advantage—and the Soviet Union’s underdeveloped logistical chains precluded
massive offensive conventional operations into Chinese territory.21 China also experienced a
degree of domestic turmoil in the 1960s and 1970s during the Cultural Revolution, but this
domestic unrest did not pose a direct threat to the ruling political regime and resulted in the

On the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute, see Klaus H. Pringsheim, “China, India, and their Himalayan Border
(1961-1963),” Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 10 (October 1963), pp. 474-495. On the 1969 Sino-Soviet border
confrontation, see Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American
Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 2000), pp. 31-41.
21
On these points, see: M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s
Territorial Disputes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 204-208; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in
the Modern Era, pp. 140-142.
20
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consolidation of the Communist Party of China’s power under Mao Zedong.22 My theory
therefore predicts that China’s historically low levels of military organizational autonomy should
result in assertive nuclear command and control arrangements.
As predicted by my theory, China’s command and control systems have remained highly
assertive throughout the duration of the country’s nuclear weapons program. Administratively,
all nuclear operations occur under the authority of the chairman of the Central Military
Commission (CMC).23 Physically, nuclear warheads are de-mated from delivery platforms and
geographically dispersed to guarantee that lower-level military actors cannot access, deploy, or
use nuclear weapons without political approval.24 John Lewis and Xue Litai note the fail-safe
nature of China’s command and control systems, stating: “A launch will automatically be
aborted if any step violates the verification requirements, and several steps depend on the
coordinated action of at least two authorized officers.”25
China’s highly assertive command and control arrangements reflect the military’s low
levels of organizational autonomy. Although China’s party-army system somewhat blurs the
lines between civilian and military roles, civilian leaders exert significant control over all matters
of warfare.26 In the nuclear realm, the CMC directly commands nuclear operations and civilian

For an overview of the Cultural Revolution, see Frank Dikötter, The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History,
1962-1976 (New York, N.Y.: Bloomsbury, 2016).
23
Ta-chen Cheng, “China’s Nuclear Command, Control and Operations,” International Relations of the AsiaPacific, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2007), pp. 156-158; Bates Gill and Evan S. Medeiros, “China,” in Born, Gill, and Hänggi,
eds., Governing the Bomb, p. 137.
24
Mark A. Stokes, China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System, Project 2049 Institute Monograph,
March 12, 2010.
25
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford, C.A.”
Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 198-199.
26
On Chinese civil-military relations, see: Dongmin Lee, “Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Divestiture of
People’s Liberation Army Business Holdings,” Armed Forces & Society Vol. 32, No. 3 (April 2006), pp. 437-453;
Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol.
31, No. 2 (Winter 2005), pp. 227-244. On the dominance of civilian oversight in military affairs, see James C.
Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, C.A.: RAND,
2002).
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leadership—especially the president—dominates nuclear decision-making.27 In short, an initial
evaluation of the evidence suggests that my theory accurately predicts the descriptive nature and
causal origins of China’s nuclear command and control systems.

Israel
My theory predicts that Israel should have deployed delegative command and control
arrangements from weaponization in 1967 to present. Israel’s decisive military victory in the
1967 Six-Day War demonstrated the country’s military superiority over its regional adversaries.
The 1973 Yom Kippur War proved costly for Israel, but Israel nevertheless prevailed and
established a peace with Egypt in the 1978 Camp David Accords, resulting in a generally benign
conventional threat environment as Israel developed its nuclear arsenal.28 Israel’s political
regime also remained stable throughout this period. Given its conventional military security and
domestic political stability, my theory predicts that Israel’s traditionally high levels of military
organizational autonomy—with military organizations historically closely connected to political
officials—should produce delegative command and control systems.29
Details on Israel’s nuclear command and control systems are extremely limited. To the
extent that data are available, however, Israel’s command and control systems do not appear to
align with my theory’s predictions. Whereas my argument expects delegative command and

For a useful overview of centralized political control over China’s nuclear forces, see Jeffrey G. Lewis and Bruno
Tertrais, “The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States,” Occasional
Paper No. 45 (Monterey, C.A.: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 2019), pp. 19-21.
28
As Vipin Narang notes, “With Egypt neutralized and Iran and Iraq bleeding each other during the 1980s, Israeli
conventional forces faced no serious challenges.” Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, p. 191.
29
On the connection between political and military bodies, see Eva Etzioni-Halevy, “Civil-Military Relations and
Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites’ Connection in Israel,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 22, No.
3 (Spring 1996), pp. 401-417.
27
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control systems, the limited evidence on Israel’s nuclear operations suggest that political elites
employ assertive command and control measures.30 My argument expects the traditionally high
levels of organizational autonomy within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to translate into
nuclear doctrine, but historical evidence suggests that civilian leaders have systematically
excluded the military from nuclear decisions since the inception of Israel’s nuclear program.31
Avner Cohen observes that “Virtually nothing is publicly known about Israel’s nuclear command
and control structure,” but indicates that civilians maintain control and custody of nuclear
weapons and may employ permissive action links on nuclear weapons.32 If Cohen’s assessment
is correct, then further research is necessary to explain why Israel’s behavior deviates from the
expectations of my theoretical framework.

North Korea
My theory expects North Korea to employ conditional command and control
arrangements. The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea creates a potentially existential threat
to Kim Jong Un’s political regime. In addition to this severe conventional threat environment,
leaders of the Kim dynasty have historically worried about domestic threats to their continued
political rule.33 To balance these competing pressures on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, my
theory expects North Korea to adopt conditional control arrangements that allow the Kim regime

See especially Avner Cohen, “Israel,” in Born, Gill, and Hänggi, eds., Governing the Bomb, pp. 152-170.
Ibid., pp. 154-156. On the decision-making procedures in Israel, see Lewis and Tertrais, “The Finger on the
Button,” pp. 22-23.
32
Cohen, “Israel,” in Born, Gill, and Hänggi, eds., Governing the Bomb, pp. 157-158.
33
For examples of the domestic threats facing the Kim regimes over time, see: Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind,
“Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” International Security, Vol. 35,
No. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. 44-74; Scott Snyder, “North Korea’s Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems
and Implications for the Future,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 517-533.
30
31
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to centralize political oversight of nuclear operations during peacetime, while also enabling the
rapid delegation of nuclear use capability early in a crisis.
The empirical data on North Korea’s command and control arrangements are insufficient
to determine the validity of my theoretical prediction. The limited information available on North
Korea’s nuclear weapons strategy, however, offers suggestive evidence in support of my theory.
For instance, North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reported that “nuclear
weapons can be used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s
Army (KPA),” which indicates centralized management during peacetime.34 Furthermore, North
Korea’s nuclear doctrine appears to emphasize preemptive strikes.35 To make a preemptive
doctrine operationally viable, North Korea would be required to quickly delegate nuclear use
capability from political leaders to the KPA in the event of a crisis. These characteristics of
North Korean nuclear strategy and operations appear to support my theoretical framework, but
further empirical support is necessary to decisively demonstrate that North Korea adopts
conditional control arrangements for the reasons predicted by my theory.

Future Research
This dissertation provides new conceptual and theoretical frameworks for describing and
explaining command and control systems in regional nuclear powers. I employ extensive
primary source data to support my findings and conclusions. My dissertation therefore provides a

“Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” Korean Central News Agency, April 1,
2013.
35
Léonie Allard, Mathieu Duchâtel, and François Godement, “Pre-Empting Defeat: In Search of North Korea’s
Nuclear Doctrine,” Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017, p. 7. The authors of this report
indicate that North Korea intends to delegate nuclear use capability at some point but do not specify when such
delegation might occur.
34
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framework for anticipating changes in the command and control arrangements of contemporary
nuclear states and the likely command and control arrangements of future proliferators. This
framework is also valuable for identifying the conditions under which conventional crises may
escalate across the nuclear threshold.
Two further efforts are necessary to advance the nuclear command and control research
program. First, the descriptive and theoretical frameworks proposed in this dissertation should be
more fully evaluated with evidence from additional regional nuclear powers. Although my
theoretical framework appears to accurately predict command and control outcomes in most
cases, further research is necessary to evaluate whether these results obtain for the reasons
postulated by my theory or whether these correlations are incidental. Second, future research
should continue to incorporate new data into the study of nuclear command and control as these
data become available. Details regarding nuclear operations remain scarce in many contexts, but
as access to archives and affiliated personnel increases over time, existing theoretical
frameworks should be reevaluated to identify their contributions and limitations.
My dissertation contributes to a large field of questions regarding nuclear operations that
deserve serious academic inquiry. Within the study of nuclear command and control, questions
remain regarding the effects of command and control systems on crisis stability and deterrence.
Other issue areas such as the causes and consequences of nuclear platform diversification also
merit continued attention as scholars continue to identify the dimensions of a nuclear arsenal that
affect a state’s deterrent and coercive capacity.36
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For a recent example of research on nuclear platform diversification, see Erik Gartzke, Jeffrey M. Kaplow, and
Rupal N. Mehta, “The Determinants of Nuclear Force Structure,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 3
(April 2014), pp. 481-508.
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Nuclear nonproliferation has served as a cornerstone of U.S. grand strategy for decades
and should remain so in the future.37 So long as nuclear weapons remain a reality of international
politics, however, scholars should continue to systematically explore theories of nuclear
operations to promote the safe and secure management of nuclear weapons and to guarantee that
nuclear weapons are not used under any circumstances.

On the historical importance of nuclear nonproliferation in U.S. foreign policy, see: Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies
of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security, Vol. 40,
No. 1 (Summer 2015), pp. 9-46; Nicholas L. Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,”
International Organization, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Fall 2014), pp. 913-944; and Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb:
The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2018).
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APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS

AEB

Atomic Energy Board

AEC

Atomic Energy Commission (India)

AEC

Atomic Energy Corporation (South Africa)

ANC

African National Congress

ARMSCOR

Armaments Corporation of South Africa

BOSS

Bureau of State Security

BJP

Bharatiya Janata Party

C3 I

Command, control, communications, and intelligence

C4I2

Command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, and information

CCD

Combat Development Directorate

CCS

Cabinet Committee on Security

CDS

Chief of defense staff

COAS

Chief of army staff

COSC

Chiefs of Staff Committee

CPO

Causal-process observation

DAE

Department of Atomic Energy

DFA

Department of Foreign Affairs

DRDO

Defense Research and Development Organization

DSO

Data-set observation

E&R

Evaluation and Research Directorate

GDP

Gross domestic product

GLCM

Ground-launched cruise missile

HEU

Highly-enriched uranium

HRP

Human reliability program

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency
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ICBM

Intercontinental ballistic missile

IGDMP

Integrated Guided Missile Development Program

JSHQ

Joint Services Headquarters

KRL

Khan Research Laboratories

MIRV

Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle

NCA

National Command Authority (Pakistan)

NCA

Nuclear Command Authority (India)

NPT

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NSAB

National Security Advisory Board

PAEC

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

PAL

Permissive action link

PEL

Permissive enable system

PNE

Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

PRP

Personnel reliability program

RAPID

Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division

SAAF

South African Air Force

SADF

South African Defense Force

SAP

South African Police

SFC

Strategic Forces Command

SLBM

Submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLCM

Submarine-launched cruise missile

SOP

Standard operating procedure

SPD

Strategic Plans Division

SSBN

Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

SSC

State Security Council

SWAPO

Southwest African People’s Organization

TEL

Transporter erector launcher

UN

United Nations
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URENCO

Uranium Enrichment Consortium

USD

U.S. dollars

VCDS

Vice chief of defense staff
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